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I. ABSTRACT 
 
JENNIFER A HORNEY: Hurricane Evacuation Failure: The Role of Social Cohesion, Social 
Capital, and Social Control 
 
(Under the direction of Jay S Kaufman) 
 
 Existing research of evacuation behavior during hurricanes and flooding has focused 
primarily on individual demographic characteristics to understand why some households 
evacuate at higher rates than others. However, social factors such as access to social capital, 
levels of social control, and the extent of social cohesion also play a role in evacuation 
behavior. We hypothesize that the strength and direction of the associations between 
evacuation and personal and environmental attributes depend on social factors. The 
association of these social factors with evacuation may differ among different groups, 
particularly among highly integrated social groups. Analysis and interventions among sub-
groups is necessary in order to better understand the impact of social factors on evacuation 
decision making and change evacuation behavior in the future. 
 An awareness of the role of social factors and an acceptance of the limitations of 
demographic and socio-economic variables in predicting evacuation failure is a major step in 
a new direction for hurricane evacuation research. Issues of social vulnerability to natural 
hazards and the ability to respond and recover should also address factors beyond individual 
characteristics and include the characteristics of social groups. While social factors are 
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generally considered to encourage evacuation, particularly for those with access to large 
networks and stocks of social capital, the potential for negative effects among certain groups 
are relatively unexamined. 
 Our understanding of evacuation decision making is limited by its reliance on existing 
methods. The typical data collected following hurricanes has not resulted in generalizable 
theories of behavior and has for the most part lacked the theoretical framework and 
interdisciplinary nature of the project. While social resources may provide non-financial 
assets that can facilitate evacuation, these resources may lead to evacuation failure for some 
groups through downward leveling of norms, peer pressure, and other factors. While it is 
possible that improved planning, forecasting models, and educational messages can ease 
evacuations for many, these changes may not be robust enough to counteract the strength of 
social factors. Future interventions could take advantage of social factors to encourage 
protective behavior and empower local residents. 
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VIII. CHAPTER 1. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
A. HURRICANE EVACUATION 
 During disasters and emergencies such as hurricanes, government authorities may 
issue evacuation orders under specific conditions. Evacuation has been shown to be an 
effective intervention during emergencies, reducing excess morbidity and mortality that is 
often the consequence of hurricanes and flooding by moving residents away from low-lying 
or coastal areas. However, not all households with the ability to evacuate choose to follow 
evacuation orders. These “non-movers” have been identified by many authors as a priority 
for future research, but much remains to be done to develop a theoretical model and conduct 
studies to determine why people at risk from a natural disaster or under official evacuation 
orders decide not to evacuate. The impact of institutional behaviors and disparities with 
regard to access to preparedness and evacuation resources will also be explored. 
 Natural disaster evacuation studies have been undertaken since the 1950s and 1960s, 
growing out of planning and research on wartime relocation following World War II, and 
later, concerns about nuclear attacks or accidents. Early studies were primarily descriptive or 
based on case-studies and therefore did not present theories or models about evacuation 
behavior. These early studies were also wide-ranging, including brief building evacuations 
and long-term relocations of segments of the population, such as the movement of children to 
rural areas during wartime. The first published study to specifically assess a hurricane 
 evacuation was a 1953 survey of residents of Panama City, Florida, after Hurricane Florence 
(Killian, 1954). 
 In the first major review of evacuation studies, Quarantelli (1980) developed an 
analytic model of evacuation behavior that included community context, threat conditions, 
social processes, patterns of behavior, and community preparedness based on about a dozen 
large scale, random-sample population surveys of communities impacted by floods, tropical 
storms, hurricanes, tornados, and man-made accidents. Quarantelli defined evacuation as “the 
mass physical movement of people, of a temporary nature, that collectively emerges in 
coping with community threats, damages, or disruptions” (p. 10). Quarantelli called for more 
field-based research, more longitudinal studies, and more interdisciplinary research to further 
the field of evacuation studies. 
 In a later review, Baker (1991) demonstrated through analysis of a large database 
constructed from surveys conducted following 12 hurricanes that made landfall in the US 
between 1961 and 1989 that a large percentage of evacuees consistently cite similar reasons 
for evacuation. These include risk level of the area, action by public authorities (such as the 
issuance of mandatory evacuation orders), housing type, personal risk perception, and storm-
specific threat factors. Other factors, such as education, marital status, sex, presence of 
children or pets, and whether the household rents or owns their residence were typically not 
associated with evacuation before these 12 hurricanes. Variables suggested for further 
research include church attendance and the number of emergency preparations taken (Baker, 
1991). 
 The following sections present associations between hurricane evacuation and factors 
identified by various authors as important in the evacuation decision. 
2 
 1. Previous Disaster Experience 
 Previous research has focused extensively on the role of previous disaster experience 
in evacuation decision making (Strope, 1977; Moore, 2004; Wilkinson and Ross, 1970; 
Aguirre, 1994, Dash and Gladwin, 2005, Riad, 1999). Individual stories of storms that did 
not make landfall as strongly as or in the location predicted are common, since relatively few 
areas have experienced direct hits by major hurricanes. Based on reports in the literature, this 
judgment of the risk of an approaching storm based on the last one that affected the area may 
lead to successful evacuation or evacuation failure. For example, in Galveston, Texas, whose 
1900 hurricane was the worst natural disaster in US history in terms of mortality, the 
tradition to “fight it out” rather than evacuate remained strong during subsequent storms 
(Urbanik, 1978). Alternatively, 97% of the residents of Pensacola, Florida, evacuated before 
Hurricane Frederic in 1979, although Hurricanes Camille (1969) and Eloise (1975) had 
recently threatened the area but failed to cause much damage (Baker, 1991). Hurricane 
experience predicted evacuation for residents of Charleston, South Carolina, for Hurricane 
Emily, which made landfall just 4 years after Hurricane Hugo devastated that city, but 
hurricane experience was not associated with preparation for or evacuation from Hurricane 
Fran, which struck the area in 1999, 11 years after Hugo (Sattler, 2001). This “experience-
adjustment” paradox that is the result of the “false experience” of weak storms or near misses 
may lead residents to misperceive the true risks (Baker, 1991), although this may lead to 
either evacuation or evacuation failure. 
One problem with the role of experience is that studies rarely separate disaster 
experience from evacuation experience. Longitudinal studies of the same sample after 
different disasters have also not been conducted. Studies that specifically address past 
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 evacuation experience (rather than just past disaster experience) do provide some evidence 
that past evacuation is positively correlated to evacuation behavior (Urbanik, 1978; Horney, 
2008). While documentation of self-reported behavior after a storm is probably preferable to 
hypothetical response data, data collected after storm landfall about behavior may make it 
difficult to ascertain what distinct factors of previous experience account for a household’s 
evacuation. 
2. Perception of Risk 
There is near consensus in the existing literature that people take action regarding 
evacuation on the basis of their perception of risk (Riad, 1998; Lindell and Hwang, 2008; 
Lindell and Perry, 2004). However, how they develop this perception is unclear. In order to 
accurately assess risk, residents must feel that they are in danger and that leaving the area 
will be beneficial (Fitzpatrick and Mileti, 1991; Arlikatti, 2006). Official watches, warnings, 
and evacuation orders are related to evacuation (Moore, 1963; Drabek, 1969; Wilkinson and 
Ross, 1970; Edwards, 2001; Whitehead, 2000; Gladwin, 1997). However, several studies 
indicate that personal communications with family, friends, and co-workers and first-hand 
assessments of the dangers are even more important to the evacuation decision than official 
warnings (Drabek and Boggs, 1968; Killian, 1954; Windham, 1977). Different residents may 
respond differently to public authorities and appeals from family and friends, with some 
choosing to comply with official orders because they respect authority or fear the penalties 
for non-compliance, while for some these warnings may contribute to their determination to 
stay (Baker, 1991). 
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 3. Personal Characteristics 
Most studies have examined associations between personal characteristics of 
individuals in the community including age, sex, race, education, socio-economic status and 
evacuation. 
Although Quarantelli’s earlier review found that evacuation from all types of events 
was positively associated with the presence of children in the home, Baker’s later review 
focusing on hurricanes did not find a consistent relationship between children and 
evacuation. In North Carolina, the effect of children on the evacuation decision may be 
explained by the fact that having children in the household typically increases the likelihood 
of living in a mobile home by nearly 50% (Edwards, 2001). Having children in school has 
generally not affected the evacuation decision, with more than 90% of respondents from 4 
Gulf Coast states indicating that this played no role in their decision to evacuate from 
Hurricane Ivan (Gladwin, 2005). To encourage evacuation, and since schools are often the 
site of public shelters, schools are likely to be closed when evacuation orders are issued. 
Age is also frequently included in studies of evacuation because of the concern about 
the limited mobility and special health needs of the elderly. Most studies have failed to find 
an association between age and evacuation, although those over age 60 may be less likely to 
evacuate (Moore, 1963; Gladwin, 1997). After Hurricane Floyd, each 1 year decrease in age 
increased the odds of evacuation by 2% (Van Willigen, 2005). However, elderly residents 
who live in a retirement community may be more likely to evacuate than others in their age 
group (Baker, 1979). If families and communities take special precautions to ensure the 
safety of the elderly, either through evacuation or evacuation failure, the presence of elderly 
in the household could be linked to social factors that are related to evacuation. 
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 Gender differences in evacuation have generally been attributed to variations in 
socio-economic status, care-giving responsibilities, and perception of risk (Bateman, 2002). 
Studies of Hurricane Bonnie (Whitehead, 2001; Bateman, 2002) found that female head of 
household and lower education level were significant predictors of evacuation for Hurricane 
Bonnie, but this relationship did not hold for Hurricanes Dennis and Floyd which affected 
approximately the same areas of eastern North Carolina around the same time period. In 
Gladwin’s study of Hurricane Ivan evacuation, several personal factors, including being 
male, African-American, or having older family members were significantly related to 
evacuation (Gladwin, 2005). 
The majority of the literature finds no differences in evacuation based on race and 
ethnicity, although race and ethnicity may be more strongly correlated with vulnerability to 
property damage from hurricanes than evacuation due to differential quality of housing (Van 
Willigen, 2005) and susceptibility of housing locations, particularly to flooding. Riad’s 1999 
study of 777 adult residents of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida following 
Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew found that African-Americans were the least likely group to 
evacuate. However, their reasons for evacuation failure were similar to the overall study 
population, with the majority citing belief that the hurricane was not a serious threat (35%) 
and the belief that their housing was safe (29%). Only 6.6% cited lack of resources to 
evacuation, while 4.2% cited the need to protect their property. Hispanics in Riad’s study 
were more likely to cite low resources for evacuation failure, but all of these findings may be 
specific to the community settings of this study. Hispanic ethnicity did not predict evacuation 
after Hurricane Floyd in North Carolina. However, Hispanic residents more frequently 
reported staying with friends and relatives during the storm, that non-Hispanic residents and 
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 reported receiving disaster assistance from trusted agencies that had worked with the 
Hispanic population on other issues before the storm, such as the Catholic Social Ministries 
(Castillo, 2000). 
Individual and household demographic factors tend to be inconsistently related to 
evacuation. This lack of consistent findings makes it difficult to draw conclusions based on 
these factors (Quarantelli, 1980; Baker, 1979 & 1991). In the 2 principal reviews of hurricane 
evacuation behavior, Quarantelli and Baker have urged that attempts to relate demographic 
variables to evacuation behavior cease as they have no predictive capability, address the 
wrong unit of analysis, and fail to address important questions (Quarantelli, 1980), but 
collection of these types of data continues in all hurricane evacuation studies. In earlier 
studies, data analysis included only frequencies and cross-tabulations, as multivariable 
analysis were not yet widely used to test the association of these personal factors with 
evacuation (Nelson, 1989). Later studies may be impacted by the rapidly changing 
demographics of coastal areas that change the potential importance of these individual 
characteristics on expected or actual evacuation behavior (Nelson, 1989) 
4. Access to Resources 
Following Hurricane Katrina, a great deal of emphasis was placed on evacuation 
failure and lack of access to resources. At the individual level, previous studies have 
indicated that access to private automobiles, radios, and telephones were the most important 
material resources for evacuation (Baker, 1979; Forrest, 1979; Urbanik, 1978). In Baker’s 
review of 12 hurricanes, many impediments for evacuation were mentioned, such as 
arranging a place to stay, providing for pets, and fighting traffic, but fewer than 5% of 
respondents in each survey stated that lack of transportation impeded their own leaving. 
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 Among those evacuated to the Houston Astrodome after Hurricane Katrina, some reported 
that although they had access to transportation and the financial means to evacuate, they 
decided not to leave. In addition to financial considerations, “shared norms, local culture and 
traditions, responsibilities to social networks, and a collective history leading to trusting 
one’s network rather than the authorities” all contributed to the decision not to evacuate 
(Cordasco, 2006). 
Evacuation can be resource intensive. The effort and expense involved with 
evacuation can include packing, arranging for a place to stay, arranging for pets or other 
family members, dealing with traffic, and enduring uncomfortable conditions at a public 
shelter. The average direct cost of evacuation from Hurricane Bonnie was $112, while costs 
including medical expenses and lost wages averaged $322 (Maiolo, 2001). Direct evacuation 
costs for residents of 8 coastal North Carolina counties from Hurricane Dennis ($131) and 
Hurricane Floyd ($169) were similar (Whitehead, 2001). Costs were higher for those who 
traveled the farthest distance from their homes, and for those who stayed in a hotel 
(Whitehead, 2001). The timing of hurricane landfall can also impact costs and may play a 
role in willingness to evacuate. A weekend landfall can have lower indirect costs, particularly 
for those without paid sick leave or vacation time at their workplace. 
Socio-economic status has generally not been a significant predictor of evacuation in 
previous studies. In Riad’s study of Hurricane’s Hugo and Andrew, socioeconomic status, as 
measured by lower education, lower quality housing, and poorer neighborhoods was not a 
predictor of evacuation. Mei’s 1992 analysis of evacuation data from Hurricane Andrew 
indicated that evacuation rates actually increased as household income decreased, from 25% 
of those with a household income greater than $75,000 per year to 50.8% of those with a 
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 household income of less than $25,000 per year. This discrepancy may be at least partially 
explained by housing conditions such as housing type and location. Those with higher 
household incomes are less likely to live in mobile homes (an indicator for evacuation); 
however, they may also tend to live in areas that are considered high risk, such as the 
beachfront, which should lead to higher evacuation rates. Poor families may be more likely to 
evacuate under official programs, such as to government-run shelters, thereby making it 
easier to quantify the number of low-income residents who evacuate (Aguirre, 1994). 
Gladwin and Peacock’s 1997 analysis of data collected following Hurricane Andrew 
suggests that people with higher incomes are more likely to evacuate because they can afford 
to stay in hotels and are less constrained by lack of access to transportation. Those with 
higher incomes may be more likely to evacuate because their neighborhoods are less open to 
looting and they are more likely to have insurance to protect against property loss (Gladwin 
and Peacock, 1997). However, they would also be more likely to be homeowners, who in 
some studies evacuate at a lower rate than renters. 
5. Pets 
Previous studies found that pets are generally taken when a household evacuates, that 
pets are included in household evacuation plans, and that households are reluctant to leave 
without pets, which are usually not permitted in shelters (Drabek and Boggs, 1968; Forrest, 
1979; Heath, 2001; Whitehead, 2001). In a study of evacuation during California floods, the 
odds of evacuation failure for households with pets was 1.3 times (95% CI: 1.1, 1.5) the odds 
of evacuation failure for those without pets. Evacuation failure was even more likely among 
households with more than one pet, with the odds of evacuation failure for households with 
more than one pet 2.7 (95%CI: 1.2, 5.9) times the odds of evacuation failure for households 
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 without pets. Pets that lived primarily outdoors and households that did not own pet carriers 
were also less likely to evacuate (Heath, 2001). Evacuation from Hurricanes Bonnie, Dennis, 
and Floyd consistently depended on pet ownership, with the odds for evacuation of pet 
owners between 0.58 and 0.68 times the odds of evacuation for households without pets 
(Whitehead, 2001). Approximately 3% of Gulf Coast residents said they did not evacuate 
from Hurricane Ivan in 2004 because they didn’t want to leave their pets, but the regression 
models did not show pet ownership to be a significant factor in the evacuation decision 
(Gladwin, 2005). Recent legislation, known as the PETS Act of 2006 (govtrack.us), requires 
government authorities provide co-located or equivalent shelter facilities for pets, as well as 
their human owners. 
6. Medically Fragile and Disabled 
Previous research has also been inconsistent with regard to the evacuation of those 
with special medical needs or disabilities. A survey of 601 businesses and 935 households 
was conducted in 8 eastern North Carolina counties following Hurricane Bonnie (Maiolo, 
2001). Twelve percent of households reported a family member with a special medical need 
or disability that complicated their evacuation. Households where there was a medical need 
were more likely to evacuate, while those with reported physical or mental disabilities were 
less likely to evacuate than households that did not report disabilities. Special medical needs 
may include conditions that require electricity, special medical equipment, or home health 
care, all of which are likely to be disrupted during a hurricane. On the other hand, disabilities 
may make transportation and accommodation more difficult due to the need for handicap 
accessible accommodations and personal care facilities. Households with either medical 
needs or disabilities reported that the decision about whether to evacuate was more difficult 
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 (Maiolo, 2001). After Hurricane Floyd, 14% of respondents indicated their household 
included someone who was disabled, and these households reported the lowest rates of 
evacuation (Van Willigen, 2002). In a survey of 3,979 individuals in 3 Florida counties 
following Hurricane Elena (1985) nearly 24% of respondents indicated that someone in their 
household had a health problem that influenced their evacuation decision (Nelson and Kurtz, 
1988). 
7. Protection of Property 
Previous studies rarely document specific measures evacuees take to prepare their 
property beyond boarding up windows or moving belongings to an upper story (Wenger and 
Parr, 1969). Preparing property does tend to result in delays in evacuation. While fear of 
looting is sometimes given as a reason for evacuation failure (Moore, 1963; Perry, 1979), and 
looting has been portrayed by the media as a problem during disasters, multiple studies have 
demonstrated that looting is generally not a significant problem. Less than 5% of survey 
respondents mention looting as a concern when considering evacuation (Drabek and 
Stephenson, 1971). However, business leaders and tourism officials may consider the 
potential of looting to be a serious threat. Drabek interviewed 68 business owners or general 
managers in 3 Florida cities who expressed concern over theft of hurricane preparedness 
supplies (such as plywood for boarding windows) that they had stockpiled to protect their 
business, and indicated that they would be likely to stay on their business property to prevent 
the theft of cash or other items (Drabek, 1992). 
Some residents may be more likely to avoid evacuation in order to protect their property 
from a flood, storm surge, or looting. A potential measurement of property protection may be 
territoriality markers, including fences, names on mailboxes, and “no trespassing” signs 
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 (Riad, 1999). Another potential measure is the use of mitigation (such as sump pumps) that 
requires monitoring during a storm to ensure functionality. Buckland and Rahman (1999) 
reported those with better preparation before river flooding in Manitoba, Canada, failed to 
evacuate given a mandatory order, citing a need to monitor flood walls and pumps. Nearly 
20% of those surveyed after Hurricane Ivan said that the things they did to prepare their 
property affected their evacuation decision (Gladwin, 2005). 
8. Length of Residence 
In the evacuation literature, length of residence has been found to be negatively 
related to evacuation (Whitehead, 2000; Riad, 1999; Buckland and Rahman, 1999; Edwards, 
2001; Gladwin, 2005; Van Heerden, 2004; Howell, 2005) but the strength of the association 
and the explanation given by the authors for the relationship have been inconsistent. One 
explanation is that long-term residents have the strongest attachment to the community, and 
therefore are more likely to feel a responsibility to provide disaster assistance to their local 
community (Haines, 1996; Drabek, 1986). Another possible reason for the association is that 
long-term residents lack an adequate perception of risk. Drawing on their past experiences 
during smaller hurricanes or at the fringes of a major hurricane, long-term residents are less 
likely to evacuate without strong evidence that an approaching storm will be significantly 
stronger than a previous one (Whitehead, 2000; Sattler, 2001). Long-term residents may be 
more likely than short-term residents to avoid evacuation in order to protect their property 
from a potential storm surge or looting, or may be more emotionally attached or unwilling to 
abandon their property or possessions (Riad, 1999; Brodie, 2006). Long-term residents may 
also be less trusting of public safety or political authorities, and therefore choose to ignore 
their recommendations to evacuate. 
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 In 1999, Buckland and Rahman studied 3 communities in Manitoba, Canada, affected 
by the 1997 flooding of the Red River, which was the worst flood on record in Canada. A 
household survey, along with key informant interviewers with long-term residents and 
community focus groups were conducted in 3 ethnically distinct communities, 1 First Nation, 
1 Mennonite, and 1 Francophone. Long-term residents, based on their experience with past 
floods and their preparations for this flood had often implemented mitigation such as sandbag 
dikes that required monitoring (Buckland and Rahman, 1999). Key informants explained that 
a long-time area resident declared an intention to resist the government’s evacuation order, 
and subsequently, many other area residents failed to evacuate. 
In 2000, the Natural Hazards Research Group at East Carolina University conducted a 
survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing of 411 residents of 3 coastal North 
Carolina counties (Edwards, 2001). The number of years a respondent had lived in their 
current county was a negative predictor of evacuation in both Hurricanes Dennis and Floyd. 
However, length of residence was strongly correlated with the number of hurricanes 
experienced. Nearly 25% of the residents surveyed had lived in their county of residence for 
30 or more years, and had experienced at least 10 hurricanes, which may explain their failure 
to evacuate. (Edwards, 2001) 
In 2004, one year before Hurricane Katrina, the Center for the Study of the Public 
Health Impact of Hurricanes at Louisiana State University conducted a survey using random 
digit dialing of approximately 600 individuals in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. Unadjusted 
survey findings suggest that length of residence has a dose-response relationship with 
evacuation behavior. Given a hypothetical Category 4 or 5 Hurricane, 81% of those who 
have lived in the area less than 10 years would evacuate; 77% of those who have lived there 
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 10–19 years, 68% of those who have lived there 20–29 years, 64% of those who have lived 
there 30–39 years, and only 60% of those who have lived in New Orleans 40 or more years 
would leave the area (Van Heerden, 2003).  
In 2004 and 2005, the University of New Orleans Survey Research Center conducted 
a survey of 4,946 residents of 12 Louisiana parishes regarding their anticipated evacuation 
behavior from a hypothetical storm and their actual evacuation behavior prior to Hurricane 
Ivan. Those living in south Louisiana for more than 30 years had strong beliefs about the 
safety of their home in a Category 3 hurricane. Prior to Ivan, 30-year residents were 4% to 
28% less likely to evacuate from a hypothetical Category 3 hurricane; after Ivan, a Category 
4 storm, long-term residents were still 4% to 12% less likely to report evacuation from Ivan 
than those resident in the parish for less than 30 years (Howell, 2005). 
B. SOCIAL FACTORS 
Evacuation literature has also generally emphasized a positive association between 
social capital, social cohesion, and social control and evacuation (Aguirre, 1994; Bland, 
1997; Dash and Gladwin, 2005; Moore, 2004; Morrow, 1999; Riad, 1999; Van Heerden, 
2004). In a review of studies on disaster planning, warning, and evacuation, Aguirre (1994) 
proposes that increasing contacts with community organizations with a role in crisis response 
may increase the probability of evacuation. Evacuation may also be more likely when 
families are together for evacuation, or if neighbors and significant others evacuate (Aguirre, 
1994). In multiple regression models based on data collected after Hurricanes Andrew and 
Georges, Dash and Gladwin (2005) show that people are more likely to evacuate if they are 
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 told in person, particularly if they hear the warning from a friend, neighbor, or relative rather 
than via the media. 
Retrospective cohort studies completed one year after Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and 6 
months after Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (n=777) found that perceived social support was a 
strong predictor of evacuation (Riad, 1999). The odds of evacuation for those who perceived 
their social support was strong were 1.71 (p<0.01) times the odds of evacuation for those 
without strong perceived social support. During Hurricane Andrew, 41% of those living in 
the most affected areas reported receiving help from family members outside their household 
(Morrow, 1999). Individuals consistently looked to others during an emergency for tangible 
assistance with evacuation, such as transportation, as well as for emotional support. A 
prospective survey of residents of New Orleans, Louisiana, conducted by the Center for the 
Study of the Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, also anticipated a positive influence for 
social networks on evacuation behavior, with those who perceived that members of their 
social network would evacuate tending to indicate that they would be more likely to evacuate 
(Van Heerden, 2004). 
In areas with high social capital and large social networks, community members may 
be able to act together to assist those who otherwise may not evacuate. Following Hurricane 
Floyd, residents of eastern North Carolina who believed their property to be safe from 
flooding reported being awoken by neighbors knocking on their doors during the night 
warning them of rising water (Moore, 2004). Comments recorded during community focus 
groups conducted after Hurricane Floyd included numerous accounts of the value of 
collective action facilitated by social capital and social networks, including “neighbors 
helping neighbors,” and described a time when everyone “worked and came together in 
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 remarkable ways” during the disaster (Moore, 2004). Hispanic residents of eastern North 
Carolina also reported that their community came together after Hurricane Floyd, with 
friends and relatives providing shelter during the storm and trusted agencies that had worked 
with the Hispanic population on other issues before the storm providing disaster assistance 
(Castillo, 2000). 
Some studies also indicate the potential negative impacts of high levels of social 
capital, social cohesion, and social control on evacuation. Qualitative data collected 
following Hurricane Katrina from those evacuated to the Houston Astrodome indicated that 
even when respondents had access to transportation and the financial means to evacuate, 
some decided not to leave. In addition to financial considerations, “shared norms, local 
culture and traditions, responsibilities to social networks, and a collective history leading to 
trusting one’s network rather than the authorities” all contributed to the decision not to 
evacuate (Cordasco, 2006). Cordasco continues, “the sharing of resources is a key aspect of 
social capital, it may also lead to the stretching of limited resources so thinly that the group 
cannot take effective action.” Similar findings were reported by Buckland and Rahman 
regarding community preparedness for the 1997 Red River floods. Rosenort, the community 
with the highest level of social capital as measured by civic involvement, experienced the 
most conflict in decision making around evacuation. Although their social capital seemed to 
facilitate better preparation before the floods, peer pressure from residents who chose not to 
evacuate led many other residents to ignore the mandatory evacuation order. 
Social network theory also may provide an explanation for the relationship between 
long-term residency and evacuation failure. In an update of his seminal article on social 
networks, Granovetter (1983) discusses the “strength of weak ties” in relation to the effective 
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 mobilization for collective action. If the social networks of long-term residents consist 
primarily of strong ties to other long-term residents and few if any weak ties to newcomers, 
this may lead to “inflexibility in the form of arrogance and a sense of infallibility” 
(Granovetter, 1983). This lack of weak ties also deprives long-term residents of access to 
information because others within their social network are likely to have access to much the 
same information as they already do. Putnam’s theories of bridging and bonding social 
capital, as presented in Bowling Alone (2000), may also be applicable to evacuation behavior. 
Long-term residents’ social capital, while plentiful, may be bonding rather than bridging, 
actually reinforcing the exclusiveness of the group and again limiting access to outside 
information or ideas (Putnam, 2000). It is reasonable to expect long-term residents have the 
most stable communities, are the least socially isolated, have the most experience with the 
benefits of social cohesion and social capital, and have the largest social networks. In fact, 
according to Kawachi and Berkman, “there is ample evidence of the destructive effects of 
residential instability and turnover” on social capital (2000). None of these explanations have 
been adequately explored explicitly in relation to hurricane evacuation behavior. 
1. Social Cohesion 
Social cohesion, defined by Kawachi and Berkman (2000) as the “extent of 
connectedness” and “presence of strong social bonds,” has generally shown a positive 
correlation with a household’s decision to evacuate. Evacuation is undoubtedly a household-
level action, with family members acting collectively to respond together as a group, rather 
than as individuals (Quarantelli, 1980). Several studies note that when warnings or 
evacuation orders are issues, families tend to gather at home to reach consensus about what 
action to take (Drabek and Boggs, 1968; Drabek and Stephenson, 1971; Moore, 2004). 
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 Community members may act together using non-financial resources derived from their 
social networks to offer mutual aid and assistance to others in the community. An assessment 
of evacuation from floods in Europe attributed evacuation failure among the elderly to small 
social networks, as well as to being less agile (Penning-Rowsell, 2007). Retrospective cohort 
studies completed one year after Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and 6 months after Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992 found that strong social support was a significant predictor of evacuation 
(Riad, 1999). A prospective survey of residents of New Orleans, Louisiana, conducted by the 
Center for the Study of the Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, also anticipated a positive 
influence for social networks on evacuation behavior, with those who perceived that 
members of their social network would evacuate tending to indicate that they would be more 
likely to evacuate (Van Heerden, 2004). 
Social support provided by family, neighbors, and community members is the primary 
way that individuals and households get resources to deal with daily life and reduce 
uncertainties (Wellman, 1990). The seeking of aid for hurricane evacuation is also 
hierarchical. Those considering evacuation first seek aid from local family and close fields, 
then other friends and neighbors, community members, membership groups such as 
churches, and then as a last resort, public agencies (Quarantelli, 1980). Evacuees prefer to go 
to the homes of friends or relatives rather than public shelters (Aguirre, 1994; Moore, 2004). 
For example, friends and relatives provided temporary housing for between 65% and 71% of 
those who evacuated the North Carolina coasts for Hurricanes Bonnie, Dennis, and Floyd 
(Whitehead, 2000). 
Some research indicates that families with relatives outside the affected area are more 
likely to evacuate (Drabek and Boggs, 1968; Drabek and Stephenson, 1971). Called 
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 “evacuation by invitation,” family members in safe areas provide accommodations for those 
in affected areas (Quarantelli, 1980). This subject was addressed in the questionnaire for this 
research. Granovetter discusses the “strength of weak ties” in relation to the effective 
mobilization for collective action. If the strength of the ties within a group limits the number 
of weak ties with those outside it, exposure to the information and organizational capacity 
available to those who are part of a broader, non-local social network is limited. Individuals 
who are most strongly embedded in dense, homogeneous, or family dominated networks 
receive and expect more social support during normal times and during an emergency 
(Haines, 1996); whether or not this support encourages or discourages evacuation should be 
further explored. 
The behavior of individuals who live alone or with other unrelated persons, tourists, and 
business travelers has generally been outside the focus of evacuation research. Changing 
demographics and increased travel and second home ownership in coastal areas make these 
groups important to consider. Tourists are generally expected to be the first to evacuate from 
a hurricane (Urbanik, 1978; Coastal Heritage, 2002). For permanent residents, 
responsibilities to work may prevent evacuation (Moore, 1963, Gladwin, 2005). 
It is unclear what effect evacuation has on building future social cohesion among 
individuals or groups. Families that rely on one another during a disaster may have more 
frequent interactions afterwards (Drabek, 1969; Drabek and Stephenson, 1971). Evacuees 
may also form new social groups and associations based on their experiences, increasing the 
number of social contacts they have outside of family (Moore, 1963; Poulshock and Cohen, 
1975). However, some disasters may weaken relationships and reduce ties due to pressures to 
provide assistance or make decisions (Buckland and Rahman, 1999). 
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 2. Social Capital 
 A cohesive community is endowed with social capital, the non-financial resources 
that can be derived from one’s social network to facilitate collective action such as 
evacuation, including “interpersonal trust, norms of reciprocity, and mutual aid.” (Kawachi 
and Berkman, 2000). Individuals look to family members outside their homes and others in 
their communities for information and assistance with evacuation. Those with a larger social 
network, as measured by the number of contacts and ties to the community via affiliations 
with family, neighborhood, and work (Berkman and Glass, 2000), are more likely to receive 
information regarding a recommendation to evacuate, while those with a smaller social 
network are less likely to evacuate (Riad, 1999). Other factors may also influence access to 
social capital, such as gender or occupation (Lin, 1999). 
 Few previous studies have explored the influence of group memberships, such as 
churches, community organizations, or voluntary associations on hurricane evacuation. 
Buckland and Rahman’s study of floods in several communities in Canada found that the 
more community organizations a person was a member of, the less likely they were to 
evacuate. Two studies have explored the role of religious organizations on the evacuation 
process in areas where the church was central to the community, including research around 
the Teton Dam floods, where the majority of the population was Mormon (Golec, 1980) and 
the Toccoa Falls Dam flood in Toccoa, Georgia, which killed 39 on the campus of a 
fundamentalist Christian university.  
 Other research has examined the role of social capital in the receipt and provision of 
financial, information, and emotional support following major life events. After a disaster, 
social capital has been shown to be a strong predictor of the help that is received, but a 
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 weaker predictor of help that is provided (Kaniasty, 1995). After other major life events (e.g. 
divorce) the health effects of the events were most strongly interrupted when assistance came 
from strong ties rather than weak ones (Lin, 1985). Stronger ties may be a more effective 
buffer against stress and other impacts of emergencies. However, during a disaster such as a 
hurricane, which affects entire communities, small dense network ties may not be able to 
function efficiently if all the members of the group have been negatively impacted by the 
storm. Situations that require temporary access to new information and new contacts may 
respond better to low density networks with heterogeneous membership (Hammer, 1983). 
3. Social Control 
a. Feeling Safe 
Most residents who report that they felt “unsafe” also report that they evacuated. 
These unsafe feelings may be the result of the perceived severity of the storm, certainty of 
the landfall location forecast, or evacuation orders from public officials (Baker, 1985). 
However, these feelings could also discourage evacuation. Those who are concerned about 
protecting their property from storm damage or looters may also feel unsafe, but the result is 
evacuation failure (Baker, 1991). After Hurricane Ivan threatened New Orleans in 2004, 
many local residents fled to the same downtown hotels where they had sheltered for the last 
20 years, seeing them as “safe” during hurricanes (Webster, 2005). Those who live in mobile 
homes may relocate to a nearby home still well within the area of impact if they consider that 
home more able to withstand hurricane conditions. 
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b. Behavior of Family, Friends, and Neighbors 
Appeals from friends and relatives can sometimes encourage evacuation. Friends and 
family may convince potential evacuees that staying in place could be dangerous, or may be 
able to offer assistance with transportation, shelter, or other logistics. Friends and relatives 
are important sources of both emotional support and instrumental aid (Wellman, 1992) 
Evacuation is a group activity and a social action, and is meaningfully oriented to the 
behavior of others. Although evacuation is a household decision, many families seek 
information about neighbors’ evacuation plans and look to others to help them with the 
decision making process. For example, after Hurricane Carla, more than 30% of respondents 
indicated that they discussed evacuation with someone outside the family (Moore, 1963). 
Survey respondents have indicated that peer pressure from neighbors who didn’t evacuate 
played a role in their own evacuation failure (Baker, 1991). Neighbors’ evacuation decision- 
making plays a role in the decision of a household, with more households choosing to stay 
when the majority of their neighbors did (Killian, 1954; Moore, 1963; Baker, 1979). Less 
mobile groups such as families with small children or the elderly may rely more heavily on 
neighbors than other groups’ evacuation decision (Wellman, 1992). 
Table 1 considers previous studies that relate social factors to evacuation outcomes. 
Some demonstrate a positive affect of social factors on evacuation, while others point out 
potential negative affects of social factors on evacuation. This project will further explore 
these questions to determine if consistent differences in study population, environmental 
setting, institutional planning and response, or mediation of effects that may explain these 
disparate findings. 
 
TABLE 1. Summary of Literature: Evacuation and Social Exposures 
 
Social Factors Supportive of Evacuation 
Author Study Type / 
Location 
Results 
Moore 
(1963) 
Case Study / 
Florida 
Important role of family and neighborhood in evacuation decision making; 
Decisions to evacuate were made by groups, not individuals; Neighbors 
traveled together and sheltered in the same areas; Formed secondary 
groups in shelters based on age, place of residence, and occupation 
Riad, 
Norris, 
Ruback 
(1999) 
Cross-
Sectional / 
Florida & 
South 
Carolina 
Strong social support a predictor of evacuation 
Van 
Heerden 
and Streva 
(2005) 
Prospective / 
Louisiana 
Anticipated a positive influence for social networks on evacuation 
behavior, with those who perceived that members of their social network 
would evacuate tending to indicate that they would be more likely to 
evacuate 
Moore 
(2004) 
Case Study / 
North 
Carolina 
Area residents who believed their property to be safe from flooding 
reported being awoken by neighbors knocking on their doors during the 
night warning them of rising water; accounts of the value of collective 
action facilitated by social capital and social networks, including 
“neighbors helping neighbors,” and described a time when everyone 
“worked and came together in remarkable ways” 
Van 
Willigen 
(2005)  
Case – 
Control Study 
/ North 
Carolina 
Students who had fewer ties binding them to the community were more 
likely to evacuate from Hurricane Floyd 
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Social Factors Not Supportive of Evacuation 
Author Study Type / 
Location 
Results 
Cordasco 
(2006) 
Case Study / 
Louisiana 
“Shared norms, local culture and traditions, responsibilities to social 
networks, and a collective history leading to trusting one’s network rather 
than the authorities” all contributed to the decision not to evacuate. 
Buckland 
and 
Rahman 
(1999) 
Case Study / 
Canada 
The community with the highest level of social capital as measured by 
civic involvement experienced the most conflict in decision making around 
evacuation. Although their social capital seemed to facilitate better 
preparation before the floods, peer pressure from residents who chose not 
to evacuate led many other residents to ignore the mandatory evacuation 
order. 
Gladwin, 
Gladwin, 
and 
Peacock 
(2001) 
Ethnographic 
interviews 
followed by 
survey / 
Florida 
Clusters of decision criteria including seniors in household, household in 
evacuation zone, perceived risk, pet ownership, evacuation plan, concerns 
about traffic, financial resources to evacuate; Majority will only evacuate if 
significant others do as well; Had to stay home to care for ill or disabled 
family member 
Solomon 
(1986) 
Re-interview 
of individuals 
previously 
interviewed 
after floods 
and dioxin 
exposure 
Strong social ties are more burdensome than supporting in times of stress; 
Higher network demands led to more alcohol abuse and somatization / 
hysteria 
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 C. STUDIES OF EVACUATION FROM OTHER DISASTERS 
 Evacuation studies began with planning related to wartime relocation during and 
after World War II, and later addressed the potential for evacuation from a nuclear 
accident or attack. Studies of evacuation during natural disasters began in the 1950s and 
1960s. In addition to hurricanes, these studies primarily addressed evacuation from floods 
and volcanoes, as the rapid onset of disasters such as earthquakes and tornados are 
generally too acute for evacuation to be an effective intervention. Man-made disasters, 
such as chlorine spills, toxic fires, and other accidental hazards have also been included 
as part of the study of evacuation. 
 Most studies of acute events tend to focus on morbidity and mortality, although 
some do address the affects of evacuation or relocation after an acute event. For tornados, 
living in a mobile home was the only factor significantly associated with increased risk of 
death, while increased warning time was important in reducing tornado-related injuries 
(Donner, 2007). Among Italian men evacuated from an area near Naples suffering from 
multiple small earthquakes, those who were permanently dislocated reported higher 
feelings of hostility and distress than those who did not evacuate or were able to return 
home (Bland, 1997). 
 Numerous studies have been conducted in the US, Canada, Europe, and Asia with 
regard to evacuations from flooding. In 1999, major flooding impacted the Mexican State 
of Veracruz. Interviews with 385 households from the area demonstrated failures by 
authorities to inform the public, particularly via radio messages (Aguirre, 2004). Those 
who did not receive information about the flooding were older, had lived in the 
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 community the longest, and were the least likely to have evacuated (Aguirre, 2004). 
Being part of a community organization was a key determinant of whether or not warning 
information was received (Aguirre, 2004). Alternatively, in Buckland and Rahman’s 
study of the Red River floods in Canada, being a part of a community organization was 
associated with evacuation failure, as community groups were responsible for much of 
the mitigation and recovery efforts in the area. 
 In 1999, Tungurahua, a volcano in Ecuador began releasing steam, gases, and 
magma. Fearing a major eruption, government officials ordered the mandatory 
evacuation of more than 25,000 people to private homes, hostels, and shelters. In the 
event of an eruption, residents of the area would have only 7 minutes to evacuate, so the 
early evacuation was viewed as necessary by the government and was enforced by the 
military (Tobin, 2002). Local residents from 3 communities were studied during the 12 
month relocation. The majority reported dissatisfaction with the government’s response 
and many returned to their homes prematurely due to poor conditions at shelters, 
concerns over loss of income, and looting by soldiers in evacuated homes (Tobin, 2002). 
 In 2005, a freight rail train traveling in Aiken County, South Carolina, crashed 
and released 90 tons of chlorine gas leading to the evacuation of approximately 5,400 
residents of Graniteville. Following the evacuation, 512 residents who lived with 2 miles 
of the crash site were surveyed by researchers at the University of South Carolina. 
Results from this survey were strikingly similar to those discussed above. Household 
demographic characteristics were not a significant predictor of evacuation from the 
chlorine spill (Mitchell, 2005). Those who lived closest to the spill were more likely to 
evacuate that those who lived farther away, but there were a considerable number of 
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 residents who failed to evacuate because they were unsure if their location was covered 
by the evacuation order issued by authorities (Mitchell, 2005). Although public shelters 
were opened, the majority of evacuees chose to stay with relatives or friends (63%), 
mostly because they felt safe and comfortable there, although 2% indicated that their pets 
were important in their decision as to where to shelter (Mitchell, 2005). 
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 This research examined the effects of social capital, social cohesion, and social 
control on hurricane evacuation. The project considers the influence of social factors on 
decision-making at the household level. Given the inconsistent results from previous 
research on this topic, the exploration of these social factors requires a theoretical 
framework and conceptual model. 
For a theoretical framework, we turned to the writings of German sociologist Max 
Weber (1922) on status groups in Economy and Society. An understanding of these 
writings helped in the development of a new approach to explaining the social factors that 
influence evacuation behavior. Aspects of the characteristics of status groups, defined by 
Weber as communities who share the same “style of life” and “restrictions on social 
intercourse,” will be linked to evacuation behavior in order to explain why certain sub-
groups should be the population of interest in evacuation research in order to better 
understand differential patterns of evacuation. A new conceptual model (Figure 1) guided 
primary data collection in an effort to explain evacuation failure, and better guide the 
development of public health and safety interventions that would facilitate evacuation, 
particularly among targeted sub-groups of the population. 
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 FIGURE 1. Conceptual model for determinants of evacuation behavior 
 
 
Closure of social 
network 
Social cohesion 
leading to excess 
obligations 
Social Control 
Peer pressure 
Perception of Gov’t 
- Length of residence 
-Age 
-Number of hurricanes 
experienced 
 
Status 
Group 
Employment 
Income 
Education 
Housing type 
-Single family home 
-Apartment 
-Mobile home 
Socio- 
Economic 
Status 
 
Evacuation 
Operate via Proximate 
Determinants  
(Currently Measured) 
 
Social Factors that 
Determine Status 
(Not Currently 
Measured) 
Presence of 
evacuation order 
Live on island, near 
river, in flood plain 
Risk of wind / flood 
damage 
Flood insurance
Demographics 
-Gender 
-Race 
-Education 
Household 
composition 
-Number of children 
-Number of seniors 
-Marital status 
-Pets 
Possible Major 
Determinants of 
Evacuation  
Perceived and  
objective  
risk, Storm 
strength 
Housing type & 
characteristics 
Markers of 
territoriality: 
-Fences 
-Names on 
mailboxes 
-No trespassing 
Preparation / 
mitigation 
-Received funds for 
mitigation 
-Mitigation requires 
monitoring 
(sandbag, pumps) 
Social Control: 
Decision making 
capacity and extent 
of centralization 
Social Capital: 
Density of civic 
engagement 
-Number / quality 
-Involved in 
hurricane prep 
-Volunteer 
Outcome 
28 
 During normal times, individuals maintain the “greatest social distance” possible, 
in spite of physical proximity (Roth, 1968). Social cooperation between neighbors is 
“likely only in cases of common danger” when the “neighbor is the typical helper in 
need” (Roth, 1968). In fact, during times of need, neighborhood ties are often more 
effective than political or governmental structures and do not depend on the social or 
financial equality of neighbors (Roth, 1968). Although Weber was referring to the loan of 
goods, implements, or labor free of charge to neighbors, these principles can be applied 
to evacuation. Social solidarity generally remains strong during disasters (Mileti, 1999) 
and the size and diversity of the social network generally has a significant effect on 
disaster preparedness and recovery (Haines, 1996). Evacuees prefer to go to the homes of 
friends or relatives rather than public shelters. Those with small or weak networks are 
more likely to use public shelters (Mileti, 1999). For example, friends and relatives 
provided temporary housing for between 65% and 71% of those who evacuated the North 
Carolina coasts for Hurricanes Bonnie, Dennis, and Floyd (Whitehead, 2000). During a 
disaster such as a hurricane, individuals and organizations that would typically maintain 
distance from one another during normal times seek and provide information, mutual aid, 
and other forms of assistance. Preexisting social inequities are also maintained (Mileti, 
1999). 
So, why does this “neighborly social action” fail to influence the evacuation 
behavior of some groups of residents? (Roth, 1968). Certain groups set themselves apart 
as a status group by mobilizing and investing resources for returns of valued goods in 
society, including wealth, status, and power (Lin, 1999). Status groups, in contrast to 
classes, are communities who share the same “style of life” and “restrictions on social 
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 intercourse” (Gerth, 1946). For example, “only the resident of a certain street (‘the 
Street’) is considered as belonging to ‘society,’ is qualified for social intercourse, and is 
visited and invited” (Gerth, 1946). “Above all, this differentiation evolves in such a way 
as to make for strict submission to the fashion that is dominant at a given time in 
society,” in this case, the failure of members of the status group to evacuate (Gerth, 
1946). Some groups may see government evacuation orders simply as a “usurpation” of 
their own social honor, privilege, and authority (Gerth, 1946). The social honor and 
prestige they share “influence[s] the communal action” of the status group (Gerth, 1946), 
in this case, the failure to follow evacuation orders. Residents generate frames through 
which they perceive and define situations, such as their responses to non-routine 
situations such as disasters, which affect the actions they choose to take (Hurlbert, 2000). 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
If the positive influence of social capital, social cohesion, and social control 
cannot consistently explain hurricane evacuation behavior, we should look more closely 
at the role that status group membership plays in this decision. While status group 
membership conveys a “specific status honor, which rests upon distance and 
exclusiveness,” it also requires that group members are “the bearers of all conventions” 
where the pursuit of rational activity may be a disqualification of status (Gerth, 1946). 
Although Weber discusses this disqualification in terms of the participation of a group 
member in common physical labor, we propose that a similar dynamic could be shown in 
evacuation. Some residents may lose their place in the status group when they follow 
government issued evacuation orders only to find themselves gathering things to take, 
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 stuck in highway traffic jams for hours, sleeping in public shelters or arranging other 
accommodations, or in line with tourists waiting for access to dwindling gasoline 
supplies. 
 In the case of some residents, the high levels of social cohesion and the strict 
responsibilities of status privilege mean that this status group is richly endowed with 
stocks of social capital that have an unexpected negative effect on evacuation behavior. 
Exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on status group members, restrictions on individual 
freedoms, and downward leveling norms are all examples of this (Portes, 1998). In 
addition, some residents’ social networks, while large, may primarily be limited to 
contacts within their status group. Within the status group, members are provided with all 
the “opportunities for satisfaction of their various interests, be they spiritual or material” 
(Parsons, 1947). This closure of the social networks may be based on interest, prestige, or 
even monopolized advantages (Parsons, 1947). For example, based on the scarcity of 
opportunities for the acquisition of land in coastal areas, property may be sold outside the 
open real estate market to other group members. Relations of personal loyalty and those 
based on common values also tend to be closed (Parsons, 1947). The strength of the ties 
within the status group may actually limits the number of weak ties with those outside it, 
limiting exposure to the information and organizational capacity available to those who 
are part of a broader social network (Granovetter, 1983). 
The same restrictions, rituals, and social norms that sustain relationships and 
accrue benefits to the members of status groups also enable them to bar outsiders. 
Restrictions on social intercourse with outsiders are a defining characteristic of Weber’s 
status groups, which grow increasingly closed over time (Roth, 1968). “As soon as there 
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 is an agreed upon communal action of this closing character, the status development is 
under way” (Gerth, 1946). The social capital created by this solidarity is at the core of the 
residents’ failure to evacuate. Their strong status group social relations enhance the 
confidence with which they ignore evacuation orders and make implicit their 
separateness from those who do follow evacuation orders. This density of civic 
engagement within the status group, while it may aid members in making preparations for 
approaching hurricanes, actually blocks or delays decision-making related to evacuation, 
which is often an urgent matter. Coastal communities are characterized by large numbers 
of temporary residents and high growth rates. Tourists, visitors, and those with second 
homes in coastal areas do not share the same status as longer-term residents, and tend to 
evacuate at much higher rates. By rejecting evacuation orders, some local residents 
maintain their privileged status, esteem, and honor, as well as their place in the 
authoritative structure of social interactions. 
Membership in a status group may also exact a cost on its members in the form of 
excess claims by other members. Although social connectedness may generally lead to 
increased evacuation, in some cases, the obligations of the status group may actually be a 
source of increased stress (Solomon, 1987; Bland, 1997; Cordasco, 2006; Gladwin and 
Gladwin, 2001; Buckland and Rahman, 1999). As part of a status group, your action may 
precipitate your responsibility for the actions of many others, including friends, family, 
extended family, and pets, so it is simply less stressful to do nothing, in this case to avoid 
evacuation. For example, Eisenman (2006) cited obligations to elderly relatives or 
responsibilities for sheltering family members as a reason for evacuation failure by New 
Orleans’ residents during Katrina. Residents may stay to appease others in the status 
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 group, even if they don’t agree with the groups’ assessment of the risk. In fact, those who 
do attempt evacuation indicate that peer pressure from neighbors who were not 
evacuating hindered their own leaving (Baker, 1991). The close “intergroup relations of 
the kind found in highly solidary communities can give rise to a free-riding problem, as 
less diligent members enforce on the more successful all kinds of demands backed by a 
shared normative structure” (Portes, 1998). For group members, their privileged access to 
the resources of fellow group members may lead to pressure that individuals shouldn’t 
take the initiative to evacuate, as any resources, such as a second home on higher ground, 
will have to be shared with the group. 
 Status group participation creates demands for conformity. When all members 
know one another and the social norms of the group are explicit, the level of social 
control is quite high, often at the cost of individual freedom. These status group ties 
constrain rather than facilitate evacuation behavior. Warning messages and other 
information are heard and interpreted in the context of the status group’s norms and 
beliefs, and distinctions in behavior are no longer only regulated by the convention of the 
status group, but also potentially by sanctions and stigma (Roth, 1968). In some cases, the 
pursuit of an activity such as evacuation may be seen as a disqualification of status. The 
closed nature of status groups may intensify this stress and be a barrier to the action of its 
individual members as status group membership creates demands for conformity, social 
control, and the “strict submission to the fashion that is dominant at a given time in 
society” (Gerth, 1946). 
Finally, the distinctions of the status group are cemented by the “common 
experience of adversity and opposition to mainstream society” (Portes, 1998). Length of 
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 residence is strongly correlated with the number of hurricanes experienced (Edwards, 
2001), and nearly all long-term residents claim to have survived past hurricanes. 
Individual stories of storms that did not make landfall as strongly as, or in the location, 
predicted are common, since relatively few areas have experienced direct hits by major 
hurricanes. The possibility of emerging unscathed leads to a downward leveling of 
norms, which prevents evacuation by some residents even from the most dangerous 
storms. Their experiences with past storms, distrust of authorities, and their view of 
government evacuation orders as a usurpation of their social honor, contribute to an 
oppositional stance towards the mainstream. This “experience-adjustment” paradox also 
means that newcomers have not yet fallen prey to the “false experience” of weak storms 
or near misses that leads long-term residents to misperceive the true risks (Baker, 1991). 
Residents who have received disaster assistance funds or made investments of their own 
money in expensive mitigation after previous storm experiences may also fail to 
recognize the true risk. Many of these mitigation tools, such as sea walls or pumps for 
flooding, require monitoring during the storm. With time and money invested in 
mitigation, why should prepared residents choose to evacuate? 
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IX. CHAPTER 2. STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
A. SUMMARY AND RATIONALE 
Social factors, such as high levels of association, integration, solidarity, and 
closure, are more applicable for explaining a social action such as evacuation than 
personal or household demographic characteristics. The need for affiliation during 
stressful conditions makes these social factors even more powerful. Because of this, 
social factors should therefore be of interest in evacuation research. Social factors interact 
with personal and environmental factors to hinder evacuation for some residents. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Question 1: Were social capital, social cohesion, social control, and other social factors 
associated with failure to evacuate from Hurricane Isabel by households in Pasquotank, 
Perquimans, and Chowan Counties? 
Question 2: Was there evidence of heterogeneity on the risk difference scale for the 
association of demographic covariates and hurricane evacuation failure according to the 
value of social cohesion, social control, social capital and other social factors?   
Question 3: Were perceived and actual risk associated with failure to evacuate from 
Hurricane Isabel by households in Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan Counties?
 
X. CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGNS AND METHODS 
A. STUDY OVERVIEW 
 The study is a cross-sectional study that comprises a random sample of 570 
households in Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan Counties in north-eastern North 
Carolina. These counties are part of the 7-county Albemarle Regional Health District 
(ARHD) and as such have the same administrative leadership and preparedness and 
response plans. 
 On September 18, 2003, Hurricane Isabel made landfall between Ocracoke Island, 
NC, and Cape Lookout, NC with winds of up to 105 miles per hour. The storm entered 
the study area where strong winds and storm surge of 4–6 feet caused extensive flooding 
and downed trees and power lines. One death was directly attributed to Hurricane Isabel 
in North Carolina, as well as more than $450 million in property damage. 
 Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) for the 3 counties were obtained from the 
North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (NCDACS). To 
ensure each flood zone was represented in the study, census blocks were first stratified by 
flood zones. Census blocks in each stratum were then randomly selected based on 
probability proportionate to population size. Within each selected block, 7 households 
were randomly selected using a survey site selection toolkit developed by the North 
Carolina Division of Public Health (NCDPH) in ESRI ArcMap 9.2 (Redlands, CA) 
(Figure 2). Using GPS-equipped Trimble Recon field data collectors, interview teams 
 
 were routed to each location with a map generated using ESRI ArcPad 6.0.3 Street Map 
USA. Interviews were conducted with one resident of the selected household and data 
was electronically recorded on the handheld data collection devices at the time of 
interview (Figure 3).  
 
 
FIGURE 2. Map of Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan Counties with interview 
locations 
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 FIGURE 3. Data sources 
 
Study Population: 
Households living in Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan Counties in 2003 
Year 2000 Census Blocks (n=1825 blocks) 
↓ 
Stratification of Blocks by Flood Zone 
(based on flood designation of block’s physical center): 
Based on Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMS), updated 2003–2008 
-100 year flood zone: 1.0% annual chance flood, additional hazard 
associated with storm waves (n=459) 
-500 year flood zone: 0.2% annual chance flood, including 1% annual 
chance flood average depths of less than 1 foot or drainage areas less than 1 
square mile (n=172) 
-Non-flood zones: Less than 1.0% annual chance flood, flood insurance 
purchase is not required (n=1194) 
 
↓ 
30 Blocks in each county selected based on Probability 
Proportionate to Population 
↓ 
210 Households in each county selected based on  
proximity to randomly generated point 
 
 
 
B. STUDY DESIGN 
1. Study Population 
 Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan Counties are located in northeastern North 
Carolina between the Albemarle Sound and the Virginia-North Carolina border. All 3 
counties are primarily rural, with Elizabeth City, NC, located in Pasquotank County, the 
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 only micropolitan statistical area in the 3-county area (FedStats, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). 
The area is seeing increased growth and development, with more housing units as coastal 
property values have increased, although 20% to 35% of all homes in the 3 counties are 
still mobile homes (FedStats, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). Growth in population and 
development and poor housing stock leaves residents of these counties at risk for 
repeated hurricane-related injuries and property damage. Evacuation of residents prior to 
hurricane landfall is one way public authorities try to reduce hurricane related morbidity 
and mortality. 
 The 3 counties contain 1825 census blocks with a total population of 60,791 
persons and 26,775 households located in 1 of 3 flood zone designations (FedStats, 2008) 
(Figure 4). Census blocks were categorized by flood zone based on the flood zone 
designation of the block’s physical center according to the FIRMs which were updated by 
the North Carolina Floodplain Mapping Program between 2003 and 2008. 
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 FIGURE 4. Map of Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan Counties with census blocks 
stratified by flood zone (n=1825) 
 
 
 The sample of households for the study were selected by means of a commonly 
used 2-stage cluster sample methodology. First developed in the 1960s as a tool for local 
health departments to conduct assessments of immunization coverage, the “30x7” sample 
methodology was later adapted by the World Health Organization’s Expanded Program 
on Immunization to assess immunization coverage in developing countries (Serfling, 
1965; Henderson, 1982; Lemeshow, 1985; Malilay, 1996). As originally developed, 30 
census blocks or block groups are randomly selected at the first stage, while at the second 
stage, a starting location is determined and data collection continues at each individual 
home until 7 interviews are completed. Census blocks or block groups are selected in 
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 stage 1 through a method known as “probability proportionate to population size,” which 
means that a census block or block group with more households is more likely to be 
included than one with fewer households. A table similar to the one shown in Table 2 is 
constructed in Excel 2003 format (Redmond, WA) with all census blocks or block groups 
listed in the first column, the blocks population in the second column, and the cumulative 
population listed in the third column. A random number between 0 and the total 
cumulative population size is generated using Excel’s random number generator and the 
census block or block group that contains that number is selected. Large clusters can be 
selected more than once in the sampling process (Lemeshow, 1985). 
 
TABLE 2. Table matching random numbers to census block groups by cumulative 
population (selected blocks indicated by shading) 
 
Census 
Block 
Population Cumulative 
Population 
Random 
Number 
01  1281 1281
02 736 1281+736=2017 1811
03 1397 2017+1397=3414
04 1725 3414+1725=5139 4569
05 1470 5139+1470=6609
 
 This design has been adopted extensively in public health and emergency 
preparedness for use in community health and rapid needs assessments following 
hurricanes and other disasters, with only slight modifications. One key modification is the 
random selection of 7 distinct locations for interviewing in stage 2 which produces a 
more spatially distributed sample. Since disaster damages are generally of similar 
intensity in small geographic areas, selecting 7 locations, rather than selecting 1 location 
and proceeding through consecutive addresses until 7 interviews have been conducted, 
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 allows for more variability in the severity of the effects of the disaster between the 
locations. The 7 locations are a simple random sample of all existing parcels selected 
using geographic information systems-based survey site selection toolkit developed by 
the North Carolina Division of Public Health in ESRI ArcMap 9.2 (Redlands, CA). This 
modification is essential to ensure that selected households are independent and represent 
the totality of the households in the cluster (Lemeshow, 1985; Malilay, 1996). The 
modification also prevents selection bias that may be introduced by allowing the 
interviewer to select households 2 through 7 after the starting point (Lemeshow, 1985). 
Houses that appear to be poorly maintained or have unrestrained pets may lead 
interviewers to proceed in a different direction to conduct subsequent interviews. It also 
makes it possible to formally calculate standard errors and construct confidence intervals 
around estimates (Turner, 1996). 
 Probability proportionate to population cluster sampling has many advantages for 
this research. This sampling method is appropriate when the outcome is a binomial 
variable (Henderson, 1982), meaning that all households will be classified as belonging 
to 1 of 2 categories, in this case evacuated or failed to evacuate. Since evacuation is a 
common outcome, the total required sample size is appropriate (Lemeshow, 1985). This 
method also saves time and expense that would be necessary to travel between 
households selected via a simple random sample, which would also require a complete 
enumeration of households. Finally, the resulting estimates are “self-weighted” so the 
size of the cluster does not enter into the calculation of the proportions or standard errors 
(Lemeshow, 1985). 
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  In this study, the clusters were census blocks. To ensure inclusion of blocks from 
all flood zones, blocks were stratified by flood zone prior to the first stage of sampling. 
Flood zones in these 3 counties have been classified according to the updated FIRMs. 
Three flood zone designations were used; 100-year flood zones, which correspond to 
areas with a 1.0% annual chance of coastal flooding with an additional hazard associated 
with storm waves; 500-year flood zones, which correspond to the 0.2% annual chance 
flood, including areas of 1.0% annual chance flood with average depths of less than 1 
foot or with drainage areas less than 1 square mile; and non-flood zones, areas where 
there is less than 1.0% annual chance flood and flood insurance purchase is not required. 
 Census blocks were categorized by flood zone based on the flood zone 
designation of the block group’s physical center. According to the updated FIRMs, 631 
(34.6%) of the 3 counties 1825 census blocks are in flood zones; 459 (25.2%) are in 100-
year flood zones, 172 (9.4%) are in 500-year flood zones, and the remaining 1194 
(65.4%) census blocks are not located in flood zones. Table 3 shows the distribution of 
census blocks within the 3 study counties. Census blocks with no households per Census 
2000 were eliminated from the study prior to sampling. 
TABLE 3. Description of flood zone characteristics of Pasquotank, Perquimans, and 
Chowan counties by census block (n=1825) 
 
County Flood Zone Number of census 
blocks / % of total 
blocks 
 
Pasquotank   
 100 year 308 / 37.5%
 500 year 134 / 16.3%
 Non-Flood 379 / 46.2%
Perquimans   
 100 year 101 / 20.2%
 500 year 28 / 5.6%
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  Non-Flood 371 / 74.2%
Chowan 
 100 year 50 / 9.9%
 500 year 10 / 2.0%
 Non-Flood 444 / 88.1%
 
2. Data Sources 
 This research examined the relationship between self-reported social capital, 
social cohesion, and social control and evacuation from Hurricane Isabel, after 
controlling for appropriate individual covariates. All data was collected on GPS-equipped 
Trimble Recon field data collectors via in-person interviews with 1 adult member of each 
selected household with data electronically recorded at the time of interview. Interview 
teams were routed to each location with a map generated with ESRI ArcPad 6.0.3 Street 
Map USA. All data was downloaded from the field data collectors into a laptop computer 
in Microsoft Excel 2003 format (Redmond, WA). Data was then cleaned and imported in 
SAS 9.1.3 (Cary, NC) for analyses. If the household did not reside in the county at the 
time of Hurricane Isabel’s landfall in 2003, an interview was not conducted. 
a. Possible issues with survey data. The survey asked respondents to recall 
behavior from more than 4 years ago. While evacuation from a hurricane is a major life 
event, it is possible that participants reported behavior that differed from their actual 
behavior at the time of the event. The survey also included questions about anticipated 
evacuation behavior. Reports of anticipated behavior may overestimate actual evacuation 
at the time of a storm, particularly in the wake of publicity surrounding the active 
hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005. Reporting bias may also have occurred if 
respondents felt they should report positive information about hurricane preparation and 
50 
 evacuation to the interviewer; self-reported answers could not be confirmed by the 
interviewers. As this research was conducted in partnership with the local public health 
agency and local emergency management officials, and all interviewers were identified 
by clothing denoting this local association, this may have improved both response rates 
and honesty of response if respondents feel that the information was important to 
improve local services and community preparedness. 
 
3. Study Measures 
 This section describes how the outcome, exposure, and covariate measures were 
constructed from the data collected. 
a. Outcome: Evacuation from Hurricane Isabel. Evacuation from 
Hurricane Isabel was the primary outcome of interest for this dissertation and was based 
on self-reported relocation of a household to any location other than their primary 
residence prior to landfall of Hurricane Isabel on September 18, 2003 (Table 4). 
TABLE 4. Outcome variable 
 
Name Definition Form 
 
Evacuated 
 
Self-reported relocation of 
household to any alternate 
location prior to landfall of 
Hurricane Isabel on 
September 18, 2003 
 
Dichotomous 
0: Evacuated 
1: Failed to evacuate 
 
b. Exposure: Social Capital, Social Control, and Social Cohesion. An 
estimate of the extent of social cohesion, social control, and social capital of each 
household was ascertained via the questionnaire (see Appendix A) using established 
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 measures for social cohesion (Sampson, 1997), social control (Sampson, 1997), and 
social capital (Coleman, 1990; Kawachi, 2000; Putnam, 2000) (Table 5). Preliminary 
exploration of the social cohesion variables indicated that they were normally distributed. 
However, social control variables were skewed left, with most households reporting 
fairly high levels of social control. Social capital was measured in 2 ways; to measure 
civic engagement respondents were asked to report any memberships in business, civic, 
community and religions organizations and to measure the density of kinship and 
friendship ties respondents were asked to report the number of local and non-local friends 
and family as well as whether they received assistance from local or non-local friends and 
family in the aftermath of Hurricane Isabel. 
TABLE 5. Exposure variables 
 
 Question 
Number 
Form 
Social Capital. Friendship and Kinship Ties 
About how many close friends and relatives do you 
have that live in this neighborhood or community? 
38 Enter number 
To your knowledge, did none, some, most, or all of 
your family, friends and neighbors evacuate before 
Hurricane Isabel? 
39 0: None; 1: Some, 
2: Most, 3:All 
Did you look to these local friends and family for 
assistance or advice about evacuation before 
Hurricane Isabel? 
40 0: No 
1: Yes 
How many of your close friends and family members 
live outside this immediate area, where they would 
not have been affected by Hurricane Isabel? 
41 0: None; 1: Some, 
2: Most, 3:All 
Did you look to these non-local friends and family 
for assistance or advice about evacuation before 
Hurricane Isabel? 
 
42 0: No 
1: Yes 
 Question 
Number 
Form 
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 Social Capital. Civic Engagement 
Are you a member of any of the following business 
or civic organizations? 
43 Picklist, Open 
“other” 
Are you a member of any of the following 
community organizations? 
44 Picklist, Open 
“other” 
Are you a member of a church or other local 
religious organization? 
45 0: No 
1: Yes 
Including business groups, community 
groups, and church, about how many 
meetings of any of these organizations do you 
attend per month? 
46 Enter number 
Did you receive information about Hurricane Isabel 
from any of these organizations? 
47 0: No 
1: Yes 
Did any of these organizations provide relief 
assistance or other hurricane related assistance in 
your community after Hurricane Isabel? 
48 0: No 
1: Yes 
Did you do any volunteer work through these 
organizations to help hurricane victims? 
49 0: No 
1: Yes 
Social Control. Would you be very likely, somewhat likely, neither likely nor 
unlikely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely to intervene if: 
You saw children in your neighborhood or 
community skipping school. 
50 Likert Scale; 1–5 
You saw children in your neighborhood or 
community destroying property such as spraying 
graffiti on a building. 
51 Likert Scale; 1–5 
You saw children in your neighborhood or 
community showing disrespect to an adult. 
52 Likert Scale; 1–5 
You saw a fight in front of a neighbor or community 
member’s home. 
53 Likert Scale; 1–5 
You heard that there were to be severe budget cuts in 
your neighborhood or community that would affect 
the ability of the police or fire department to 
function? 
54 Likert Scale; 1–5 
You saw looters stealing from one of your neighbors 
or community members after a hurricane or other 
disaster 
55 Likert Scale; 1–5 
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 Social Cohesion. Would you say that you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements: 
People who live in this neighborhood or community 
are willing to help their neighbors. 
56 Likert Scale; 1–5 
This is a close-knit neighborhood or community. 57 Likert Scale; 1–5 
People in this neighborhood or community can be 
trusted. 
58 Likert Scale; 1–5 
People here in this neighborhood or community do 
not get along. 
59 Likert Scale; 1–5 
 Question 
Number 
Form 
People here in this neighborhood or community 
share the same values. 
60 Likert Scale; 1–5 
This neighborhood or community has the services 
that I need such as a homeowners’ association or a 
crime prevention program. 
61 Likert Scale; 1–5 
 
c. Assessment of Potential Effect Measure Modifiers. 
 Each covariate was assessed for effect measure modification by testing the 
homogeneity of risk differences across strata of covariates. An a priori criteria for an 
effect measure modifier is a Wald Heterogeneity test p-value of < 0.20 (Selvin, 2004). 
Substantive as well as significant modification was explored further based on published 
literature and subject matter expertise.   
d. Assessment of Potential Confounders. 
 Assessment of confounding was conducted after completion of the assessment for 
effect measure modification and was informed by published literature and the directed 
acyclic graph (DAG) (Figure 5). To assess confounding, variables were removed 1 at a 
time, starting with the variables with the largest standard error as compared to its 
estimated effect. An a priori change in the RD of ≥ 0.10 was used to determine whether a 
variable should be considered to be a confounder (Maldonado, 1993). Variables that are 
commonly adjusted for in the literature were included in the final models to enhance 
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 comparability if their inclusion did not significantly affect the precision of the estimate. If 
deletion led to a gain in precision, then these variables were deleted. 
e. Directed Acyclic Graph. 
 
FIGURE 5. Directed Acyclic Graph for association of social factors (social control, social 
capital, and social cohesion) on Hurricane Isabel evacuation 
 
Social Factors Evacuation 
(Hurricane 
Isabel, Y,N)
Evacuation Order 
Covered Your 
Home
Perceived Risk
Past Evacuation
Behavior
Type of Home
Pet Ownership
Homeowner
Prepared Property
Neighbors 
Evacuated
Age
Medical Needs
 
Figure 5 illustrates the proposed directed acyclic graph for the project. Unblocked 
backdoor paths identify pet ownership, past evacuation, age, prepared property, medical 
needs, age, perceived risk, neighbor’s evacuation, and home type as potential 
confounders.  
4. Data Analysis 
 This research used a cross-sectional survey to assess the role of social cohesion, 
social control and social capital on evacuation from Hurricane Isabel among residents of 
Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan Counties. A cross-sectional study was an 
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 appropriate design for this study. Results of the study are highly generalizable to the 3-
county region since the study was based on a sample of the general population. 
Limitations around determining the temporality of exposure and outcome which can 
sometimes be important in cross-sectional studies do not apply in this case as the 
outcome clearly follows the exposures, and the exposures are considered to be 
cumulative over time. The study assessed the association between social factors and 
evacuation at a single point in time to measure risk differences between the exposed and 
unexposed.  This section discussed how the quality of the data was assured, the study 
hypotheses that arose from the research questions, and the statistical analyses that were 
conducted to answer the questions posed. 
 a.  Quality Control. This research involved primary data collection. Data 
was collected by 1- and 2-person teams of trained interviewers on handheld computers at 
the time of the interview and downloaded into a central computer for cleaning and 
analysis. Interviewers received training in basic interviewing techniques, as well as an 
introduction to GIS and GPS, and practice with the use of the handheld computer. 
Interview teams consisted of 1 graduate student in the University of North Carolina 
Gillings School of Global Public Health and 1 staff member from ARHD. A paper-based 
log of each refusal and completed interview was kept by each interview team and 
submitted along with the handheld computer at the end of each day. After download, all 
data was reviewed for errors and inconsistencies. Outliers and impossible data values 
were confirmed with the interview team, and were dropped from the dataset if reasonable 
values could not be verified 
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  Demographic, geographic, and information about hurricane experience and 
perceived risk were collected using questions taken from published examples of 
hurricane evacuation research. Measures of social cohesion, social control, and social 
capital were based on well-established measures that have been validated and published 
by other researchers. 
 If those who are at highest risk for evacuation failure are also more likely to be 
missed in a household survey, there was potential for response bias. Interviews were 
conducted on weekends and weekdays during both day and evening hours to minimize 
potential response bias. Low refusal rates in similar research conducted in eastern North 
Carolina has been previously demonstrated. 
b. Study Hypotheses Review. The primary outcome for this project is 
hurricane evacuation failure. The study hypotheses arising from the 3 research questions 
are as follows: 
 
Question 1: Were social capital, social cohesion, social control, and other social factors 
associated with failure to evacuate from Hurricane Isabel by households in Pasquotank, 
Perquimans, and Chowan Counties? 
Hypothesis 1: High levels of social cohesion, social control, and social capital were 
associated with increased evacuation failure from Hurricane Isabel among residents of 
northeastern North Carolina. 
Rationale: Exploration of the role of social cohesion, social control, and social capital in 
hurricane evacuation behavior has been limited in the literature and results have been 
inconsistent.  
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Question 2: Was there evidence of heterogeneity on the risk difference scale for the 
association of demographic covariates and hurricane evacuation failure according to the 
value of social cohesion, social control, social capital and other social factors?   
Hypothesis 2:  Factors generally studied as determinants of evacuation—age, gender, 
race, home type, children in home, pet ownership, past evacuation, risk perception, and 
property preparation—have not been further explored if found not to be significantly 
associated with evacuation in bivariate analysis. 
Rationale: Failing to identify effect measure modifiers in analysis results in the 
calculation of an average risk across the population. In this case, heterogeneity is 
fundamentally important to the development of effective and targeted public health 
interventions which recognize the disparities of disasters. 
 
Question 3: Were perceived and actual risk associated with failure to evacuate from 
Hurricane Isabel by households in Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan Counties? 
Hypothesis 3:  Residents of areas classified by government authorities as flood zones are 
often unable to accurately assess their risk for flooding. Neither perceived nor actual 
flood risk was associated with failure to evacuate from Hurricane Isabel in 2003.  
Rationale: Major governmental investments in updated flood maps have no impact on 
public health and safety if residents are unaware of their risk and if flood zone 
designation is not associated with hurricane evacuation. 
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c. Statistical Analysis. 
 Exploratory and Descriptive Analysis. The data analysis began by examining the 
distributions of the outcome, exposures and covariates. Data was summarized in 
contingency tables, histograms, and box plots to assess normality and linearity. 
 Crude Associations. Crude associations between the measures of social cohesion, 
social control, and social capital and evacuation failure were assessed using SAS 9.1.3 
statistical software (Cary, NC). 
 Multivariable Regression Analysis. The primary outcome was evacuation failure 
prior to landfall of Hurricane Isabel. Since the outcome is common, the main analytic 
approach was generalized linear modeling, which produced risk differences (RD) 
representing the risk of evacuation failure for households with high levels of social 
cohesion, social control, and social capital compared with the risk of evacuation failure 
for households with low levels of social cohesion, social control, and social capital. 
Separate models were developed for each main exposure. Since a major goal of this study 
is the development of recommendations around public health interventions to improve 
evacuation, the RD scale is most appropriate. 
 Backward elimination was used to develop a parsimonious model. Interaction 
terms were evaluated for significance individually, and terms with a Wald p-value less 
that the a priori criteria of 0.20 were retained in the model (Selvin, 2004). Confounding 
was assessed by removing variables 1 at a time from the model. To maintain a 
hierarchically well-formulated model, covariates that were part of significant interaction 
terms were not considered for individual removal from the model for the assessment of 
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 confounding or at any other time. Model convergence and predicted probabilities 
between the values of 0 and 1 were verified. Model selection was informed by comparing 
-2 log likelihoods of nested models. 
d. Study size. For binomial outcomes, the size of the necessary simple 
random sample required to produce results of a specified accuracy and precision can be 
determined from the following formula (Henderson, 1982; Lemeshow, 1985):  n = (z2pq) 
/ d2 where d is the precision of the result required, z is the confidence limits of the survey 
results, and p and q are the proportion of the population who evacuated and the 
proportion who failed to evacuate. The sum of p and q must equal 1.0 (Henderson, 1982). 
 Since the proportion of the population that evacuated from Hurricane Isabel was 
previously estimated, these figures were used. According to a 2004 study conducted by 
the US Army Corps of Engineers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 23% of residents in the counties 
classified as Category 1–3 storm surge areas (including Pasquotank, Chowan, and 
Perquimans Counties) evacuated from Hurricane Isabel, while 77% did not. The value of 
z for the 95% confidence interval is 1.96, while the value for d will be set at ±5%. 
Therefore, n = (1.96)2 (0.23) (0.77) / (0.05)2  = 0.68034736 / 0.0025 = 272. To select a 
simple random sample of size 272 from all households in the region is not operationally 
feasible as no enumeration of households existed and the interviewing process would 
have been highly inefficient. Therefore, a cluster sample of approximately twice the size 
of the simple random sample was needed to achieve the same precision (Lemeshow, 
1985). As a result, the necessary sample size with cluster sampling was 544. In keeping 
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 with the tradition of the “30x7” sampling methodology, a total of 630 interviews were 
attempted. 
C. HUMAN SUBJECTS 
This research received approval by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Gillings School of Global Public Health 
(Public Health IRB #06-0426, approved August 2006 and subsequently renewed in 
August 2007 and August 2008). Data elements for the proposed research do not contain 
personal identifiers such as name, address, or date of birth. Although the field data 
collectors will capture the geographic location of the interview, specific data about the 
location (such as longitude and latitude) was not made available to the investigators and it 
was not possible to identify the specific household or the individual interviewed.  
D. SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
The survey instrument (Appendix A) includes questions typically included on all 
hurricane evacuation research questionnaires, in addition to questions addressing social 
capital, social cohesion, and social control. Exposure measurements used established 
measures which have been previously published. Information on actual and hypothetical 
evacuation behavior was collected. 
 A pilot-test of the survey instrument was conducted with 14 residents of Chowan 
County on March 8, 2008. Based on the pilot test, several adjustments were made to the 
questionnaire. In addition, the questionnaire was informed by meetings on March 7, 2008 
with county emergency management and ARHD officials. Questions related to special 
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 medial needs, supplies necessary for evacuation to a shelter, and primary sources of news 
about weather events were added at their request.  
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XI. CHAPTER 4. RESULTS PAPER 1 
 
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH RISK OF EVACUATION FAILURE FROM 
HURRICANE ISABEL IN NORTH CAROLINA, 2003 
A. Abstract 
 PURPOSE. Important differences in risk of evacuation failure exist across 
households. This study examines if social factors such as social capital, social cohesion 
and social control contributed to differential rates of evacuation from Hurricane Isabel by 
residents of 3 North Carolina counties. METHODS. Census blocks in 3 counties affected 
by Hurricane Isabel were stratified by flood zone. Thirty census blocks were selected 
probability proportionate to population size from each flood zone. Within each selected 
block, 7 random interview locations were chosen using a geographic information 
systems-based site selection tool. Risk differences (RD) and 95% confidence intervals 
(CI) for evacuation failure were calculated for social factors including social capital, 
social control and social cohesion. RESULTS. High levels of neighborhood social 
cohesion, markers of territoriality (e.g. no trespassing signs), membership in a church or 
civic organization, neighbors’ evacuation and longer length of residence were associated 
with an increased risk of hurricane evacuation failure in this study. While attending more 
church or organizational meetings did not increase the likelihood of evacuation failure, 
 
 those who reported that they volunteered through their church or civic group to provide 
assistance following Hurricane Isabel were more likely to fail to evacuate. 
CONCLUSIONS. Differential levels of social capital, social cohesion and related social 
factors contributed to differential rates of evacuation from Hurricane Isabel. Those who 
reported closer relationships with neighbors and were active volunteers in the community 
may be most susceptible to evacuation failure and should received targeted messages 
regarding evacuation from officials. 
 
B. Background 
 On September 18, 2003, Hurricane Isabel made landfall as a Category 2 storm on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale between Ocracoke Island, NC, and Cape Lookout, NC. The 
storm entered the Albemarle Sound where winds of up to 105 miles per hour and storm 
surge of 4–6 feet caused extensive flooding and downed trees and power lines. One death 
and over $450 million in property damage were directly attributed to Hurricane Isabel.  
 Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan counties are located in northeastern North 
Carolina between the Albemarle Sound and the Virginia-North Carolina border (Figure 
6). All 3 counties are primarily rural, with a total population of 60,791 persons and 
26,775 households (FedStats 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). The region is seeing increased 
growth and development, with more housing units as coastal property values have 
increased; although 20 to 35 percent of all homes in the counties are still mobile homes 
(FedStats 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). Rapid growth in population and development without 
concurrent infrastructure development (such as highways) may hinder evacuation, while 
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 poor quality housing leaves residents at risk for repeated property damage and hurricane 
related injuries. 
 
FIGURE 6. Map of North Carolina with 3-county study area expanded 
 
According to a study conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (2004), 23% of residents in the counties classified as Category 1–3 
storm surge areas (including Pasquotank, Chowan, and Perquimans counties) evacuated 
from Hurricane Isabel, while 77% did not. Pasquotank, Perquimans and Chowan counties 
are part of the 7-county Albemarle Regional Health District (ARHD). As such, they share 
staff, emergency preparedness plans and other area-level public health and emergency 
response resources. 
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 C. Methods 
1. Data Sources 
 Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) for the 3 counties were obtained from the 
North Carolina Floodplain Mapping Program. To ensure that each flood zone was 
represented in the study, census blocks were first stratified by flood zone based on the 
designation of the block’s physical center. Thirty census blocks in each stratum were then 
randomly selected based on probability proportionate to population size. Within each 
selected block, 7 interview locations were chosen from a simple random sample of all 
existing parcels using a geographic information systems-based (GIS) survey site selection 
toolkit developed by the North Carolina Division of Public Health in ESRI ArcMap 9.2 
(Redlands, CA).  
 Data were collected between March 15, 2008, and August 23, 2008, using global 
positioning systems-equipped Trimble Recon field data collectors via in-person 
interviews with 1 adult member of each selected household. Data were electronically 
recorded at the time of interview. Interviewers were routed to each location with a map 
generated with ESRI ArcPad 6.0.3 Street Map USA (Redlands, CA). Selected households 
were approached by an interviewer or interview team and gave informed consent. In 
order to qualify for inclusion, the resident had to be living in the same place as they did 
when Hurricane Isabel made landfall. This research received approval by the Institutional 
Review Board of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Gillings School of 
Global Public Health (Public Health IRB #06-0426). 
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 2. Study Outcome 
 Evacuation from Hurricane Isabel is defined as self-reported relocation of a 
household or any household members to any location other than their primary residence 
prior to landfall of Hurricane Isabel on September 18, 2003.  
3. Exposure to Social Factors 
 Social capital, social cohesion, and social control among the study sample were 
determined using established measures for social cohesion (Sampson, Raudenbush, and 
Earls 1997), social control (Sampson et al. 1997), and social capital (Coleman 1990; 
Kawachi and Berkman 2000; Putnam 2000). Additional social control measures included 
markers of territoriality (Riad, Norris, and Ruback 1999) and property preparation (Baker 
1991; Buckland and Rahman 1999). 
Social cohesion was represented by 5 survey questions that asked respondents 
about their willingness to help neighbors, how close-knit they felt their neighborhood 
was, whether they trusted their neighbors, whether they got along with their neighbors, 
and whether neighbors shared their values. Responses to each question were on a 5 point 
Likert scale and had a possible total score of 4 (0 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree) 
with higher values reflecting greater social cohesion.  To determine the consistency of the 
5 questions in measuring the single construct of social cohesion, a Cronbach’s alpha 
statistic was calculated in SAS 9.1.3 (Cary, NC). 
Social control was represented by 5 survey questions that asked respondents about 
their likelihood of taking action if they saw children from their neighborhood destroying 
property, skipping school, fighting, or being disrespectful to an adult. Respondents were 
also asked about the likelihood that they would write a letter or attend a community 
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 meeting if they heard that budget cuts were likely to eliminate a program that was 
important to them, such as a local fire station. Responses to each question were on a 5 
point Likert scale and had a total possible score of 4 (0 = highly unlikely; 4 = highly 
likely) with higher values reflecting greater social control. Similar to social cohesion, a 
Cronbach’s alpha statistic was calculated in SAS 9.1.3 (Cary, NC) to determine the 
consistency of responses to the 5 questions. 
Social capital was measured in 2 ways. Following Putnam’s (2000) model of civic 
involvement, respondents were asked to report any memberships in business, civic, 
community, and religions organizations. To measure engagement, respondents reported 
the number of meetings they attended each month. Information on organizational social 
capital specifically related to Hurricane Isabel was also collected, including dichotomous 
questions for whether the organization provided information or assistance to area 
residents affected by Hurricane Isabel and whether the respondent themselves 
volunteered through these organizations to provide assistance to anyone impacted by 
Hurricane Isabel. The density of friendship and kinship ties was also examined by having 
respondents report the number of local and non-local friends and family, whether or not 
the respondent received assistance after Hurricane Isabel from local or non-local friends 
and family, and whether or not local friends and family evacuated from Hurricane Isabel. 
Several other social factors were measured. Prior to starting an interview, 
interviewers recorded the presence of markers of territoriality at the residence, including 
names on mailboxes, no trespassing signs, beware of dog signs, and fenced in yards (Riad 
et al. 1999). To measure the extent of property preparation and the potential for residents 
to fail to evacuate in order to monitor their property, residents were asked whether they 
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 prepared their property in advance of Hurricane Isabel by putting plywood on windows 
or taking other measures to protect their property. If residents reported making 
preparations, they were asked whether keeping an eye on those preparations was part of 
their reason for failing to evacuate (Baker 1991; Buckland and Rahman 1999). Residents 
were also asked if they agreed that their county or city provided the services that they 
needed, such as healthcare and after school and recreation programs for children, and 
how likely they would be to intervene if they saw looters stealing from a neighbor after a 
hurricane. Responses to both of these questions were on a 5 point Likert scale and had a 
total possible score of 4 (0 = strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree) with higher values 
reflecting stronger agreement or likelihood. 
4. Data Analysis 
 Bivariate analyses were performed using generalized linear models to identify any 
associations between hurricane evacuation failure and demographic, storm related, and 
social factor variables. Crude risk differences (RDs) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) 
were estimated. CIs that did not include the null value were interpreted as indicating a 
statistically significant difference in the absolute risk of evacuation failure between the 
referent group and the exposed group. For both dichotomous and multilevel exposures, 
reference categories were selected because they were identified in previous studies or 
assumed by the authors to be the lowest risk for evacuation failure. All statistical analyses 
were conducted in SAS 9.1.3 (Cary, NC). 
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 D. Results 
Of those eligible to participate, 86.8% responded to the survey (Figure 7). 
Evacuation was defined as self-reported relocation of a household or any household 
members to any location other than the primary residence prior to Hurricane Isabel 
landfall on September 18, 2003. In the study sample, 28% (n= 162) of the residents 
interviewed reported evacuating prior to Hurricane Isabel landfall, while 72% (n=408) 
did not evacuate. 
FIGURE 7. Response rate: Of those eligible to participate in the study, 86.8% (570/656) 
responded to the survey questions. 
 
Total Households 
Approached: 1058 
Not at Home / Did 
Not Answer: 342 
At Home: 716 
Not Resident during 
Hurricane Isabel: 58 
Resident during 
Isabel: 656 
Language 
Barrier: 2 
Interview 
Refused: 86 
Interview 
Conducted: 570 
 
 
 Those living in stick built single family homes had an excess risk of evacuation 
failure of 36% (95% CI: 27%, 45%) when compared with those living in mobile homes. 
In other words, out of every 100 residents of the region, 36 more people evacuated if they 
lived in mobile homes than if they lived in stick built homes. Homeowners were also 
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 more likely to fail to evacuate, with an excess risk of evacuation failure of 10% (95% CI: 
1%, 21%) compared to those who rented their homes. Residents 50 years or older had an 
excess risk of evacuation failure of 10% (95% CI: 2%, 18%) when compared with 
younger residents. Race, gender, marital status, having children, having pets, or having a 
special medical need was not significantly associated to evacuation status (Table 6). 
TABLE 6. Distribution, crude risk differences and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) for 
demographic factors potentially associated with evacuation from Hurricane Isabel, 2003 
(n=570) 
 
Variable Description Evacuated  
(n=162) 
Did not evacuate  
(n=408) 
Risk differences 
(95% CI) 
 n % n %  
      
Home Type      
Stick Built 78 19.50 322 80.50 REF 
Mobile Home 82 55.03 67 44.97 0.36 (0.27, 0.45) 
Multi-Unit 2 9.52 19 90.48 -0.20 (-0.35, -0.04) 
Homeownership      
Own 118 26.22 332 73.78 REF 
Rent 44 36.67 76 63.33 0.10 (0.004, 0.21) 
Age      
Less than 50 91 33.83 178 66.17 REF 
50 Years or Older 71 23.75 228 76.25 0.10 (0.02, 0.18) 
Missing 0 0.00 2 1.00  
Race      
White 114 27.14 306 72.86 REF 
African-American or 
Other 48 32.00 102 68.00 0.05 (-0.05, 0.14) 
Gender      
Female 100 31.65 216 68.35 REF 
Male 62 24.41 192 75.59 0.07 (-0.01, 0.15) 
Marital Status      
Married 112 29.17 272 70.83 REF 
Widowed, Never 
Married, or Divorced 50 26.88 136 73.12 -0.02 (-0.11, 0.06) 
Children in Household      
Yes 85 23.55 276 76.45 0.13 (-0.05, 0.22) 
No 77 36.84 132 63.16 REF 
Pets      
Yes 69 27.17 185 72.83 0.02 (-0.05, 0.10) 
No 93 29.43 223 70.57 REF 
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 Special Medical Needs      
Yes 147 28.88 362 71.12 -0.04 (-0.17, 0.08) 
No 15 24.59 46 75.41 REF 
 
 
 Residents who believed that their home was under an evacuation order issued by 
local authorities had a reduced risk of evacuation failure of 32% (95% CI: 16%, 48%) 
when compared with those who believed that an evacuation order did not cover their 
home. Those who reported that they did not know whether or not an evacuation order 
covered their home also had a reduced risk of evacuation failure of 18% (95% CI: 3%, 
34%) when compared with those who believed that an evacuation order did not cover 
their home. Having an evacuation plan was important for successful evacuation, with 
those who did not have a plan having an excess risk of evacuation failure of 15% (95% 
CI: 6%, 23%) when compared to those with an evacuation plan. On the other hand, not 
having a disaster supply kit was not significantly associated with hurricane evacuation 
failure. Neither perceived risk for flood or wind damage was significantly related to 
hurricane evacuation failure (Table 7). 
TABLE 7. Distribution, crude risk differences and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) 
for storm-related factors potentially associated with evacuation from Hurricane Isabel, 
2003 (n=570) 
 
Variable Description Evacuated 
(n=162) 
Did not evacuate 
(n=408) 
Risk differences  
(95% CI) 
 n % n %  
      
Believed Home Under 
Evacuation Order 
     
Yes 26 57.78 19 42.22 -0.32 (-0.48, -0.16) 
No 113 23.84 361 76.16 REF 
Don’t Know 23 45.10 28 54.90 -0.18 (-0.34, -0.03) 
Evacuation Plan      
Yes 128 33.86 250 66.14 REF 
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 No 31 19.25 130 80.25 0.15 (0.06, 0.23) 
Missing 3 9.68 28 90.32  
Disaster Supply Kit      
Yes 95 26.99 257 73.01 REF 
No 67 30.73 151 69.27 -0.04 (-0.12, 0.04) 
Perceived Flood Risk      
Low 105 27.78 273 72.22 REF 
Medium 32 25.81 92 74.19 -0.03 (-0.13, 0.06) 
High 25 36.76 43 63.24 0.09 (-0.03, 0.22) 
Perceived Wind Risk      
Low 35 22.15 123 77.85 REF 
Medium 73 31.60 158 68.40 0.05 (-0.03, 0.13) 
High 54 29.83 127 70.17 0.02 (-0.06, 0.10) 
 
 Responses for the 5 social cohesion questions were closely associated 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.92) and were therefore aggregated. The range for total social cohesion 
was 0 to 20 with a median of 15. In the crude analysis, a 1-unit increase in social 
cohesion was associated with an excess risk of evacuation failure of 1% (95% CI: 0%, 
2%). When the social cohesion factors were examined separately, strongly agreeing in 
your willingness to help neighbors was associated with an excess risk of evacuation 
failure of 6% (95% CI: 1%, 11%), characterizing your neighborhood as close knit was 
associated with an excess risk of evacuation failure of 5% (95% CI: 1%, 9%), strongly 
agreeing that you trust your neighbors was associated with an excess risk of evacuation 
failure of 6% (95% CI: 2%, 10%) and strongly agreeing that your neighbors get along 
well was associated with an excess risk of evacuation failure of 5% (95% CI: 1%, 9%). 
 Responses for the 5 social control questions were closely associated (Cronbach’s 
α = 0.87) and were therefore aggregated. The range for total social control was 0 to 20 
with a median of 17. In the crude analysis, there was no change in the risk of evacuation 
failure for a 1-unit increase in social control. When the social control factors were 
examined separately, strongly agreeing in your willingness to confront or report children 
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 skipping school was associated with a reduced risk of evacuation failure of 3% (95% CI: 
0%, 6%) and showing disrespect to elders was associated with a reduced risk of 
evacuation failure of 3% (95% CI: 0%, 7%). The other individual social control variables 
had no effect on the risk of evacuation failure. 
 Other variables may have also given some indication of social control. Residents 
who had markers of territoriality at their homes, including names on mailboxes, no 
trespassing or beware of dog signs, or fenced-in yards had an excess risk of evacuation 
failure of 11% (95% CI: 3%, 19%) (Table 8). However, respondents who indicated that 
they spent time preparing their property prior to the storm were no more likely to fail to 
evacuate. Residents who felt that their community provided the services they needed, 
including health care, recreation, and after-school programs, had a non-significant 
increase in their risk of evacuation failure of 2% (95% CI: - 2%, 5%) for each unit 
increase in agreement. Residents who felt that they would be very likely to intervene if 
they saw looters stealing from a neighbor after a hurricane also had a non-significant 
increase in their risk of evacuation failure of 2% (95% CI: - 2%, 7%) for each unit 
increase in likelihood to intervene. 
TABLE 8. Distribution, crude risk differences and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) 
for additional social control measures potentially associated with evacuation from 
Hurricane Isabel, 2003 (n=570) 
 
Variable Description Evacuated  
(n=162) 
Did not evacuate  
(n=408) 
Risk differences  
(95% CI) 
 n % n %  
      
Markers of Territoriality      
No 132 31.35 289 68.65 REF 
Yes 30 20.13 119 79.87 0.11 (0.03, 0.19) 
Prepared Property      
Yes 101 28.13 258 71.87 0.01 (-0.07, 0.09) 
No 61 28.91 150 71.09 REF 
76 
  Social capital was measured in 2 ways, including organizational participation and 
the number and location of friends and family. Respondents who reported that they were 
members of a church had an excess risk of evacuation failure of 11% (95% CI: 3%, 19%) 
when compared with those who were not church members (Table 9). Membership in a 
business or civic organization (e.g., Rotary, Ruritan, or the American Legion) was 
associated with an excess risk of evacuation failure of 16% (95% CI: 5%, 28%) when 
compared with those who did not report membership this type of organization. Those 
who attended more church services or organizational meetings per month were no more 
likely to fail to evacuate than those who attended fewer meetings. There was also no 
difference in the risk of evacuation failure for respondents if the organizations they 
participated in provided relief services to those affected by the hurricane or if the 
organizations provided information about Hurricane Isabel to the respondent. However, if 
the respondent reported being a volunteer through one of these organizations following 
Hurricane Isabel their excess risk of evacuation failure was 12% (95% CI: 3%, 21%). 
TABLE 9. Distribution, crude risk differences and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) 
for social capital measures potentially associated with evacuation from Hurricane Isabel, 
2003 (n=570) 
 
Variable Description Evacuated  
(n=162) 
Did not evacuate  
(n=408) 
Risk differences  
(95% CI) 
 n % n %  
      
Attend Church      
No 69 35.75 124 64.25 REF 
Yes 93 24.73 283 75.27 0.11 (0.03, 0.19) 
Missing 0 0.00 1 1.00  
Member of a Club      
No 155 29.92 363 70.08 REF 
Yes 7 13.46 45 86.54 0.16 (0.05, 0.28) 
Provided Hurricane Relief       
No 103 27.83 267 72.17 0.03 (-0.05, 0.11). 
Yes 42 24.85 127 75.15 REF 
77 
 Missing 17 54.84 14 45.16  
Provided Hurricane 
Information  
     
No 145 29.29 350 70.71 -0.06 (-0.17, 0.05) 
Yes 17 23.29 56 76.71 REF 
Volunteered      
No 144 30.51 328 69.49 REF 
Yes 18 18.37 80 81.63 0.12 (0.03, 0.21) 
 
   
 Neither the number of local friends and family nor the number of out-of-town 
friends and family were significantly associated with an increased risk of evacuation 
failure for the respondent. Receiving evacuation assistance from either local or non-local 
friends or family was also not associated with evacuation failure. 
 Other factors may also give some indication of the role of social capital in 
evacuation failure. When considering their neighbors’ behavior, indicating that some 
neighbors evacuated was associated with a reduced risk of evacuation failure of 14% 
(95% CI: 4%, 24%) while indicating that most or all neighbors evacuated was associated 
with a reduced risk of evacuation failure of 61% (95% CI: 49%, 73%) (Table 10).  
Length of residence in the specific home that was greater than the sample median of 8 
years was associated with an excess risk of evacuation failure of 10% (95% CI: 3%, 
18%).  Having more hurricane experience than the median of 4 hurricanes was also 
associated with an excess risk of evacuation failure of 10% (95% CI: 3%, 18%).   
TABLE 10. Distribution, crude risk differences and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) 
for social capital measures potentially associated with evacuation from Hurricane Isabel, 
2003 (n=570) 
 
Variable Description Evacuated  
(n=162 ) 
Did not evacuate  
(n=408) 
Risk differences  
(95% CI) 
 n % N %  
      
Neighbors’ Evacuation      
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 None 71 18.07 322 81.93 REF 
Some 48 39.02 75 60.98 -0.14 (-0.24, -0.04) 
Most or All 41 83.67 8 16.33 -0.61 (-0.73, -0.49) 
Missing 2 40.00 3 60.00  
Tenure in Home      
≤8 Years 95 33.57 188 66.43 REF 
> 8 Years 67 23.34 220 76.66 0.10 (0.03, 0.18) 
Hurricanes Experienced      
≤4  89 34.10 172 65.90 REF 
> 4 73 23.62 236 76.38 0.10 (0.03, 0.18) 
 
 
E. Discussion 
 The associations between hurricane evacuation and individual and household 
demographic factors have been somewhat inconsistent in published studies. The 2 
principal reviews of the hurricane evacuation literature (Quarantelli 1980; Baker 1991) 
showed no significant association between hurricane evacuation failure and demographic 
characteristics including race, gender, marital status, having children, having pets, or 
having a special medical need. However, more recent studies have shown significant 
associations between evacuation and gender (Whitehead 2001; Bateman 2002; Gladwin 
2005; Lindell 2005), race (Van Willigen 2005; Riad et al. 1999), pet ownership (Heath 
2001; Whitehead 2001), having children at home (Lindell 2005) and special medical 
needs (Maiolo 2001; Van Willigen 2002).  
In this study, there were no significant associations between demographic 
variables and evacuation failure with the exception of age, with older residents being 
more likely overall to fail to evacuate. At the county level, African-Americans had a 
reduced risk of evacuation failure in Chowan County of 16% (95% CI: 1%, 33%) and 
those with children had a reduced risk of evacuation failure in Perquimans County of 
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 19% (95% CI: 5%, 32%). The fact that there are few differences between demographic 
groups in this study leads us to question the construction of social difference in this 
region and suggests that further research focusing on other factors related to the 
evacuation decision is warranted. Variables suggested by Baker (1991) for further 
research included church attendance and the number of property preparations taken. 
These factors, as well as additional measures of social capital, social cohesion, and social 
control, were included in this study along with demographic and storm-specific factors.  
Older residents were more likely to fail to evacuate than younger residents, 
possibly due to actual or perceived difficulties in evacuation or based on experience with 
previous storms. The last major hurricane to affect this area was Hurricane Hazel in 1954, 
which may have led older residents to believe that they were not at risk.  The type of 
home and whether the respondent rented or owned the home were strongly predictive of 
evacuation failure. Those who live in mobile homes are clearly aware of added dangers 
of failing to evacuate during severe weather when compared to those who live in stick 
built homes. It is also reasonable that renters have less at stake in terms of the damage 
that may occur to their homes. Renters are unlikely to have any financial or other 
responsibility for damages that may occur to a landlord’s property, and therefore have 
little interest in staying through a storm to see how the property fares. 
The belief that their property was covered by an evacuation order issued by local 
government officials was an important factor in residents’ decision to evacuate from 
Hurricane Isabel, indicating that the issuance of evacuation orders is effective in 
encouraging evacuation. In addition, those who reported that they did not know whether 
or not an evacuation order covered their home were also more likely to chose to evacuate, 
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 perhaps feeling that it was better to be safe than sorry. A closer examination of the 
covariate pattern for those reporting that they did not know whether their home was 
covered by an evacuation order showed that they were more than twice as likely to live in 
a mobile home and about one-third as likely to have children under 18 years old living at 
home compared to the overall study sample.  
The perception of risk of damage from either flooding or high winds was not 
associated with evacuation. This leads us to ask: How bad must respondents perceive 
conditions are before they decide to evacuate? Perceived risk includes not only the 
official or personal assessment of the severity of the threat (e.g., the issuance of the 
evacuation order) but also the individuals’ perceived susceptibility (Riad and Norris 
1998; Perry, Lindell, and Greene 1981; Houts et al. 1984). While residents’ perceived 
susceptibility to flooding or wind damage was not enough to spur evacuation from 
Hurricane Isabel, perceived severity as determined by an evacuation order was. Those 
who live in an area where they feel the risks for flood and wind damage are severe may 
not see a way to avoid the anticipated negative effects of a strong storm and decide to 
take no action. The issuance of an evacuation order removes perceived barriers by 
providing information on open shelters and evacuation routes as part of the issuance of 
the evacuation order. Having an evacuation plan may also provide a cue to action for 
evacuation similar to that of an evacuation order. 
Higher levels of social cohesion were associated with an increase in hurricane 
evacuation failure. There is much scientific and antidotal evidence that communities 
come together in the face of a disaster. It makes sense that neighbors who trust each 
another, get along well, and are willing to help each another may feel more comfortable 
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 remaining in their homes and neighborhoods rather than evacuating. The social resources 
available through direct ties to neighbors can provide access to the temporary support 
necessary for coping with storm impact and dealing with the initial phases of recovery 
(Lin 1999). These findings are consistent with the importance that neighbors’ evacuation 
status had on the respondent’s evacuation. Neighbors who do not evacuate may 
contribute to a downward leveling of norms which encourages evacuation failure of those 
they know and trust.  
Higher levels of overall social control were not associated with evacuation failure. 
However, indicators of social control such as markers of territoriality (Riad 1999) were 
important. Posting no trespassing signs may indicate an unwillingness to follow 
government-issued evacuation orders or a lack of interest in taking part in the social 
action of an evacuation. Residents who had markers of territoriality may also be more 
likely to avoid evacuation in order to protect their property from flooding, a storm surge, 
or looting. Since the presence of markers of territoriality were noted by the interviewer 
prior to making contact with the respondent, this measure may be a more unbiased 
indicator of whether or not a respondent would trust their neighbors or take action against 
looters following a storm as some respondents may be reluctant to report distrust of 
neighbors who they believe may also be approached by the interviewer. 
Civic involvement was an important factor in hurricane evacuation failure. 
Members of churches and other community or civic groups were more likely to fail to 
evacuate than those who reported no memberships. Although density of engagement as 
measured by the number of meetings attended per month was not associated with an 
increase in evacuation failure, volunteering with the organization to provide assistance to 
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 victims of the hurricane was important in evacuation failure. Clearly, civic engagement 
engenders ties to the community that may inhibit evacuation, either through peer pressure 
or the anticipated need for assistance through volunteerism. Friendship and kinship ties 
were not associated with an increased risk of evacuation failure. Additional analyses of 
the density of relationships with friends and family using splines or other methods to 
account for outliers (e.g., respondents who reported hundreds of local friends and 
relatives) should be explored in the future. 
In previous studies, neighbors’ evacuation decision played an important role in 
the decision-making of a household, with more households choosing to stay when the 
majority of their neighbors did (Killian 1954; Moore et al. 1963; Baker 1979). The 
findings in this study were consistent with previous results. However, these results may 
be unrelated to social factors. Neighbors are likely to have the same information about a 
storm’s anticipated severity, either due to location (e.g., areas near water or low-lying 
areas) or housing quality (e.g., trailer parks or suburban developments); therefore, their 
decision to evacuate may be unrelated to the influence of their neighbors. In this study, 
there was evidence that stick built homes were clustered (Mantel-Haenszel χ2 = 84.5986; 
p <.0001) so it is likely that neighbors were all in homes they considered safe and chose 
not to evacuate regardless of their neighbors’ evacuation decision. This and the other 
associations reported in this paper should be explored further through multivariable 
modeling. 
A strength of this study is the generalizability of the results to the entire 3-county 
area. The GIS-based survey site selection toolkit allowed for random selection of 
households in the second stage of sampling. This ensured that selected households were 
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 independent and represented the totality of the households in the cluster (Lemeshow and 
Robinson 1985). This modification also prevented the selection bias that may have been 
introduced by allowing interviewers to select households for subsequent interviews after 
beginning at a random starting point (Lemeshow and Robinson 1985). Selection bias 
could be introduced if interviewers avoided homes that appeared to be poorly maintained 
or had unrestrained pets. Additional strengths of the study include the strong local 
partnerships with public health and emergency management officials, which contributed 
to very high response rates, and the use of handheld technology for data collection, which 
has been demonstrated to improve data quality (Fletcher et al. 2003; Lal et al. 2000).  
This study has several limitations. If those who are at highest risk for evacuation 
failure were also more likely to be missed in this survey, there is potential for response 
bias. To minimize this problem, interviews were conducted on weekends and weekdays 
during both day and evening hours. However, only those who were still living in the 
same location as they were when Hurricane Isabel made landfall were eligible to 
participate. Renters, those living in poverty, and other underserved groups may be more 
likely to move to different addresses or stay with friends or family members for a period 
of time and therefore would have been ineligible to participate. In addition, due to the 
nature of the questionnaire, only the characteristics and actions of residents were 
measured. Therefore the role that local governments and other agencies played in 
evacuation failure of some residents could not be assessed. 
Since Hurricane Isabel made landfall nearly 5 years prior to the survey, recall bias 
could have been a factor in this study. However, a hurricane is a major event in the life of 
a community, so it seems unlikely that residents would have trouble remembering the 
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 effects of the storm or the actions they took in response to it. Some residents may not 
have wanted to report to the interviewers that they did not evacuate, particularly since 
accurate forecasted warnings regarding flooding for Hurricane Isabel were widely 
available prior to landfall. Additionally, since knowledge and beliefs were self-reported 
by survey respondents, the associations reported between these variables (e.g., the 
perception that an evacuation order covered your residence) and evacuation failure may 
have been the result of differential misclassification due to recall bias. Those who chose 
to evacuate may be more likely to report an evacuation order covered their home as a 
justification for their decision. Recall bias would not be a concern for variables that were 
rated by the interviewer or for self-reported demographic variables. Finally, since 
evacuation status and exposure to social factors were measured in the same interview, 
there is a potential for dependent errors that could bias results away from the null even if 
these errors were non-differential. 
F. Conclusion 
In this study, demographic characteristics including race, gender, martial status, 
having children, having pets, or having a special medical need were not associated with 
hurricane evacuation failure while social cohesion, markers of territoriality, civic 
engagement, and volunteerism were associated with an increased risk of hurricane 
evacuation failure. When studying a complex action such as hurricane evacuation, a 
compositional approach that considers only the characteristics of individuals and not 
communities has many limitations. In addition, it is difficult to develop effective 
interventions based on demographic factors, many of which are non-modifiable by public 
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 health scientists or policymakers. Using a contextual approach, targeted interventions 
could be developed by policy makers and planners to take advantage of neighborhood 
ties, civic engagement, and peer influence to encourage protective behavior and empower 
local residents. 
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XII. CHAPTER 5. RESULTS PAPER 2 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECT MEASURE MODIFICATION WHEN USING 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES TO PREDICT EVACUATION FROM 
HURRICANE ISABEL: 2003  
 
 
A. Abstract 
 PURPOSE. Previous studies have identified a number of demographic 
characteristics, such as age, income, level of education, household composition and race 
or ethnicity, which affect the risk of hurricane evacuation failure. However, the 
magnitude and direction of these associations vary widely, even when the area of landfall 
or the intensity of the storm was similar. We study the association of demographic 
characteristics and hurricane evacuation failure and how the relationship is modified by 
social factors. METHODS. Ninety census blocks in 3 eastern North Carolina counties 
affected by Hurricane Isabel were selected probability proportionate to population and 7 
interviews were conducted at random locations within each of the selected blocks. Risk 
differences (RD) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were produced for stratified data to 
test for heterogeneity. RESULTS. There was statistical evidence of effect measure 
 
 modification on the additive scale of the effect of home type, homeownership, age, race, 
gender, marital status and having children under age 18 living at home on hurricane 
evacuation failure based on Wald p-values of the interaction terms of ≤ 0.20 and strata-
specific RDs which crossed the null value. Social cohesion, volunteerism, property 
preparation, church attendance, neighbor’s evacuation, and the number of local friends 
and family modified the RDs for the demographic characteristics. CONCLUSIONS. The 
associations between demographic characteristics and hurricane evacuation failure are 
modified by social factors. Effect measure modification on the additive scale may explain 
the inconsistency of previously published associations between demographic factors and 
evacuation and is the appropriate measure for targeted public health interventions that can 
increase evacuation among certain groups that are missed when average risks are 
calculated across the population. 
B. Background 
 Past research has primarily looked at demographic factors, such as age, household 
composition and race or ethnicity to understand evacuation decision-making. However, 
the associations between hurricane evacuation and these demographic factors have been 
inconsistent, sometimes appearing to encourage evacuation and other times to deter it. 
This inconsistency makes it difficult to develop effective interventions based on these 
factors and to target messages about evacuation to those most at risk. It also makes it 
difficult to draw conclusions based on these factors that will hold true over multiple 
storms. In addition, most compositional variables are not modifiable by public health 
scientists or policymakers, limiting the potential of interventions based on these factors. 
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 In the 2 principal reviews of hurricane evacuation behavior, Quarantelli (1980) 
and Baker (1991) have urged that attempts to relate demographic variables to evacuation 
behavior cease as they have no predictive capability, address the wrong unit of analysis, 
and fail to address important questions, but collection and analysis of these types of data 
continues in all hurricane evacuation studies. However, the earlier studies included in 
these reviews generally only examined frequencies and cross-tabulations, as 
multivariable analyses techniques were not yet widely used to test the associations of 
these personal factors with evacuation in a more complex way (Nelson, 1989).  
More recent studies that utilized multivariable modeling techniques have shown 
significant associations between evacuation and gender (Whitehead 2001; Bateman 2002; 
Gladwin 2005; Lindell 2005), race (Van Willigen 2005; Riad et al. 1999), pet ownership 
(Heath 2001; Whitehead 2001), having children at home (Lindell 2005) and special 
medical needs (Maiolo 2001; Van Willigen 2002). These more recent results may also 
have been influenced by changing demographics of coastal areas as they become more 
developed. Variability in results may be attributable to modification of risk factors for 
evacuation by population characteristics that change in prevalence over time or differ 
depending on the location of landfall (Slattery, 2007).   
Although Quarantelli’s earlier review found that evacuation from all types of 
events was positively associated with having children under age 18 living in the home, 
Baker’s later review focusing on hurricanes did not find a consistent relationship between 
households with children under age 18 living at home and evacuation from 12 storms 
between 1961 and 1989. In North Carolina, the effect of children on the evacuation 
decision may be explained by the fact that having children in the household typically 
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 increases the likelihood of living in a mobile home, generally a predictor of evacuation, 
by nearly 50% (Edwards, 2001).  
Age is frequently included in studies of evacuation because of concerns about the 
limited mobility and special health needs of the elderly. Most studies have failed to find 
an association between age and evacuation. Those over age 60 were reportedly less likely 
to evacuate after Hurricanes Carla (Moore, 1963) and Andrew (Gladwin, 1997) made 
landfall in Florida, and each 5-year increase in age decreased the odds of evacuation by 
10% when Hurricane Floyd made landfall in North Carolina (Van Willigen, 2005). 
Gender differences in evacuation have generally been attributed to variations in 
socio-economic status, care-giving responsibilities, and perception of risk (Bateman, 
2002). Studies of Hurricane Bonnie (1998) found that female gender of the head of 
household and lower education levels were significant predictors of evacuation 
(Whitehead, 2001; Bateman, 2002). However, significant associations were not found in 
studies of storms of similar magnitude and location. Whitehead (2001) and Bateman 
(2002) found no association between gender and evacuation from Hurricanes Dennis 
(1999) or Floyd (1999), although all 3 made landfall in south-eastern North Carolina as 
Category 2 hurricanes within a 1-year period. In Gladwin’s study of Hurricane Ivan 
evacuation, male gender of the respondent was significantly associated with increased 
evacuation (Gladwin, 2005).  
Differences in evacuation by marital status likely reflect differential access to 
information and financial and emotional support (Kaniasty, 1995) and are likely to 
change as the composition of households changes over time. Married residents of Pitt 
County, NC, were half as likely to have evacuated from Hurricane Floyd as single 
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 residents (Van Willigen, 2005); however, there was no difference in evacuation rates for 
single or married residents of eastern North Carolina after Hurricane Bonnie (Bateman, 
2002).  
The majority of the literature finds no differences in evacuation based on race and 
ethnicity, although race and ethnicity may be more strongly correlated with vulnerability 
to property damage from hurricanes than evacuation due to differential quality of housing 
(Van Willigen, 2005) and susceptibility of housing locations, particularly to flooding. 
Race may also be associated with differential access to information and services 
necessary for successful evacuation. 
Previous studies found that pets are generally taken when a household evacuates, 
that pets are included in household evacuation plans, and that households are reluctant to 
leave without pets, which are usually not permitted in shelters (Drabek and Boggs, 1968; 
Forrest, 1979; Heath, 2001; Whitehead, 2001).  
Previous research has been inconsistent with regard to the evacuation of those 
with special medical needs or disabilities. In a survey conducted following Hurricane 
Bonnie, households which reported a special medical need were more likely to evacuate, 
while those with reported physical or mental disabilities were less likely to evacuate than 
households that did not report a disability (Whitehead, 2001). Special medical needs may 
include conditions that require electricity, special medical equipment, or home health 
care, all of which are likely to be disrupted during a hurricane. On the other hand, 
disabilities may make transportation and accommodation more difficult due to the need 
for handicap accessible accommodations and personal care facilities. After Hurricane 
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 Floyd, households that included someone who was disabled reported the lowest rates of 
evacuation of any population sub-group (Van Willigen, 2002).  
 In order to understand the potential interactions between demographic covariates 
and social factors, substantive and statistical evidence of effect measure modification on 
the additive scale should be sought, even for those variables without significant 
associations in bivariate analyses. For example, a variable that has a positive effect on 
evacuation among families with children under age 18 living at home may have a 
negative effect on families without children at home. Results of no association, likely 
when strata-specific risks are on opposite sides of the null, reflect average risks that are 
uninformative for public health intervention. The identification of effect measure 
modification on the additive scale is appropriate for the targeting of public health 
interventions (Greenland, 2009) and could explain the inconsistency of previously 
published results.  
C. Methods 
1. Data Sources 
 All data were collected from residents of 3 coastal North Carolina counties as part 
of a cross-sectional study conducted between March 15, 2008 and August 23, 2008. 
Trimble Recon field data collectors (handheld computers) equipped with geographic 
positioning system (GPS) software were used to electronically record responses from 1 
adult member of each selected household via in-person interviews. Households were 
selected for interview via a 2-stage random sampling methodology (Henderson, 1982; 
Lemeshow, 1985; Malilay, 1996). At the first stage, 30 census blocks in each county 
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 were randomly selected probability proportionate to population size. At the second stage, 
7 individual parcels were randomly selected using a survey site selection toolkit 
developed by the North Carolina Division of Public Health in ESRI ArcMap 9.2 
(Redlands, CA). Interviewers were routed to each location with a map generated with 
ESRI ArcPad 6.0.3 Street Map USA (Redlands, CA). Selected households were 
approached by an interviewer or interview team who obtained informed consent. In order 
to qualify for inclusion, the resident had to be living in the same place as when Hurricane 
Isabel made landfall in September, 2003. This research received approval by the 
Institutional Review Board of the UNC Gillings School of Global Public Health (Public 
Health IRB #06-0426). 
2. Study Outcome and Covariates 
 Evacuation from Hurricane Isabel was defined as self-reported relocation of a 
household or any household members to any location other than their primary residence 
prior to landfall of Hurricane Isabel on September 18, 2003. 
 The interviewer assessed and recorded the type of home prior to the start of the 
interview. Homes were categorized as a stick built home, mobile home or multi-unit 
dwelling. Multi-unit dwellings were combined with mobile homes for analysis. 
Respondents were asked whether they owned or rented their homes. Additional 
demographic covariates included bivariate variables for age (< or ≥ median age of 50 
years), race (white or African-American and other), gender (male or female), marital 
status (married or widowed / divorced / never married), having children under age 18 
living at home, having pets, or having a special medical need (yes or no).  
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 The extent of social cohesion among the study population was determined using 
established measures. Social cohesion was measured with 5 questions that asked 
respondents to report how willing they were to help neighbors, how close-knit they felt 
their neighborhood was, whether they trusted their neighbors, whether they got along 
with their neighbors and whether neighbors shared their values (Sampson, 1997). 
Responses to each question were on a 5 point Likert scale and had a possible total score 
of 4 (0 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree) with higher values reflecting greater 
social cohesion.  Social control was measured in a similar way, with 5 survey questions 
which asked respondents about their likelihood of taking action if they saw young people 
from their neighborhood destroying property, skipping school, fighting or being 
disrespectful to an adult or if they heard that budget cuts were likely to eliminate a 
program that was important to them, such as an afterschool program (Sampson, 1997). 
Additional social control measures included markers of territoriality (Riad, 1999) and 
property preparation (Baker, 1991; Buckland and Rahman, 1999).  
3. Data Analysis 
 Bivariate analyses were performed in SAS 9.1.3 (Cary, NC). Generalized linear 
models were used to identify any associations between hurricane evacuation failure and 
demographic variables. Crude risk differences (RD) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) 
were estimated. Reference categories were selected because they were previously 
identified or assumed to be the lowest risk level.  
Since average risks calculated in the bivariate analysis may obscure significant 
strata-specific differences, effect measure modification on the additive scale was assessed 
by calculating strata-specific RDs and 95% CIs. Strata-specific estimates that were 
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 considered substantively different (e.g. on opposite sides of the null value) were explored 
further based on subject matter knowledge, even when 95% CIs overlapped. Plots of 
point estimates and 95% CIs were produced in SigmaPlot 11.0 (San Jose, CA). 
Heterogeneity tests of the RDs across strata of covariates were also conducted in SAS 
9.1.3 (Cary, NC). A Wald p-value was calculated for the product interaction term 
between the main exposure and each covariate. A Wald p-value of ≤ 0.20 was considered 
evidence of potential effect measure modification (Selvin, 2004). 
D. Results 
Of those eligible to participate, 86.8% (570/656) responded to the survey. In the 
study sample, 28% (n=162) of the residents reported evacuation from Hurricane Isabel, 
while 72% (408) reported that they remained in their homes. Overall, around three-
quarters (n=400) of the study population lived in a stick built home rather than a mobile 
home or multi-unit dwelling and were homeowners (n=450) as opposed to renting (Table 
11). Additionally, approximately 75% of the sample identified their race as white 
(n=420). Approximately two-thirds of the respondents were married (n=384) and a 
similar amount reported a child less than 18 years of age living at home (n=361). The 
sample was approximately evenly divided between males (n=254) and females and about 
one-half of the survey sample reported having a household pet (n=254). Ten percent 
reported having a special medical need (n=61). 
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 TABLE 11. Demographic characteristics of cross-sectional sample (overall and 
according to evacuation) from residents of Chowan, Perquimans and Pasquotank 
Counties, NC (n=570) 
 
       
  Study Population  Evacuated  Did Not Evacuate 
  n %  n %  N % 
Home Type          
Stick Built  400 70.18  78 19.50  322 80.50 
Mobile Home   149 26.14  82 55.03  67 44.97 
Multi-Unit  21 3.68  2 9.52  19 90.48 
Homeownership          
Own  450 78.95  118 26.22  332 73.78 
Rent  120 21.05  44 36.67  76 63.33 
          
Age          
< 50  269 47.19  91 33.83  178 66.17 
≥ 50  299 52.46  71 23.75  228 76.25 
Missing  2 0.49  0 0.00  2 100.00 
          
Race          
White  420 73.68  114 27.14  306 72.86 
African-American or Other  150 26.32  48 32.00  102 68.00 
          
Gender          
Female  316 55.44  100 31.65  216 68.35 
Male  254 44.56  62 24.41  192 75.59 
          
Marital Status          
Married  384 67.37  112 29.17  272 70.83 
Widowed, Never Married 
or Divorced 
 186 32.63  50 26.88  136 73.12 
          
Children Under Age 18 in 
Household 
         
Yes  361 63.33  85 23.55  276 76.45 
No  209 36.67  77 36.84  132 63.16 
          
Pets          
Yes  254 44.56  69 27.17  185 72.83 
No  316 55.44  93 29.43  223 70.57 
          
Special Medical Needs          
Yes  509 89.30  147 28.88  362 71.12 
No  61 10.70  15 24.59  46 75.41 
 
 In the bivariate analyses of demographic factors, only home type (RD = 0.30 
(95% CI: 0.21, 0.38)), homeownership (RD = 0.10 (95% CI: 0.01, 0.21)), and age (RD = 
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 0.10 (95% CI: 0.02, 0.18)) were significantly associated with evacuation failure with 
those living in stick built homes, home owners, and older residents being more likely to 
fail to evacuate. Race, gender, martial status, having children under age 18 living at 
home, having pets, and having a special medical need were not significantly associated 
with evacuation status in the bivariate analysis.  
 There was evidence of effect measure modification of the RDs based on 
differences in the strata-specific RD estimates for a number of variables (Figure 8 and 
Appendix B). Homeownership, age, marital status and having children under age 18 at 
home all had differential effects on hurricane evacuation failure depending on the 
respondent’s reported volunteerism after Hurricane Isabel. Renters who reported 
volunteering were more likely to fail to evacuate (RD = 0.25; 95% CI: 0.05, 0.46) 
compared to homeowners who volunteered. Being a volunteer also increased the risk of 
evacuation failure for residents younger than the sample median age of 50 by 0.23 (95% 
CI: 0.11, 0.34) while having a much smaller and non-significant affect on older residents. 
A similar effect was seen among those who were unmarried and those who did not have 
children under age 18 living at home. Those individuals who were widowed, never 
married or divorced were more likely to fail to evacuate when they reported being a 
volunteer (RD = 0.25; 95% CI: 0.13, 0.36) as compared with married volunteers. The 
participants who had no children under the age of 18 living at home were also more likely 
to fail to evacuate when they reported being a volunteer (RD = 0.23; 95% CI: 0.10, 0.36) 
as compared to volunteers with children.  
 The effect of home type, gender, and having children under 18 on evacuation 
failure was modified by reported property preparation. Those who lived in a mobile home 
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 and reported preparing their property prior to Hurricane Isabel’s landfall were 0.14 (95% 
CI: -0.02, 0.30) less likely to fail to evacuate that those living in stick built homes who 
reported property preparation. There was also evidence of modification of the RD for 
gender, with estimates for men and women on different sides of the null. While property 
preparation reduced men’s risk of evacuation failure (RD = -0.08; 95% CI: -0.20, 0.02) it 
appeared to increase women’s risk of evacuation failure (RD = 0.05; 95% CI: -0.05, 
0.16). A similar crossover effect was seen when comparing families with and without 
children under age 18 living at home. Property preparation increased the risk of 
evacuation failure for those without children under age 18 by 0.09 (95% CI: -0.04, 0.22) 
while decreasing the risk of evacuation failure of those with children under age 18 by 
0.05 (95% CI: -0.04, 0.14). 
Homeownership, marital status, and having children under age 18 at home had 
differential effects depending on the amount of social cohesion reported by the 
respondent. Reporting above average levels of social cohesion had differential effects on 
homeowners and renters, with homeowners with high social cohesion having an 
increased risk of evacuation failure of 0.15 (95% CI: 0.07, 0.23) while high social 
cohesion was protective for renters and encouraged evacuation (RD = -0.02; 95% CI: -
0.22, 0.18). High levels of social cohesion increased the risk of evacuation failure for 
those who were married by 0.18 (95% CI: 0.09, 0.27) and those without children under 
age 18 by 0.23 (95% CI: 0.11, 0.36). 
The number of local friends and family a respondent reported had a differential 
effect on the failure to evacuate from Hurricane Isabel depending on race. African-
Americans with more local friends and family were more likely to evacuate, with a 
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reduced risk of hurricane evacuation failure of 0.17 (95% CI: 0.02, 0.32). Having more 
local friends and family appeared to have no effect on white respondents, whose risk of 
hurricane evacuation failure was unchanged. Being a member of a church discouraged 
more women than men from evacuating, with women’s failure to evacuate increasing by 
0.19 (95% CI: 0.08, 0.31) when they reported being a member of a church. Respondent’s 
with no children under age 18 at home who reported that all or most of their neighbors 
evacuated had a reduced risk of hurricane evacuation failure of 0.70 (95% CI: 0.60, 0.79) 
while those with children under age 18 living at home reported a reduction in risk of only 
0.44 (95% CI: 0.23, 0.65). The results for respondents with pets were similar, with those 
without pets who reported that all or most of their neighbors evacuated having a reduced 
risk of hurricane evacuation failure of 0.50 (95% CI: 0.30, 0.71) while those with pets 
reported a reduced risk of 0.68 (95% CI: 0.56, 0.79).   
FIGURE 8. Crude and Stratified Risk Differences (RD), 95% Confidence Intervals (95% 
CI) for product interaction terms between demographic and social covariates by 
demographic covariate (vertical line at 0.0 represents null value on the risk difference 
scale) 
 
Hometype (Stick Built v. Mobile Home / Multi Unit)
RD (95% CI)
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Crude
 Neighbor's Evacuation
                         Stick
                       Mobile
    Prepared Property
                      Stick
                    Mobile
     Volunteer
           Stick
         Mobile
   Attend Church
                Stick
              Mobile
Total Social Cohesion
                       Stick
                     Mobile
No.Local Friends/Family
                           Stick
                         Mobile
 
Homeownership (Own v. Rent)
RD (95% CI)
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Crude
 Neighbor's Evacuation
                          Rent
                          Own
    Prepared Property
                       Rent
                       Own
     Volunteer
            Rent
            Own
   Attend Church
                 Rent
                 Own
Total Social Cohesion
                        Rent
                        Own
No.Local Friends/Family
                            Rent
                            Own
 
 Age (< 50 Years v. >= 50 Years)
RD (95% CI)
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Crude
 Neighbor's Evacuation
                         >=50
                           <50
   No.Local Friends/Family
                               >=50
                                 <50
    Prepared Property
                       >=50
                         <50
     Volunteer
           >=50
             <50
   Attend Church
                >=50
                  <50
Total Social Cohesion
                        >=50
                          <50
 
Marital Status (Married v. Never Married / Widowed / Divorced)
RD (95% CI)
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Crude
 Neighbor's Evacuation
                 Not Married
                      Married
    Prepared Property
              Not Married
                    Married
     Volunteer
   Not Married
         Married
   Attend Church
        Not Married
              Married
Total Social Cohesion
              Not Married
                    Married
No.Local Friends/Family
                  Not Married
                        Married
 
Race (White v. African American / Other)
RD (95% CI)
-1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Crude
 Neighbor's Evacuation
                 AA / Other
                        White
    Prepared Property
              AA / Other
                     White
     Volunteer
   AA / Other
          White
   Attend Church
        AA / Other
               White
Total Social Cohesion
               AA / Other
                      White
No.Local Friends/Family
                   AA / Other
                          White
 
Pets in Home (No v. Yes)
RD (95% CI)
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Crude
 Neighbor's Evacuation
                            No
                           Yes
    Prepared Property
                           No
                         Yes
     Volunteer
               No
             Yes
   Attend Church
                   No
                  Yes
Total Social Cohesion
                           No
                          Yes
 No.Local Friends/Family
                                No
                               Yes
 
Special Medical Needs (No v. Yes)
RD (95% CI)
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Crude
 Neighbor's Evacuation
                            No
                           Yes
    Prepared Property
                           No
                         Yes
     Volunteer
               No
             Yes
   Attend Church
                   No
                  Yes
Total Social Cohesion
                           No
                          Yes
 No.Local Friends/Family
                                No
                               Yes
 
Gender (Female v. Male)
RD (95% CI)
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Crude
 Neighbor's Evacuation
                          Male
                      Female
    Prepared Property
                       Male
                    Female
     Volunteer
           Male
        Female
   Attend Church
                Male
             Female
Total Social Cohesion
                         Male
                     Female
 No.Local Friends/Family
                             Male
                          Female
 
Children Under Age 18 Living at Home (No v. Yes)
RD (95% CI)
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Crude
 Neighbor's Evacuation
                             No
                           Yes
    Prepared Property
                           No
                         Yes
     Volunteer
               No
             Yes
   Attend Church
                   No
                  Yes
Total Social Cohesion
                           No
                          Yes
103 
 E. Discussion 
We found that social factors modify the associations between demographic 
characteristics and hurricane evacuation failure. These relationships should be taken into 
account in the development and implementation of interventions and educational programs 
that attempt to encourage evacuation. For example, among younger people in this study, 
volunteerism led to an increased risk of evacuation failure, while among older respondents, 
volunteerism appeared to encourage evacuation. Special attention should be paid to younger 
residents who volunteer. Younger residents may be more likely to volunteer in agencies or 
organizations that provide emergency services, such as volunteer fire departments or 
emergency medical services and therefore may feel responsible to the community during an 
emergency such as a hurricane.  
Similar increases in evacuation failure were seen among other groups of volunteers, 
including renters and those who were unmarried and did not have children under age 18 at 
home. This suggests that volunteerism provides an important and binding tie to the 
community. While these results do not suggest that residents of high risk areas should 
necessarily be discouraged from volunteering, increased attention should be paid by 
community organizations that have volunteers to the role they will play in hurricane response 
and recovery.  
Although it did not have a significant overall effect in predicting hurricane evacuation 
failure, property preparation encouraged evacuation among mobile home residents, men, and 
families with children under age 18. This finding presents an opportunity for intervention 
among several high-risk groups. Although mobile home residents in this study were already 
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 less likely to fail to evacuate than those living in stick built homes, the synergistic effect of 
property preparation to further decrease evacuation failure among mobile home residents 
should be fully exploited. Evacuation from mobile homes must be encouraged by authorities 
due to the vulnerability of these homes to the high winds generally associated with 
hurricanes. Males account for the majority of injuries and deaths from hurricanes (Combs, 
1996; Bourque, 2006) so if encouraging property preparation can encourage more men to 
evacuate then overall hurricane-related morbidity and mortality could be decreased.  
Reporting higher levels of social cohesion was detrimental to hurricane evacuation 
for homeowners when compared to renters. Homeowners are already more likely to fail to 
evacuate than renters, presumably because homeowners have a substantial investment at risk 
and believe that staying will enable them to better protect their home from damage. 
Additionally, since evacuees overwhelmingly prefer staying with friends or family as 
opposed to staying in a public shelter (Aguirre, 1994; Moore, 2004; Whitehead, 2000) it 
follows that those homeowners who report higher levels of social cohesion may provide 
shelter for others in their homes, such as family and friends who live in mobile homes or in 
areas closer to water.  More social cohesion was also detrimental to evacuation for families 
without children living at home. Those without children living at home have smaller families 
and may therefore have stronger relationships with friends and neighbors as demonstrated by 
higher levels of trust and increased willingness to help one another. However, generally 
families with children report higher levels of social cohesion, probably through children’s 
participation in school or community activities. 
African-Americans who reported a larger number of local friends and family had 
significantly reduced risk of evacuation failure when compared with whites. Previous studies 
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 have shown that social networks dominated by kin relationships provide more support than 
those that are primarily made up of friends (Haines, 1996). This finding may also reflect a 
long history of differential treatment and a deep distrust of authorities around natural 
disasters (Cordasco, 2007; Rattray, 1999). Exclusionary practices around planning, 
preparedness, and recovery from disasters may mean that all community members may not 
have an equal voice in the development and implementation of emergency plans. If some 
community members are left out of the pre-disaster planning for recovery, it is unlikely that 
they will trust or support the policies and programs that take effect after a disaster occurs 
(Berke, 2006).  Therefore, personal communications with a large number of local family and 
friends who have previously experience storms may be a more trusted source of information 
for African-American residents and encourage evacuation. This is supported by previous 
studies which have shown this type of personal information to be more important to 
evacuation decision-making among some groups than official warnings (Drabek and Boggs, 
1968; Killian, 1954; Windham, 1977).  
 The study has several limitations including the use of a cross-sectional study design. 
Cross-sectional data provides only a picture of the population at a given point in time and 
cannot take into account changes in risk factors or population characteristics over time. For 
example, populations in the study area of eastern North Carolina may be aging faster than the 
overall population of the state as retirees relocate to the coast. Additionally, social capital as 
measured by membership in civic organizations and social clubs has been documented as 
declining over the past 20 years (Putnam, 2000). More longitudinal data needs to be collected 
in areas that are frequently hit by hurricanes in order to determine whether associations 
between risk factors and hurricane evacuation failure vary over time. Since this study asked 
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 residents to recall their behavior from nearly 5 years ago, there may also be potential for 
recall bias. However, a major hurricane had not made landfall in the area in nearly 50 years, 
so Hurricane Isabel’s effects and the actions taken by residents to deal with them are likely 
quite memorable. It is also possible that residents did not accurately report their age, marital 
status and whether or not they had children under age 18, pets, or special medical needs at 
the time that Hurricane Isabel made landfall, although interviewers were trained to remind 
respondents at various points in the survey that these questions were related to their situation 
in 2003. 
F. Recommendations 
Our findings lead to multiple recommendations around interventions for public health 
and emergency management officials to improve hurricane evacuation rates. Public health 
and emergency management officials should work closely with organizations that utilize 
volunteers, particularly volunteers who are involved in emergency response. For example, 
volunteer fire departments should clearly understand the specific role of their organizations 
and members during emergencies and volunteers should be educated about the risks of 
staying. Policy makers should review whether agencies like these encourage or require 
certain types of volunteers to remain in place during hurricanes in order to provide services 
during and immediately after landfall. If so, public shelters or additional information about 
safe sheltering in place should be provided to these volunteers and they should be encouraged 
to evacuate their families if possible. Volunteers should be reminded that putting themselves 
at risk will do little to help the community recover after a disaster and assured that they will 
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 be able to gain access to the impacted area after landfall in order to be part of the relief and 
recovery efforts. 
Property preparation should be encouraged through the implementation of regulations 
as well as through the use of incentives. State legislatures and county governments can 
implement stricter building codes that require storm shutters for new properties in areas 
vulnerable to hurricanes, and require retrofitting of existing properties. Some of the costs of 
these safety measures could be offset by making property preparation expenses tax 
deductible or though offering discounts on homeowners’ insurance premiums. Innovative 
public / private partnerships with building supply or home improvement companies could 
also provide discounts to consumers in high risk areas through bulk purchasing or state 
contracting. 
Local officials should also identify and initiate partnerships with community leaders 
well before hurricane season.  In this study, residents who reported strong neighborhood 
involvement and larger numbers of local friends and family were more likely to fail to 
evacuate. Effective and efficient preparedness, response, and delivery of assistance during 
recovery depend on developing strategies that recognize the value of community-based 
leadership and social capital and how they are operationalized. Decisions on the issuance of 
evacuation orders and shelter locations must be informed by resident experiences and beliefs 
in order to be effective. Faith-based and non-profit organizations have demonstrated that 
their communities trust the disaster-related information they receive from these groups, often 
more than messages delivered by elected officials or and emergency management. Messages 
should also be targeted for various audiences and developed and delivered in a culturally 
appropriate manner. 
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 G. Conclusion 
 The ability to estimate the influence of demographic factors on hurricane evacuation 
decision-making depends on the presence of effect measure modifiers.  Social factors such as 
volunteerism, church membership, and high social cohesion appear to modify RDs associated 
with other potentially important risk factors including home type, homeownership, age, race, 
gender, marital status, and having children under age 18 living at home. Changes in the 
prevalence of these social factors over time and among different groups of residents will 
affect RD estimates associated with these demographic factors.  Identifying effect measure 
modification is important for understanding not only the data but also the complex process of 
evacuation decision-making. In addition, providing stratified estimates can inform policy 
makers, planners, and emergency services personnel and guide targeted interventions towards 
sub-groups that are most important to reach with education and interventions that can 
increase hurricane evacuation. Relying on population average risk across the population 
ignores heterogeneity that is fundamental to improving the public health response to 
hurricanes. 
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XIII. CHAPTER 6. RESULTS PAPER 3 
 
INDIVIDUAL ACTUAL OR PERCEIVED PROPERTY FLOOD RISK: DID IT 
PREDICT EVACUATION FOR HURRICANE ISABEL IN NORTH CAROLINA, 
2003? 
 
 
A. Abstract 
 PURPOSE. An individual’s perception of risk has consistently been considered an 
important determinant of hurricane evacuation in published studies and reviews. Adequate 
risk assessment is informed by environmental and social cues, as well as evacuation 
intentions and past disaster experience. This study measured perceived flood risk of residents 
of several high-risk coastal North Carolina counties, compared their perception with actual 
risk determined by updated flood plain maps and determined if either was associated with 
evacuation from Hurricane Isabel in 2003. METHODS. A cross-sectional study of 570 
residents of 3 eastern North Carolina counties affected by Hurricane Isabel was conducted. 
Census blocks were stratified by flood zone and 30 census blocks were randomly selected 
from each flood zone. Seven interviews were conducted at random locations within selected 
blocks. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were conducted to produce risk differences. 
 
 RESULTS. Neither the designated flood zone of the parcel where the home was located nor 
the residents’ perceived flood risk was associated with evacuation from Hurricane Isabel in 
the bivariate analysis. For perceived risk, there was evidence of effect measure modification 
of the risk difference by home type. Intention to evacuate and type of home were important 
confounders of the association between actual risk and evacuation. CONCLUSIONS. The 
belief that one is at high risk of property damage or injury is important in evacuation 
decision-making. However, in this study, while coastal residents’ perceived risk of flooding 
was correlated with their actual flood risk, neither was associated with evacuation. These 
findings provide important opportunities for education and intervention by policy makers and 
other authorities to improve hurricane evacuation rates and minimize damage and injuries 
associated with flooding. 
B. Introduction 
Since flooding causes most hurricane-related deaths, flood plains are among the most 
important areas to evacuate prior to hurricane landfall. Designated flood zones may be 
affected by heavy rains associated with hurricanes as well as by storm surge from nearby 
bodies of water. Hurricane Isabel made landfall in northeastern North Carolina on September 
18, 2003 as a Category 2 storm after approaching the area as a powerful Category 5 storm. 
Hurricane Isabel caused widespread damage to the Albemarle Sound and Pasquotank River 
basin area, where strong winds felled thousands of trees resulting in power outages to more 
than 700,000 residents of North Carolina. Unusually high storm surge, the highest seen in 
this region since Hurricane Hazel in 1954, was responsible for extensive inland flooding. 
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 Since the late 1960s, federal and state governments have emphasized flood insurance 
as a tool for improving resident awareness of flood hazards. Flood insurance, subsidized by 
governments, provides coverage to reimburse homeowners for flood-related losses (Lave, 
1991). Eligibility to participate in the National Flood Insurance Program is determined by 
flood hazard maps developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 
partnership with the states. After Hurricane Floyd caused massive flooding in eastern North 
Carolina in 1999, North Carolina’s Floodplain Mapping Program began an extensive project 
to provide updated flood hazard data and produce digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps 
(FIRMs) that would be available online for users of geographic information systems (GIS) 
(North Carolina Floodplain Mapping Program).  These updated maps were intended to be 
used by counties and municipalities to make better decisions about design, building location 
and infrastructure, and to minimize future property losses through improved floodplain 
management.  
Increasing individuals’ awareness of their personal flood risk or designating 
evacuation areas during emergencies is not a stated goal of the program. Education about the 
flood zone designation of individual properties has generally been left to mortgage lenders, 
who require property owners in floodprone areas to obtain flood insurance as a condition of 
financing, while evacuation orders are issued by emergency management officials based on 
local conditions. However, it is possible that increasing individuals’ awareness of the flood 
zone designation of their property could improve risk perception and assist residents of 
floodprone areas in making sound decisions about evacuation. 
The decision to evacuate from a hurricane is a complex one, which involves many 
factors that may be related to a households’ perception of risk. The actual flood zone 
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 designation of the property is just one factor in this development of risk perception. In order 
to accurately assess risk, residents must also feel that they are in danger and that leaving the 
area will be beneficial (Fitzpatrick and Mileti, 1991; Arlikatti, 2006). To make the decision 
to evacuate, residents should receive accurate and responsible advice and information from 
authorities, such as the timely issuance of hurricane watches and warnings and evacuation 
orders. Unofficial information from friends and family is also important in risk perception. 
Residents may respond differently to public authorities and appeals from family and friends, 
with some choosing to comply with official orders because they respect authority or fear the 
penalties for non-compliance, while for others, these warnings may contribute to their 
determination to stay (Baker, 1991).  
Perceived risk has been measured in various ways in published studies. In a study of 
Hurricane Bret evacuees, Zhang (2004) asked coastal residents to identify their risk area on a 
map developed and distributed by the Texas Division of Emergency Management and then 
calculated the difference between official risk designations and reported risk to determine 
perceived risk. In an assessment conducted by emergency management officials after 
Hurricane Isabel in North Carolina, many residents reported basing their perceived risk on 
how they were impacted by “reference storms” of similar track and intensity (US Department 
of Commerce, 2003).  Perceived risk may also differ according to the time at which it is 
measured and the recent disaster experience of respondents. For example, coastal residents 
who have recently received evacuation orders for a hurricane that caused little damage at 
landfall may underestimate their risk (Arlikatti, 2006) while those who failed to evacuate a 
strong or damaging storm may overestimate their risk in a future event (Perry, 1981). 
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 Regardless of how it has been measured, published studies have by and large 
concluded that perceived risk is important in deciding whether or not to evacuate (Riad, 
1998; Lindell and Hwang, 2008; Lindell and Perry, 2004). When perceived risk has been 
measured by the issuance of official watches, warnings, and evacuation orders, it has 
generally been positively associated with evacuation (Moore, 1963; Drabek, 1969; Wilkinson 
and Ross, 1970; Edwards, 2001; Whitehead, 2000; Gladwin, 1997). Personal 
communications with family, friends, and co-workers and first-hand assessments of the risk 
area have also been shown to increase evacuation, and have had a stronger association with 
perceived risk than official warnings in several studies (Drabek and Boggs, 1968; Killian, 
1954; Windham, 1977). 
 One approach of measuring risk perception is the Protective Action Decision Model 
(PADM) (Lindell and Perry, 1992 and 2004). Lindell and Perry proposed that individuals 
develop risk perception based on environmental cues, social cues, personal experience and 
evacuation impediments. Environmental cues include proximity to bodies of water and storm 
conditions while social cues include the evacuation of friends, family and neighbors and the 
issuance of watches, warnings or evacuation orders by authorities (Lindell, 2005). Personal 
experience includes both the number of hurricanes experienced as well as “false experiences” 
with weak storms or near misses that may lead residents to misunderstand the true risks 
(Lindell, 2005; Baker, 1991) while evacuation impediments include concerns about looting 
and property protection, evacuation expenses, and traffic during evacuation (Lindell, 2005).  
This paper uses a causal diagram adapted from Lindell and Perry’s PADM to 
examine the associations between living in a designated flood zone (actual risk), perceived 
flood risk, and hurricane evacuation (Figure 9). Demographic factors and family 
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 characteristics such as age and home type, evacuation intentions and experience, levels of 
neighborhood social cohesion, and government actions such as the issuance of evacuation 
orders were also examined to determine if there were factors that modified or confounded the 
relationship between perceived or actual risk and evacuation.  
FIGURE 9. Proposed causal diagram for the association of perceived and actual risk and 
evacuation from Hurricane Isabel based on the Protective Action Decision Model (Lindell 
and Perry, 1992) 
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C. Methods 
1. Data Collection 
All data were collected as part of a cross-sectional study conducted between March 
15, 2008, and August 23, 2008, in 3 coastal North Carolina counties. In-person interviews 
with 1 adult member of each selected household were conducted using global positioning 
systems-equipped (GPS) Trimble Recon field data collectors (handheld computers). Data 
was electronically recorded on the handheld computers at the time of interview. This research 
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 received approval by the Institutional Review Board of the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill Gillings School of Global Public Health (Public Health IRB #06-0426). 
2. Data Sources 
Households were selected for interview via a commonly used 2-stage cluster 
sampling design (Henderson, 1982; Lemeshow, 1985; Malilay, 1996).To ensure that each 
flood zone was represented in the study, census blocks in 3 coastal North Carolina counties 
were first stratified by flood zone using the physical center of a census block for the block-
wide flood zone designation.  
After stratification by flood zone, 30 census blocks in each stratum were randomly 
selected based on probability proportionate to population size. Within each selected block, 7 
interview locations were chosen from a simple random sample of all existing parcels in the 
block using a geographic information systems-based (GIS) survey site selection toolkit 
developed by the North Carolina Division of Public Health in ESRI ArcMap 9.2 (Redlands, 
CA). Interviewers were routed to each location with a map generated with ESRI ArcPad 
6.0.3 Street Map USA (Redlands, CA). The household nearest the randomly selected 
interview location was approached by an interviewer or interview team to give informed 
consent. To qualify for inclusion, the resident had to be living in the same place they were 
living Hurricane Isabel made landfall. If the interview was refused or the individual did not 
meet the inclusion criteria, the interviewer proceeded to the next nearest home. 
Evacuation intention was dichotomous and was measured by asking respondents 
whether or not they would evacuate from a future hurricane measuring Category 3 or higher 
on the Saffir-Simpson scale (winds > 110 miles per hour). Past hurricane experience was the 
number of hurricanes that the respondent reported having experienced in their lifetime. 
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 Social cohesion was represented by 5 questions that asked respondents about their 
willingness to help neighbors, how close-knit they felt their neighborhood was, whether they 
trusted their neighbors, whether they got along with their neighbors and whether neighbors 
shared their values. Responses to each question were on a 5 point Likert scale with a possible 
total score of 4 (0 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree) with higher values reflecting 
greater social cohesion. Based on the Cronbach’s alpha statistic (α = 0.92) calculated in SAS 
9.1.3 (Cary, NC), responses to the 5 social cohesion questions were aggregated. Types of 
homes included single-family homes, mobile homes and apartments or other multi-unit 
dwellings. Homeownership was dichotomous as all respondents either owned or rented their 
homes. A dichotomous variable for age was created around the median age (50 years) of all 
respondents.  
The longitude and latitude coordinates captured by the field data collector’s GPS at 
the location where each interview was conducted were mapped to a parcel-level flood zone 
map using ArcGIS (Redlands, CA) after data collection was complete.  
Actual risk was determined by the flood zone designation of each parcel according to FIRMs 
provided by the North Carolina Floodplain Mapping Program.  Three flood zone 
designations were used; non-flood zones, areas where there is less than 0.02% annual chance 
of flooding and flood insurance purchase is not required; 500-year flood plains, which 
correspond to the 0.2% annual chance floodplains (1 flood expected per 500 years); and 100-
year flood plains, which correspond to the 1% annual chance floodplains (1 flood expected 
per 100 years). Perceived risk was measured by asking respondents to characterize the risk of 
flood damage to their home during a hurricane similar to Hurricane Isabel as low, medium, 
or high. 
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 3. Statistical Methods 
 A Mantel-Haenszel χ2 test of association between actual and perceived flood risk was 
calculated using SAS 9.1.3 (Cary, NC).  Both actual and perceived flood risk were assumed 
to be measured on an ordinal scale with the actual flood risk of the parcel being non-flood 
zone, 500-year flood plain, or 100-year flood plain, and the perceived flood risk for the 
respondent being a self reported low, medium, or high. To take advantage of this ordinality, a 
modified ridit score with 1 degree of freedom was produced (Stokes, 2000). The null 
hypothesis of no association was tested against the alternative of linear association of actual 
and perceived risk. The strength of the association was assessed through an estimation of the 
concordance of actual and perceived risk of each pair (low / non-flood; medium / 500-year; 
high / 100-year) with a Somer’s D C|R statistic, which has a range of -1.0 to 1.0 and 
measures the conditional probability that a given pair is concordant. 
Bivariate analyses were conducted in SAS 9.1.3 (Cary, NC) to examine crude 
associations between hurricane evacuation failure and covariates. Generalized linear models 
were used to identify any adjusted associations between hurricane evacuation failure and 
flood zone designation or perceived risk of flooding. Crude risk differences (RD) and 95% 
confidence intervals (CI) were first estimated. In subsequent multivariable analyses, the 
inclusion of individual covariates was based on the published literature and the causal 
diagram adapted from Lindell’s PADM (Figure 9). For both dichotomous and multilevel 
exposures, reference categories were selected because they were identified in previous 
studies or assumed by the authors to be the lowest risk for evacuation failure.  
Multivariate analyses were used to assess effect measure modification on the additive 
scale and to adjust for potential confounding. A full multivariable model was developed 
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 based on a review of published studies with perceived or actual flood risk as the main 
exposure and covariates including evacuation intention (Perry, 1981), past hurricane 
experience (Houts, 1984; Drabek and Stephenson, 1971), social cohesion (Riad and Norris, 
1998; Lindell, 2005) and demographic characteristics, such as housing type, home ownership 
and age (Houts, 1984; Drabek and Stephenson, 1971). In order to construct the final model, 
variables were removed from the full model 1 at a time except indicator variables and 
interaction terms, which were removed as a group. Based on the χ2 values from Likelihood 
Ratio Tests (LRT), variables with a p-value of ≤ 0.10 and interaction terms with a p-value of 
≤ 0.20 were retained in the final model (Kleinbaum, 2005).  
 Effect measure modification was assessed by conducting a heterogeneity test of the 
RDs across strata of covariates. A Wald p-value was calculated for the product interaction 
term between the main exposure and each covariate. A Wald p-value of ≤ 0.20 was 
considered evidence of potential effect measure modification. Stratified RDs and 95% CIs 
were calculated for all variables. If there was evidence of effect measure modification, 
interaction terms were entered into the full model. Confounding was assessed by removing 
variables one at a time from the full model, except indicator variables which were removed 
as a group. Variables that resulted in a change in the RD of greater than or equal to 10% were 
considered to be confounders and retained in the final model (Maldonado, 1993). 
D. Results 
 Of those eligible to participate, 86.8% responded to the survey. In the study sample, 
28% (n=162) of the residents interviewed reported evacuating prior to Hurricane Isabel 
landfall, while 72% (n=408) did not evacuate. Four hundred of the parcels (70.18%) where 
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 interviews were conducted were designated as non-flood zones, while 61 (10.70%) were 
located in the 500-year flood plain and 109 (19.12%) were located in the 100-year flood 
plain. Approximately three-quarters of those surveyed lived in stick built homes (n=400) as 
opposed to mobile homes or apartments, and four-fifths reported owning their homes as 
opposed to renting (n=450). The median age of the respondents was 50 years old (Table 12). 
TABLE 12. Demographic characteristics of cross-sectional sample (overall and according to 
evacuation) from residents of Chowan, Perquimans and Pasquotank Counties, NC (n=570) 
       
  Study Population  Evacuated  Did Not Evacuate 
  n %  n %  n % 
Home Type          
Stick Built  400 70.18  78 19.50  322 80.50 
Mobile Home   149 26.14  82 55.03  67 44.97 
Multi-Unit  21 3.68  2 9.52  19 90.48 
Homeownership          
Own  450 78.95  118 26.22  332 73.78 
Rent  120 21.05  44 36.67  76 63.33 
          
Age          
< 50  269 47.19  91 33.83  178 66.17 
≥ 50  299 52.46  71 23.75  228 76.25 
Missing  2 0.49  0 0.00  2 100.00 
          
 
1. Association between perceived and actual flood risk 
A Mantel-Haenszel χ2 test of association was conducted to assess whether perceived 
flood risk was correlated with actual flood risk. The nonzero correlation of perceived flood 
risk and actual flood risk was 12.28 (1df, p=0.0005) leading us to conclude that among the 
survey respondents, lower perceived flood risk was reported by respondents with lower 
actual flood risk as assigned by the FIRMs.  When considering residents’ ability to accurately 
rate their flood risk, 316 out of 570 (55.44%) respondents correctly identified their flood risk 
represented by the diagonal in Table 13. However, of those living in the riskiest 100-year 
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 flood plain (Row 1, Table 13), more than half characterized their risk of flooding as low, 
while less than 20% correctly characterized their risk as high. Of those who lived in the 100-
year flood plain and incorrectly reported their risk as low, nearly three-quarters (39/55) were 
homeowners living in stick built homes who would therefore be eligible for or required to 
purchase flood insurance. Overall, 22.81% of those surveyed underestimated their risk for 
flooding by at least 1 level. The Somer’s D C|R statistic (0.14; 95% CI: 0.06, 0.22) was 
positive, indicating a positive concordance between perceived and actual risk when perceived 
risk was considered as the dependent variable.  
TABLE 13. Matrix of perceived and actual risk for flooding of residents of Chowan, 
Pasquotank and Perquimans Counties (n=570) 
 
 Perceived Risk  
 High Medium Low  
Actual Risk n % N % n % Total 
100-Year 20 18.35 34 31.19 55 50.46 109 
500-Year 6 9.84 14 22.95 41 67.21 61 
Non-Flood 42 10.50 76 19.00 282 70.50 400 
 
2. Bivariate analyses  
In the bivariate analysis, there was no association between actual flood risk as 
determined by the FIRM flood zone designation of the parcel where the home was located 
and evacuation from Hurricane Isabel. RDs were small and statistically insignificant, with 
confidence limit differences between 0.20 and 0.30.  Residents living in the 500- and 100-
year flood plains were no more likely to evacuate than those living in non-flood areas. When 
compared with those living in non-flood areas, those living in the 500-year flood plain had an 
excess risk of evacuation failure of 0.02 (95% CI: -0.10, 0.15) while those living in the 
higher risk 100-year flood plain had an excess risk of evacuation failure of 0.01 (95% CI: -
0.08, 0.11) (Table 14). Results were consistent when those living in either the 100- or 500-
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 year flood plain were collapsed and compared with those living in non-flood areas (RD = 
0.02; 95% CI: -0.07, 0.10).  
Similarly, no significant association was found between perceived flood risk as 
reported by the survey respondents and evacuation from Hurricane Isabel. Those who 
perceived their flood risk to be medium or high were no more likely to evacuate from 
Hurricane Isabel than those who perceived their flood risk to be low. When compared with 
those who perceived their flood risk to be low, those who perceived their flood risk to be 
medium had a reduced risk of evacuation failure of -0.03 (95% CI: -0.13, 0.06) while those 
who perceived their flood risk to be high had an excess risk of evacuation failure of 0.09 
(95% CI: -0.03, 0.22) (Table 14).  Again, results were similar when those living in any flood 
zone were compared with those living in non-flood areas (RD = -0.02; 95% CI: -0.10, 0.06). 
TABLE 14. Distribution, Crude Risk Differences (RD) and 95% Confidence Intervals (95% 
CI) for the association of failure to evacuate from Hurricane Isabel and flood zone 
designation of residence and residents’ perceived flood risk (n=570) 
 
Variable Description Evacuated  
(n=162 ) 
 
Did not evacuate  
(n=408) 
RD (95% CI) 
 n % N %  
      
Flood Zone      
Non-Flood 116 29.00 284 71.00 REF 
500-Year Flood 16 26.23 45 73.77 0.02 (-0.10, 0.15) 
100-Year Flood 30 27.52 79 72.48 0.01 (-0.08,0.11) 
Perceived Flood Risk      
Low 105 27.78 273 72.22 REF 
Medium 32 25.81 92 74.19 -0.03 (-0.13, 0.06) 
High 25 36.76 43 63.24 0.09 (-0.03, 0.22) 
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 3. Multivariable analyses 
 Since a respondent’s assessment of perceived flood risk may be modified or 
confounded by other characteristics such as evacuation intentions, social cohesion and 
demographic characteristics such as housing type, home ownership and age, a multivariable 
analysis approach was also used. 
The main exposures, perceived flood risk and actual flood risk, were tested for effect 
measure modification on the RD scale. Based on the p-value of the interaction terms, there 
was no evidence of RD heterogeneity for the strata-specific associations between perceived 
flood risk and age (≤ 50 years vs. > 50 years) (p = 0.23), homeownership (own vs. rent) (p = 
0.72) or total social cohesion (≤ median vs. > median) (p = 0.52). For actual flood risk, there 
was no evidence of heterogeneity by age (p = 0.54) or homeownership (p = 0.29). For both 
perceived (p = 0.15) and actual risk (p = 0.06), home type (stick built vs. mobile home or 
apartment) was a potentially important modifier for the association between hurricane 
evacuation and both actual and perceived risk. For actual flood risk, total social cohesion (p = 
0.02) was a potentially important modifier of the association between hurricane evacuation 
and the actual flood risk of the residence.  
Stratified RDs and 95% CIs were constructed for both home type (Table 15) and 
social cohesion (Table 16). There was some evidence of modification of the effect of actual 
flood risk on evacuation by home type, with stratified estimates for those living in stick built 
homes (RD = -0.02; 95% CI: -0.07, 0.03) and mobile homes or apartments (RD = 0.06; 95% 
CI: -0.05, 0.16) on opposite sides of the null value of 0 although confidence intervals crossed 
the null. Similar results were found for perceived flood risk, with stratified estimates for 
those living in stick built homes (RD = -0.04 (-0.10, 0.02) and mobile homes or apartments 
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 (RD = 0.05 (-0.04, 0.15), indicating that home type may modify the relationship between 
actual flood risk and hurricane evacuation and perceived flood risk and evacuation.  These 
results did not change when mobile home and apartment residents were analyzed as separate 
strata. Lower perceived and actual risk reduced the excess risk of evacuation failure for those 
who live in stick built homes while it increased the excess risk of evacuation failure for those 
who live in mobile homes or apartments. There was no evidence of modification of the effect 
of actual or perceived flood risk on evacuation by social cohesion. 
 
TABLE 15. Crude Risk Differences (RD), Stratified RD and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
for the association between evacuation from Hurricane Isabel and actual and perceived flood 
risk stratified by home type (n=570) 
 
Actual Flood Risk 
 100- or 500- Year Flood Zone Non-Flood  
  Evacuated Did Not 
Evacuate 
Evacuated Did Not 
Evacuate 
RD (95% CI) 
Home Type n      
Crude RD 570 46 124 116 284 0.02 (-0.07, 0.10) 
Stick Built 
Home 
400 25 96 53 226 -0.02 (-0.10. 0.06) 
       
Mobile 
Home or 
Apartment 
170 21 28 63 58 0.09 (-0.07, 0.25) 
Perceived Flood Risk 
  High or Medium Perceived Risk Low Perceived Risk  
 
Crude RD 
 
570 
 
83 
 
135 
 
79 
 
273 
 
-0.02 (-0.10. 0.06) 
Stick Built 
Home 
400 28 96 50 226 -0.04 (-0.13. 0.04) 
Mobile 
Home or 
Apartment 
170 55 39 29 47 0.11 (-0.03. 0.26 
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 TABLE 16. Crude Risk Differences (RD), Stratified RD and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
for the association between evacuation from Hurricane Isabel and actual and perceived flood 
risk stratified by total social cohesion dichotomized at median value of 18 (n=570) 
 
Actual Flood Risk 
 100- or 500- Year Flood Zone Non-Flood  
  Evacuated Did Not 
Evacuate 
Evacuated Did Not 
Evacuate 
RD (95% CI) 
Total Social 
Cohesion 
n      
Crude RD 570 46 124 116 284 0.01 (-0.04, 0.06) 
Low Total 
Social 
Cohesion 
319 30 59 80 150 0.00 (-0.06, 0.06) 
High Total 
Social 
Cohesion 
251 16 65 36 134 0.02 (-0.05, 0.08) 
Perceived Flood Risk 
  High or Medium Perceived Risk Low Perceived Risk  
 
Crude RD 
 
570 
 
137 
 
365 
 
25 
 
43 
-0.03 (-0.08, 0.03) 
Low Total 
Social 
Cohesion 
319 97 185 13 24 0.00 (-0.07, 0.07) 
High Total 
Social 
Cohesion 
251 40 180 12 19 -0.05 (-0.13, 0.02) 
 
 For perceived risk, the backward elimination modeling resulted in a final model that 
included the main exposure, perceived flood risk, as well as intended evacuation from a 
future storm of Category 3 or higher (LRT χ2 < 0.0001), home type (LRT χ2 < 0.0001) and 
the interaction term for perceived risk and home type (LRT χ2 = 0.17). Assessment of 
confounding resulted in maintaining the variable for evacuation intention in the model due to 
a change in the RD of more than 10% when this variable was removed from the model. 
Home type was retained in the model as part of an interaction term to maintain a 
hierarchically well-formulated model. Among residents of the 3 county study area, intended 
evacuation from a future storm of Category 3 or higher was associated with a reduced risk of 
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 evacuation failure from Hurricane Isabel of 0.25 (95% CI: 0.18, 0.33) controlling for home 
type. Living in a stick built home as compared to a mobile home was associated with an 
increased risk of evacuation failure of 0.15 (95% CI: 0.10, 0.28) controlling for evacuation 
intention (Table 17). 
TABLE 17. Adjusted Risk Differences (RD), 95% Confidence Intervals (95% CI) and P-
values for the association of failure to evacuate from Hurricane Isabel and residents’ 
perceived flood risk (n=570) 
 
 Parameter Estimates 
 Intention to 
Evacuate 
95% CI; p-value Home Type 95% CI; p-value 
Failure to Evacuate 
from Hurricane 
Isabel 
-0.25 -0.33, -0.18; 
<0.001 
0.15 0.10, 0.28; 
<0.001 
 
Results were similar for actual flood risk. For actual risk, backward elimination 
resulted in a model that included the main exposure as well as covariates intended evacuation 
(χ2 < 0.0001) and home type (χ2 = 0.0001). Assessment of confounding resulted in 
maintaining both intended evacuation and home type due to a change in the RD of more than 
10% when these variables were removed from the model. Intended evacuation from a future 
storm of Category 3 or higher was associated with a reduction in risk of evacuation failure 
from Hurricane Isabel of 0.25 (95% CI: 0.18, 0.32) controlling for home type. Living in a 
stick built home as compared to a mobile home was associated with an increased risk of 
evacuation failure of 0.15 (95% CI: 0.08, 0.22) controlling for intended evacuation (Table 
18). 
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 TABLE 18. Adjusted Risk Differences (RD), 95% Confidence Intervals (95% CI) and P-
values for the association of failure to evacuate from Hurricane Isabel and residents’ actual 
flood risk (n=570) 
 
 Parameter Estimates 
 Intention to 
Evacuate 
95% CI; p-value Home Type 95% CI; p-value 
Failure to Evacuate 
from Hurricane 
Isabel 
-0.25 -0.32, -0.18; 
<0.001 
0.15 0.08, 0.22; 
<0.001 
 
E. Discussion 
Although perceived and actual flood risks were statistically associated, nearly one-
half of the residents surveyed were unable to correctly identify the flood risk of their property 
as determined by the FIRMs. Nearly three-quarters of those who lived in the most risky area 
and identified their flood risk as low were homeowners who lived in stick built homes and 
therefore should have been offered or required to purchase flood insurance. It could be that 
longer-term residents of stick built homes would be less aware of the new FIRMs if they did 
not hold a mortgage on their home, since lien-holders generally require the purchase of flood 
insurance. However, those who had lived in their homes at least 20 years were no less likely 
to correctly identify their flood risk than those who had lived in their homes less than 20 
years and likely still had a mortgage. Longer-term residents might also lack confidence in the 
flood zone designations as determined by government authorities and make their evacuation 
decisions based more on personal experiences with previous storms or the information about 
flooding received from friends and neighbors. However, when this table was stratified by 
median length of residence in the home or county, there was no difference is residents’ 
ability to correctly identify their flood risk. With nearly one-quarter of the sample 
underestimating their risk, the direct provision of up-to-date flood maps to residents as well 
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 as door-to-door and other education campaigns at least in high-risk flood zones is 
recommended. 
 Although evacuation from other hurricanes has been associated with risk (Riad, 1998; 
Zhang, 2004), this was not the case for residents of the 3 coastal counties affected by 
Hurricane Isabel where neither self-reported nor official flood risk designation of the 
property was related to evacuation. There are several potential explanations for this finding. 
Prior to Hurricane Isabel, the last major hurricane to affect this specific region of North 
Carolina was Hurricane Hazel in 1954, perhaps leading residents to believe they were not at 
risk for hurricane related flooding. Alternatively, North Carolina’s coast in general was 
affected by many hurricanes between 1996 and 1999, some of them severe. This may have 
led residents to conclude that the recent occurrence of so many storms decreased the 
probability of a strong storm in 2003. Also, according to local emergency management 
officials, residents were warned prior to Hurricane Isabel to prepare for a storm surge about 2 
feet higher than the surge that accompanied Hurricane Floyd. Although this forecast was 
correct, many residents still failed to evacuate, perhaps because no storm surge that high had 
ever been observed in the area before (US Department of Commerce). Based on residents’ 
experience with a “reference storm” of similar intensity and track (e.g., Hurricane Dennis in 
1999) that did not lead to flooding, residents may have felt there would not be flooding in 
association with Hurricane Isabel. 
This study has several limitations. FIRMs do not provide any evidence of whether or 
not the respondent’s home was actually flooded during Hurricane Isabel and this data was not 
collected as part of the survey. Also, FIRMs were not intended to be used for determining 
evacuation zones during floods or hurricanes but rather for siting and design of infrastructure 
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 and. It is, however, a stated goal of the program to reduce the loss of life and property that 
results from flooding disasters. The program also aims to alert property owners at risk of the 
need to purchase flood insurance, although to date, the authors know of no community 
education or outreach conducted by the Floodplain Mapping Program. North Carolina’s 
vulnerability to hurricanes, which may cause flooding through both heavy rains and storm 
surge, and the extensive investment made in updating FIRMs by the state demonstrate the 
value of more directly linking FIRMs and evacuation designation. 
The flood zone stratification strategy ensured representation from all flood zones 
while allowing for improved efficiency of interviewing due to time and resource constraints. 
Although census blocks cover a fairly small geographic area, misclassification bias could be 
introduced if a specific parcel where an interview was conducted had a different flood zone 
designation than the center of the block. To avoid misclassification bias in the data analysis, 
longitude and latitude coordinates were mapped to parcel-level flood zone maps. Given the 
potential of up to a 100 foot measurement error of the field data collector’s GPS, it is still 
possible that some misclassification occurred.   
The cross-sectional nature of the study requires that residents accurately report past 
evacuation behavior and future evacuation intentions, both of which may be influenced by 
many unknown factors that may vary depending on the time of hurricane landfall. This study 
also assumes that evacuation intention is a good indicator of a respondent’s actual 
evacuation. It is possible that the associations between perceived risk and evacuation 
intention are different from the association between perceived risk and actual evacuation. 
Longitudinal studies should be planned for hurricane prone areas to confirm anticipated 
behavior and reveal patterns of evacuation. Since residents were asked to classify the risk of 
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 flood damage to their property as low, medium or high rather than to report the FIRM flood 
zone classification of their property, measurement error could account for some of the 
discrepancy between actual and perceived flood risk.  
 The identification of the potential causal interaction between perceived and actual 
risk and type of home may have important public health and safety implications. In this 
study, those who lived in mobile homes were more likely to evacuate in general, with those 
living in stick built homes having an excess risk of evacuation failure of 0.36 (95% CI: 0.27, 
0.45) when compared with those living in a mobile home. In other words, out of every 100 
residents of the region, 36 more people evacuated if they lived in mobile homes than if they 
lived in stick built homes. Although it would seem that perceived or actual risk would 
account for most or all of this difference in evacuation failure for those living in mobile 
homes, when adjusted for perceived or actual risk, this number was only reduced to 0.15 
(95% CI: 0.08, 0.22). The interaction between home type and perceived or actual risk may 
explain the remainder of this risk difference.  
 Social comparison theory as described by Festinger (1954) explains that individuals’ 
opinions are influenced by the abilities and opinions of others who are similar (Suls, Martin, 
and Wheeler, 2002). In this case, when respondents who live in a mobile home are asked to 
report their perceived risk from flooding, their perceptions are shaped by comparing 
themselves with others who live in mobile homes. Similarly, those who live in stick built 
homes compare themselves with other stick built home residents. Therefore, a high perceived 
risk reported by a mobile home resident may actually be higher than a high perceived risk 
reported by a stick built home resident. This may be due to the respondents’ knowledge that 
mobile homes are unsafe during severe weather events, as indicated by their reduced risk of 
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 evacuation failure when compared to residents of stick built homes, or their belief that 
mobile home parks are typically situated on cheap land that may be low-lying or more 
vulnerable to wind damage. This widely-held anecdotal belief was not demonstrated in this 
study; based on the FIRMs, those who lived in mobile homes were no more likely to live in 
the 500- or 100-year flood zone than those who lived in stick built homes (χ2 = 1.38 (1df), p 
= 0.24). Without the interaction term, the model treats all high reported perceived risk as 
equal, regardless of the home type of the respondent, which may be inaccurate. Based on 
these results, it appears that high risk is qualitatively different for a mobile home resident 
than for a resident of a stick built home.  
 Previous studies have identified several factors that are associated with accurate risk 
perception, including age, length of residence, experience with disasters and previous 
evacuation (Arlikatti, 2006). However, these results are problematic for local officials and 
policy-makers, as these variables are difficult or impossible to influence. On the other hand, 
the results of this study suggest at least 3 potential interventions, including efforts to increase 
intended evacuation by requiring family or neighborhood evacuation plans, educational 
campaigns to raise property owners’ awareness of vulnerability to hurricanes and flooding, 
and new regulations that use updated FIRMs to guide rebuilding, retrofitting, and new 
development in hurricane-prone areas.  
Several strategies have been implemented in other states with mixed results. In Texas, 
risk area maps have been distributed to residents prior to hurricane season, but residents 
reported problems with reading and interpreting the maps, and their ability to accurately 
characterize the risk of their area had no effect on their likelihood of evacuation (Arlikatti, 
2006).  In Louisiana, major marketing efforts were made to increase the number of 
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 households covered by flood insurance after Hurricane Katrina. However, more than 15% of 
new policyholders in Louisiana failed to renew their post-Katrina policies in 2007 (Louisiana 
Department of Insurance). In North Carolina, homebuilders and other interest groups have 
successfully opposed the implementation of stricter building codes, including a requirement 
that homes have hurricane shutters (News and Observer, 2007). In Florida, the integration of 
land-use planning and evacuation planning has been required in order to expand 
infrastructure to support timely evacuation of at-risk residents. At the national level, a 
proposed amendment to the National Flood Insurance Act would have required flood 
insurance even when no loan is involved in property purchase, which broadened the number 
of households and businesses eligible for coverage, increased maximum coverage amounts, 
and reduced waiting periods failed to become law (GovTrack.us, “H.R. 4973 – 109th 
Congress).  
F. Conclusion 
 Perceived flood risk as reported by residents of 3 coastal North Carolina counties was 
statistically associated with actual flood risk as determined by updated FIRMs, although 
nearly 50% of respondents were unable to correctly characterize the flood risk of their 
property. Based on the findings of this study, many residents in the flood-prone Pasquotank 
River basin are not aware of their risk for flooding. Additionally, flood risk does not appear 
to have played a role in residents’ decision to evacuate from Hurricane Isabel or in their 
intention to evacuate from a future hurricane. Potentially important interactions between 
perceived and actual risk and home type, evidence that evacuation intentions are an important 
factor in the evacuation decision regardless of flood risk, and updated flood hazard maps 
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 present opportunities for policy makers and emergency management officials to target 
evacuation education efforts on improving flood risk perception and increasing the number of 
residents who intend to evacuate prior to a storm. 
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XIV. CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
A. STUDY REVIEW: AIMS AND OUTCOMES 
The decision to evacuate from an impending disaster is a complex one that goes 
beyond the descriptive characteristics of an individual or a household. Contextual factors 
such as the extent of connectedness, levels of trust and reciprocity, and shared values shape 
the actions of individuals. Over time and through storms, some neighbors expect to take 
responsibility for one another during disasters while others are excluded from this informal 
network of support and resources. Residential segregation, differential housing quality and 
vulnerability, and status group characteristics have excluded some, increasing their likelihood 
of exposure to the effects of disasters while at the same time limiting their access to resources 
that may enhance preparedness and recovery. 
The first dissertation paper sought to describe the associations between demographic 
and social factors and failure to evacuate from Hurricane Isabel in 2003 of residents of 3 
northeastern North Carolina counties. The goal was to determine if social factors were 
associated with hurricane evacuation failure by answering the following research question: 
Were social cohesion, social capital, and social control associated with failure to evacuate 
from Hurricane Isabel by households in Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Chowan Counties? 
This research found that higher levels of social cohesion and social capital were associated 
with evacuation failure.  
 
 Reporting a stronger willingness to help your neighbors, characterizing your 
neighborhood as close knit, and agreeing that you trust and get along well with your 
neighbors were all associated with an increased risk of evacuation failure. Previous studies 
that have dismissed the strong associations generally found between neighbor’s evacuation 
status and a study household’s evacuation status have been too quick to conclude that this 
association was simply confounding by storm strength in certain areas. Certainly, some of 
this decision to stay when your neighbors do is related to the fact that neighbors experience 
similar storm intensity and conditions; However, based on these results, the more neighbors 
rely on one another during an emergency, the more likely they are to fail to evacuate 
together. 
Reporting membership in a church, business, or civic organization was associated 
with an increased risk for evacuation failure. Volunteers were also more likely to fail to 
evacuate than non-volunteers. There has been much anecdotal evidence of communities 
coming together to face disasters. This study provides additional confirmation that the 
commitment to community involvement carries over from normal times to times of disaster.  
Social control was not associated with evacuation failure in this study. However, 
several proxies for social control, including markers of territoriality (e.g. no trespassing 
signs, beware of dog signs, and fenced in yards) were associated with increased risk of 
hurricane evacuation failure. It is reasonable to consider that there are two sides to the social 
action of evacuation. On the one hand, households who are highly socially integrated in their 
communities and trust and rely on neighbors during normal times naturally extend that trust 
to disasters and rely on neighbors to share resources and face disasters together. On the other 
hand, socially isolated households refuse to evacuate not because they trust that their 
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 neighborhood will deal with the effects of the storm together; rather they fear their neighbors 
as possible looters or thieves. 
The second dissertation paper explored the role of social factors in the modification 
of the association of demographic factors and hurricane evacuation failure. The goal was to 
identify population sub-groups that could be targeted by public health education and 
intervention in order to improve hurricane evacuation rates by answering the following 
question: Was there evidence of heterogeneity on the risk difference scale for the association 
of demographic covariates and hurricane evacuation failure according to the measured value 
of social cohesion, social control, social capital, and other social factors? This research found 
some evidence of effect measure modification of risk differences for demographic factors by 
total social cohesion, volunteerism, property preparation, church membership, neighbor’s 
evacuation status, and the number of local friends and family.  
These findings should enable policy makers and planners to target specific sub-
groups (e.g. younger or unmarried volunteers or African-Americans who are new to the 
community and may have smaller numbers of local friends and family and therefore fewer 
trusted information sources). Effect measure modification on the additive scale is appropriate 
for public health intervention targeting. Inherent limitations in capital and human resources, 
as well as limited lead time prior to hurricane landfall underscore the necessity of targeting 
interventions to increase successful evacuation. In some cases, those targeted for intervention 
will be a high-risk subgroup. Men make up the majority of hurricane related morbidity and 
mortality. If efforts that increase property preparation in order to increase evacuation have a 
synergistic effect on men’s evacuation, then a larger absolute reduction of morbidity and 
mortality may be realized through this targeted approach. In other cases, target groups may 
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 appear to be at lower risk. For example, in this study, younger residents were 10% (95% CI: 
2%, 18%) more likely to evacuate than older residents, but younger residents who reported 
volunteering were 23% (95% CI: 11%, 34%) more likely to fail to evacuate. Paying special 
attention to younger volunteers and targeting messages to the agencies where they volunteer 
could lead to a greater reduction in the absolute risk of hurricane evacuation failure. 
The third dissertation paper sought to discover if using different measures of risk, 
including residents’ perceived risk and actual flood risk as measured by FIRMs, were 
associated with difference in hurricane evacuation failure. The research associated with the 
third paper found several interesting things: 1) Perceived and actual risk were statistically 
associated, yet more than one-half of the study sample failed to correctly identify the 
designated flood risk of their property as measured by the FIRMS. Nearly one-fifth of the 
study sample lived in the most risky 100-year floodplain, yet reported that their perceived 
flood risk was low. 2) Neither perceived flood risk nor actual flood risk was associated with 
hurricane evacuation failure. Those who rated the vulnerability of their property to flooding 
as high were no more likely to evacuate that those who rated their property’s vulnerability as 
medium or low. Those who lived in the 100-year flood plain were no more likely to evacuate 
that those who lived in the 500-year flood plain or in areas designated as non-flood.  
Certain subgroups and modifiable factors were again identified in this third paper as 
appropriate for public health intervention. The role of risk perception in evacuation decision 
making varies depending on the type of home the respondent lives in. Those who live in stick 
built homes are more likely to fail to evacuate and more likely to underestimate their risk. 
The same is not true of those who live in mobile homes or multi-unit dwellings. It seems 
likely that those who live in mobile homes and identify themselves as high risk compare 
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 themselves to others living in mobile homes and not to others in the community who live in 
stick built homes. Therefore, mobile home residents reported high risk is qualitatively higher 
than the high risk reported by residents of stick built homes. Without accounting for the 
interaction of home type and risk perception, the excess risk of evacuation failure for those 
who live in stick built homes cannot be addressed. 
 
B. STUDY LIMITATIONS 
There are multiple limitations to this research. The research study was designed as a 
cross-sectional study and therefore only captured data at one point in time. This design does 
not allow for the determination of temporal relationships between exposure and the outcome 
and cannot take into account changes in the prevalence of measured factors in the study 
population occur over time. 
This study asked respondents to report intentions and behavior from nearly 5 years prior 
to the time the study was carried out which could have resulted in recall bias. It is also 
possible that respondents did not accurately report their age, marital status, or whether or not 
they had children under age 18 living at home at the time Hurricane Isabel made landfall, and 
instead reported their current status as of 2008.  
The study includes a number of objective and subjective variables. While the interviewer 
recorded some variables, such as the type of home and the presence of markers of 
territoriality, many other variables were reported by the respondent, such as evacuation 
behavior and intentions, perceived risk, and variables that measured social cohesion, social 
capital, and social control. The associations between self-reported variables and evacuation 
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 failure may have been the result of differential misclassification die to recall bias. This would 
not be a concern for variables rated by the interviewer. 
This study used p-values to conduct statistical significance testing for the construction of 
multivariable models. Since this was an observational study, p-values as reported should not 
be construed to represent actual probabilities or be interpreted formally as Type I error rates. 
Instead, they are simply presented as a form of data description. Substantive significance, in 
addition to statistical significance, was considered when the authors linked statistical results 
to recommendations for public health interventions or policy changes. 
If those who were at highest risk for evacuation failure were also more likely to be 
missed by this survey, there is a potential for response bias. Only those living in the same 
location as they were when Hurricane Isabel made landfall nearly 5 years prior to data 
collection were eligible to participate in the survey. This may have eliminated more renters, 
as well as more households living in poverty or with other unstable housing situations. This 
study did not collect data on, and therefore could not study the associations between, the 
actions or characteristics of local government or other agencies on hurricane evacuation 
failure.  
 
C. STUDY STRENGTHS 
Despite its limitations, this study has the potential to contribute to the disaster 
research literature. The use of the 2-stage random sampling method ensured that households 
were independent and represented the totality of the households in the cluster, thereby 
making the study results generalizable to the entire three-county study area. This sampling 
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 method also limited selection bias that may have been introduced if interviewers had been 
able to select the direction they would travel after the identification of the first interview 
location for the subsequent interviews. 
A strength of this study was the strong partnership with local agencies. Local public 
health and emergency management officials were consulted during the study design, 
questionnaire development, and data collection phase of the study. Local officials provided 
educational information and incentives to the research team that were distributed to 
respondents. In addition, the survey teams assisted local officials by collecting special needs 
forms from residents who reported needing assistance with evacuation. This partnership was 
one of the reasons for the high response rate of the study, as respondents saw that the survey 
data would be important in local decision making and priority setting. 
The use of handheld technology for data collection has been demonstrated in 
numerous studies to improve data completeness and quality. This type of data collection 
prevents errors that may be introduced during data entry when data is moved from paper 
forms to a database. The use of the GPS-enabled devices also reduced misclassification 
errors, by preventing interviewers from completing a survey if they were located outside of 
the physical boundaries of the selected census block. Having the longitude and latitude of the 
interview location allowed for mapping of the parcel where the interview was conducted and 
collecting relevant information on the parcel through overlaying other map-based data, such 
as flood zone designation. 
The simultaneous collection of data for a wide range of social, demographic, and 
storm-related factors is also an addition to the literature. Few studies have collected such as 
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 wide range of data. Social factors were measured using questions that have been validated 
and widely published. 
 
D. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The results of this research suggest several possible directions for future research. 
Investments should be made by funding agencies and academic institutions to provide 
funding for longitudinal studies in areas that are frequently affected by disasters. 
Longitudinal studies could account for the changing prevalence of certain covariates over 
time and could validate measures such as intended evacuation with measures of actual 
evacuation. They could also provide comparative data that could be used to develop 
interventions that address factors that are consistently associated with hurricane evacuation 
behavior over time and across multiple disasters. 
Measures for social factors should be developed specifically for use in rural areas. 
Although the measures used in this study have been widely validated and published, most 
were developed for use in urban settings. The quality and quantity of social cohesion, social 
capital, and social control among rural residents, who define neighborhood and community 
differently than residents of urban neighborhoods, merits its own measures.  
Ultimately, this research will lead to an examination of the relationship of social 
factors and disasters in multiple ways. Institutional and environmental factors should be 
further developed as contextual variables. The presentation and interpretation of results 
should be explored within a social-ecological framework that recognizes the importance of 
interpersonal relationships, government policies, land use, and environmental factors for 
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 understanding the decisions and attitudes of individuals. For example, risk can be assessed 
using physical indicators like FIRMs and measures of inundation during specific storm 
events, individual level perceptions of safety, as well as social-level factors such as the 
possible placement of low income or low education families on low quality, flood-
susceptible land. Future research should develop, implement, and validate impact of 
interventions on all of these levels in order to reduce hurricane-related morbidity and 
mortality. 
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 XV. APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Hurricane Evacuation Failure: A Quick Response Survey of Social Cohesion, Social 
Control, and Social Capital 
 
FOR THE INTERVIEWER TO COMPLETE PRIOR TO INTERVIEW: 
 
Q1. CLUSTER NO: ____     
Q2. INTERVIEW NO: ____ 
Q3. INTERVIEWER INITIALS: ____ 
 
Q4. Are markers of territoriality present? (allow all answers plus text in other) 
 
1 NAME ON MAILBOX 
2 NO TRESPASSING SIGN 
3 FENCED IN YARD 
4 BEWARE OF DOG SIGN 
5 OTHER 
 
Q5. What type of house is this? (pick only 1 answer) 
 
1 SINGLE FAMILY HOME 
2 APARTMENT OR TOWNHOUSE 
3 MOBILE HOME 
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 4 BOAT 
5 RECREATIONAL VEHICLE 
6 OTHER 
 
Q6. What is the sex of the survey respondent? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 MALE 
2 FEMALE 
 
Hello, my name is ____ and I am a student / staff / faculty from the University of North 
Carolina Gillings School of Global Public Health. We are working with the Albemarle 
Regional Health District to talk with community members about their hurricane experiences. 
I’d like to ask you a few questions about the hurricanes that have impacted this area in order 
to understand why households do or do not evacuate during a hurricane. 
 
Participation in this interview is voluntary. Your answers will be kept completely 
confidential. If you agree to participate, we will ask you questions for approximately 15 
minutes. 
 
Q7. Would you be willing to answer a few questions about hurricane impacts on your 
family? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
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 2 NO 
 
BEGIN THE SURVEY QUESTIONS: 
 
Q8. Are you currently living in the same area—in Perquimans, Chowan, or Pasquotank 
County—as you were living in when Hurricane Isabel threatened the North Carolina coast in 
September of 2003? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
[IF THEY SAY NO, CONCLUDE THIS SURVEY AND THANK THEM FOR BEING 
WILLING TO PARTICIPATE] 
 
[IF THEY SAY YES, PROCEED WITH SURVEY—REMIND THEM THAT QUESTIONS 
ARE ABOUT THE TIME WHEN HURRICANE ISABEL HIT (SEPT 2003)] 
 
Q9. Did you evacuate from your home when Hurricane made landfall in September 2003? 
(pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
152 
 2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
If NO, SKIP TO Q12, OTHERWISE GO ON TO Q10 
 
Q10. If you were to evacuate, do you know what you need to take with you? (pick 1 answer) 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q11. If YES, where did you go? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 SHELTER 
2 SPECIAL NEEDS SHELTER 
3 HOTEL OR MOTEL 
4 HOME OF FAMILY OR FRIEND 
5 OTHER 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q12. Approximately what time did you evacuate from your home? (pick 1 answer) 
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1 MORE THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO ANTICIPATED LANDFALL 
2 BETWEEN 12 AND 24 HOURS PRIOR TO ANTICIPATED LANDFALL 
3 LESS THAN 12 HOURS PRIOR TO ANTICIPATED LANDFALL 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q13. What do you consider the most important reasons why you did not evacuate? (can pick 
up to 3 answers) 
 
1 NOT WORRIED ABOUT/NOT SERIOUS ENOUGH 
2 DIDN’T WANT TO MISS WORK 
3 MY JOB REQUIRED ME TO STAY 
4 TOLD TOO LATE/NOT ENOUGH TIME TO LEAVE 
5 ROADS CLOSED 
6 PROTECT MY PROPERTY 
7 CONCERN FOR PETS 
8 PHYSICALLY UNABLE TO GO 
9 CAR TROUBLE / NO TRANSPORTATION  
10 NOWHERE TO GO 
11 NOT SURE WHERE TO GO 
12 CONFIDENT IN HOME CONSTRUCTION 
13 OTHER  ________________________ 
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 88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q14. Did an evacuation order cover your home (were you told to leave your home by 
emergency management officials?)  (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
If NO, SKIP TO Q16, OTHERWISE GO ON TO Q15 
 
Q15. Was this a voluntary or mandatory evacuation order? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 VOLUNTARY 
2 MANDATORY 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
Q16. At the time Hurricane Isabel made landfall, did you have a disaster supply kit for your 
household that included at least a 3 day supply of food and water? (pick 1 answer) 
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 1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
Q17. At the time Hurricane Isabel made landfall, counting yourself, how many people were 
living or staying in this household (do not include people only staying here because of the 
hurricane)? (enter number) 
 
ENTER NUMBER (1–15) 
 
Q18. Did anyone in your household have any special medical needs that made evacuating 
during Hurricane Isabel difficult? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q19. Did any children under the age of 18 live in your household? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
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 88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
IF NO, THEN GO TO Q21, OTHERWISE GO TO Q20 
 
Q20. Did you receive information about the hurricane from your children’s school? (pick 1 
answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
Q21. Did you have any pets? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q22. At the time Hurricane Isabel made landfall, did you have at least one running or 
working vehicle in your household? (pick 1 answer) 
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 1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q23. Did you own or rent your home? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 OWN 
2 RENT 
3 NEITHER/LIVE FOR FREE 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q24. How many years had you lived in the house you lived in when Hurricane Isabel made 
landfall? 
 
ENTER NUMBER REPORTED 
 
Q25. How many years had you lived in the county you lived in when Hurricane Isabel made 
landfall? 
 
ENTER NUMBER REPORTED 
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 Q26. How many hurricanes have you experienced in your lifetime? 
 
ENTER NUMBER REPORTED 
 
Q27. What was your age? 
 
ENTER NUMBER REPORTED 
 
Q28. What do you consider to be your race or ethnicity? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 WHITE 
2 AFRICAN AMERICAN 
3 HISPANIC 
4 OTHER 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q29. What was your marital status? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 MARRIED 
2 SEPARATED OR DIVORCED 
3 NEVER MARRIED 
4 OTHER 
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 88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q30. At the time Hurricane Isabel made landfall, were you employed full time or part time, 
retired, or in the military? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
3 RETIRED 
4 MILITARY 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
IF NO, SKIP TO Q32, OTHERWISE Q31 
 
Q31. Did you receive information about the hurricane from your work? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
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 Q32. Did you prepare your property in advance of Hurricane Isabel (e.g., storm shutters, 
plywood)? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES  
2 NO  
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q33. Did you feel that these preparations required that you stay in your home to monitor 
their effectiveness against winds or flooding? (e.g., to monitor that a pump turned on if 
basement flooded) (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES  
2 NO  
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
 
Q34. Before Hurricane Isabel, had your home or property sustained damage from a previous 
hurricane? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
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 88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
Q35. Consider the risks from flooding during a hurricane similar to Hurricane Isabel. In your 
opinion, was the home where you lived located in a high-risk site, a medium-risk site, or a 
low-risk site for flooding? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 LOW 
2 MEDIUM 
3 HIGH 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q36. Consider the risks from wind damage during a hurricane similar to Hurricane Isabel. In 
your opinion, was the home where you lived located in a high-risk site, a medium-risk site, or 
a low-risk site for wind damage? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 LOW 
2 MEDIUM 
3 HIGH 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
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 Q37. If a Category 3 or higher hurricane was approaching this area now, would you 
evacuate? Isabel was a Category 2 hurricane. (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
FRIENDSHIP AND KINSHIP TIES QUESTIONS 
 
Q38. About how many close friends and relatives do you have that live in this neighborhood 
or community? (Close friends are people who might watch your children, invite you to their 
home for a meal or activity, do you another favor, let you borrow something valuable.) 
 
ENTER NUMBER REPORTED 
 
 
Q39. To your knowledge, did none, some, most, or all of your family, friends and neighbors 
evacuate before Hurricane Isabel? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 NONE 
2 SOME 
3 MOST 
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 4 ALL 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q40. Did you look to these local friends and family for assistance or advice about evacuation 
before Hurricane Isabel? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
Q41. How many of your close friends and family members live outside this immediate area, 
where they would NOT have been affected by Hurricane Isabel? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 NONE 
2 SOME 
3 MOST 
4 ALL 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
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 Q42. Did you look to these non-local friends and family for assistance or advice about 
evacuation before Hurricane Isabel? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL QUESTIONS: ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Q43. Are you a member of any of the following business or civic organizations? (select all 
that apply, open text for typing other) 
 
1 LIONS CLUB 
2 KIWANIS 
3 ROTARY 
4 JAYCEES 
5 YMCA 
6 VFW 
7 KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS 
8 SALVATION ARMY 
9 ELKS CLUB 
10 SHRINERS 
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 11 OTHER 
12 RURITAN 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q44. Are you a member of any of the following community organizations? (select all that 
apply, open text for typing other) 
 
1 PARENT TEACHER ASSOCIATION 
2 LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP 
3 UNION OR WORKERS ORGANIZATION 
4 COMMUNITY SPORTS TEAM OR LEAGUE 
5 NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH 
6 HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION 
7 COMMUNITY COUNCIL 
8 LOCAL POLITICAL GROUP 
9 ETHNIC OR NATIONALITY CLUB 
10 4H 
11 OTHER 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
Q45. Are you a member of a church or other local religious organization? (pick 1 answer) 
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1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
Q46. Including business groups, community groups, and church, about how many meetings 
of any of these organizations do you attend per month? 
 
ENTER NUMBER 
 
Q47. Did you receive information about Hurricane Isabel from any of these organizations? 
(pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
Q48. Did any of these organizations provide relief assistance or other hurricane related 
assistance in your community after Hurricane Isabel? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
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 2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW   
99 REFUSED 
 
Q49. Did you do any volunteer work through these organizations to help hurricane victims? 
(pick 1 answer) 
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
88 DON’T KNOW 
99 REFUSED 
 
SOCIAL CONTROL QUESTIONS 
 
For the next few questions, I will ask you to rate each statement as very likely to very 
unlikely with very likely being 1 and very unlikely being 5. Would you be very likely, 
somewhat likely, neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely to intervene 
if: 
 
Q50. You saw children in your neighborhood or community skipping school. (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 VERY LIKELY 
2 SOMEWHAT LIKELY 
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 3 NEITHER LIKELY NOR UNLIKELY 
4 SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY 
5 VERY UNLIKELY 
 
Q51. You saw children in your neighborhood or community destroying property such as 
spraying graffiti on a building. (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 VERY LIKELY 
2 SOMEWHAT LIKELY 
3 NEITHER LIKELY NOR UNLIKELY 
4 SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY 
5 VERY UNLIKELY 
 
Q52. You saw children in your neighborhood or community showing disrespect to an adult. 
(pick 1 answer) 
 
1 VERY LIKELY 
2 SOMEWHAT LIKELY 
3 NEITHER LIKELY NOR UNLIKELY 
4 SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY 
5 VERY UNLIKELY 
 
Q53. You saw a fight in front of a neighbor or community member’s home. (pick 1 answer) 
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1 VERY LIKELY 
2 SOMEWHAT LIKELY 
3 NEITHER LIKELY NOR UNLIKELY 
4 SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY 
5 VERY UNLIKELY 
 
Q54. You heard that there were to be severe budget cuts in your neighborhood or community 
that would affect the ability of the police or fire department to function? (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 VERY LIKELY 
2 SOMEWHAT LIKELY 
3 NEITHER LIKELY NOR UNLIKELY 
4 SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY 
5 VERY UNLIKELY 
 
Q55. You saw looters stealing from one of your neighbors or community members after a 
hurricane or other disaster. (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 VERY LIKELY 
2 SOMEWHAT LIKELY 
3 NEITHER LIKELY NOR UNLIKELY 
4 SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY 
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 5 VERY UNLIKELY 
 
SOCIAL COHESION AND TRUST QUESTIONS 
 
For the next few questions, we will ask you to rate each statement as strongly agree to 
strongly disagree with strongly agree being 1 and strongly disagree being 5. Would you say 
that you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with 
the following statements: 
 
Q56. People who live in this neighborhood or community are willing to help their neighbors. 
(pick 1 answer) 
 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
3 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
4 DISAGREE 
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
 
 
Q57. This is a close-knit neighborhood or community. (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
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 3 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
4 DISAGREE 
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
 
Q58. People here in this neighborhood or community can be trusted. (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
3 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
4 DISAGREE 
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
 
Q59. People here in this neighborhood or community do not get along. (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
3 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
4 DISAGREE 
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
 
Q60. People here in this neighborhood or community share the same values. (pick 1 answer) 
 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
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 2 AGREE 
3 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
4 DISAGREE 
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
 
Q61. This neighborhood or community has the services that I need, such as homeowner’s 
association, crime prevention program, community health clinic or recreational program. 
(pick 1 answer) 
 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
3 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
4 DISAGREE 
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
 
Q62. Where do you usually get news about hurricanes or dangerous weather? (pick 1) 
 
1 WITN TV 7 
2 WTKR TV 3 
3 WAVY TV 10 
4 WVEC TV 13 
5 WSKY TV 4 
6 WYAH TV 
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 7 WRAL RALEIGH 
8 INTERNET 
9 WEATHER CHANNEL 
10 LOCAL RADIO 
11 SCANNER 
12 OTHER 
 
 
THANK YOU. THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR TIME. PLEASE TAKE THIS 
FIRST AID KIT AND OTHER INFORMATION AS A SMALL TOKEN OF OUR 
APPRECIATION FOR YOUR TIME.  
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 XVI. APPENDIX B: STRATIFIED RISK DIFFERENCES 
Crude and Stratified Risk Differences (RD), 95% Confidence Intervals (95% CI), and 
Wald p-values for product interaction terms between demographic and social 
covariates 
 
Evacuation Predictors All Respondents 
(n=570) 
Stratified RD Wald p-
value 
 Crude RD (95% CI) RD (95% CI) 
mediator = 0 
RD (95% CI) 
mediator = 1 
 
Hometype 
(Stick Built v. Mobile 
Home or Apartment) 
0.30 (0.21, 0.38) - - - 
Hometype x Total 
Social Cohesion 
- 0.11 (0.03, 0.19) 0.07 (-0.09, 0.23) 0.66 
Hometype x 
Neighbor’s Evacuation 
- -0.61 (-0.77, -0.45) -0.51 (-0.64, -0.39) 0.34 
Hometype x No. of 
Local Friends & 
Family 
- -0.06 (-0.13, 0.02) -0.07 (-0.22, 0.08) 0.90 
Hometype x Prepared 
Property 
- 0.00 (-0.08, 0.07) -0.14 (-0.30. 0.02) 0.15 
Hometype x Volunteer - 0.04 (-0.06, 0.13) 0.23 (-0.02, 0.48)  0.24 
Hometype x Church - 0.05 (-0.04, 0.13) 0.12 (-0.03, 0.27) 0.43 
Homeownership  
(Own or Rent) 
0.10 (0.004, 0.21) - - - 
Homeownership x 
Total Social Cohesion 
- 0.15 (0.07, 0.23) -0.02 (-0.22, 0.18) 0.13 
Homeownership x 
Neighbor’s Evacuation 
- -0.63 (-0.75, -0.51) -0.54 (-0.78, -0.30) 0.54 
Homeownership x No. 
of Local Friends & 
Family 
- -0.04 (-0.12, 0.04) -0.15 ( -0.32, 0.03) 0.28 
Homeownership x 
Prepared Property 
- 0.00 (-0.08, 0.08) -0.15 (-0.36, 0.06) 0.19 
Homeownership x 
Volunteer 
- 0.09 (-0.01, 0.18) 0.25 (0.05, 0.46) 0.15 
Homeownership x 
Church 
- 0.12 (0.03, 0.21) 0.04 (-0.13, 0.22) 0.45 
Age  
(< 50 years or ≥ 50 
years) 
0.10 (0.02, 0.18) - - - 
Age x Total Social 
Cohesion 
- 0.16 (0.05, 0.27) 0.10 (0.00, 0.20) 0.40 
Age x Neighbor’s 
Evacuation 
- -0.66 (-0.77, -0.55) -0.52 (-0.72, -0.32)  0.23 
Age x No. of Local 
Friends & Family 
- -0.05 (-0.17, 0.06) -0.02 (-0.11, 0.08) 0.63 
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 Age x Prepared 
Property 
- 0.03 (-0.08, 0.15) -0.05 (-0.15, 0.05) 0.27 
Age x Volunteer - 0.23 (0.11, 0.34) 0.02 (-0.11, 0.16) 0.02 
Age x Church - 0.11 (-0.01, 0.22) 0.10 (-0.01, 0.20) 0.87 
Race 
(White or African-
American and Other) 
0.05 (-0.05, 0.14) - - - 
Race x Total Social 
Cohesion 
- 0.12 (0.03, 0.19) 0.19 (0.05, 0.34) 0.35 
Race x Neighbor’s 
Evacuation 
- -0.53 (-0.68, -0.38) -0.75 (-0.99, -0.21) 0.38 
Race x No. of Local 
Friends & Family 
- -0.07 (-0.09, 0.07) -0.17 (-0.32, -0.02)  0.07 
Race x Prepared 
Property 
- -0.01 (-0.10, 0.07) -0.01 (-0.18, 0.16) 0.27 
Race x Volunteer - 0.10 (0.01, 0.20) 0.19 (0.00, 0.37) 0.42 
Race x Church - 0.14 (0.05, 0.23) 0.03 (-0.15, 0.20) 0.26 
Gender 
(Female or Male) 
0.07 (-0.01, 0.15) - - - 
Gender x Total Social 
Cohesion 
- 0.13 (0.02, 0.23) 0.15 (0.05, 0.25) 0.76 
Gender x Neighbor’s 
Evacuation 
- -0.61 (-0.75, -0.48) -0.60 (-0.77, -0.43) 0.91 
Gender x No. of Local 
Friends & Family 
- -0.05 (-0.15, 0.06) -0.05 (-0.15, 0.06) 0.99 
Gender x Prepared 
Property 
- 0.05 (-0.05, 0.16) -0.08 (-0.20, 0.02) 0.08 
Gender x Volunteer - 0.06 (-0.09, 0.21) 0.15 (0.04, 0.25) 0.37 
Gender x Church - 0.19 (0.08, 0.31) 0.04 (-0.07, 0.15) 0.04 
Marital Status 
(Married or Widowed / 
Never Married / 
Divorced) 
-0.02 (-0.11, 0.06) - - - 
Marital Status x Total 
Social Cohesion 
- 0.18 (0.09, 0.27) 0.06 (-0.06, 0.19) 0.16 
Marital Status x 
Neighbor’s Evacuation 
- -0.60 (-0.78, -0.48) -0.61 (-0.83, -0.39) 0.98 
Marital Status x No. of 
Local Friends & 
Family 
- -0.05 (-0.14, 0.04) -0.05 (-0.18, 0.07) 0.93 
Marital Status x 
Prepared Property 
- 0.00 (-0.09, 0.10) -0.03 (-0.17, 0.12) 0.72 
Marital Status x 
Volunteer 
- 0.09 (-0.01, 0.20) 0.25 (0.13, 0.36) 0.06 
Marital Status x 
Church 
- 0.14 (0.04, 0.25) 0.05 (-0.08, 0.19) 0.28 
Children Under Age 
18 (No or Yes) 
0.13 (-0.05, 0.22) - - - 
Children Under Age 
18 x Total Social 
Cohesion 
- 0.08 (0.00, 0.17) 0.23 (0.11, 0.36) 0.05 
Children Under Age 
18 x Neighbor’s 
- -0.44 (-0.65, -0.23) -0.70 (-0.79, -0.61) 0.03 
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 Evacuation 
Children Under Age 
18 x No. of Local 
Friends & Family 
- -0.02 (-0.11, 0.07) -0.04 (-0.18, 0.09) 0.72 
Children Under Age 
18 x Prepared Property 
- -0.05 (-0.14, 0.04) 0.09 (-0.04, 0.22) 0.09 
Children Under Age 
18 x Volunteer 
- 0.08 (-0.03, 0.20) 0.23 (0.10, 0.36) 0.11 
Children Under Age 
18 x Church 
- 0.14 (0.04, 0.23) 0.07 (-0.07, 0.21) 0.46 
Pets 
(No or Yes) 
0.02 (-0.05, 0.22) - - - 
Pets x Total Social 
Cohesion 
- 0.09 (-0.02, 0.20) 0.18 (0.08, 0.27) 0.23 
Pets x Neighbor’s 
Evacuation 
- -0.50 (-0.71, -0.30) -0.68 (-0.79, -0.55) 0.16 
Pets x No. of Local 
Friends & Family 
- -0.04 (-0.15, 0.07) -0.06 (-0.16, 0.04) 0.84 
Pets x Prepared 
Property 
- -0.06 (-0.18, 0.06) 0.03 (-0.07, 0.13) 0.25 
Pets x Volunteer - 0.06 (-0.08, 0.21) 0.16 (0.05, 0.27) 0.30 
Pets x Church - 0.07 (-0.06, 0.19) 0.14 (0.03, 0.24) 0.39 
Special Medical Needs 
(No or Yes) 
-0.04 (-0.17, 0.08) - - - 
Special Medical Needs 
x Total Social 
Cohesion 
- 0.13 (0.05, 0.21) 0.23 (0.04, 0.42) 0.35 
Special Medical Needs 
x Neighbor’s 
Evacuation 
- -0.62 (-0.74, -0.51) -0.48 (-0.87, -0.09) 0.49 
Special Medical Needs 
x No. of Local Friends 
& Family 
- -0.06 (-0.14, 0.02) 0.04 (-0.17, 0.26) 0.37 
Special Medical Needs 
x Prepared Property 
- 0.01 (-0.07, 0.09) -0.16 (-0.39, 0.07) 0.25 
Special Medical Needs 
x Volunteer 
- 0.14 (0.05, 0.23) -0.17 (-0.61, 0.27) 0.18 
Special Medical Needs 
x Church 
- 0.11 (0.03, 0.20) 0.09 (-0.13, 0.32) 0.88 
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